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ART. I.—DR. BUSH ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE
DEAD.

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The preparation of this article was suggested by the re-reading of a somewhat remarkable production, entitled "Anastasis; or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead," by the late Rev. Dr. Bush, Professor of Hebrew in the New York City University. The fact that this work was written and given to the public some thirty years ago, might seem to render a notice of it inappropriate. The work, however, is of such a character as eminently to merit attention; and the circumstance that of late the name of the sainted author has become somewhat prominently associated with that of the eccentric, but learned and genial Baron Swedenborg, may serve as an additional inducement to take up the general subject of the resurrection in connection with the work referred to above. We may also further state that the author once occupied a prominent position in the American Church, as Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Literature in one of its oldest and most renowned institutions. He was, besides, very favorably known as the author of a number of learned and popular works, such as his "Notes" on the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, and other books of the Bible, "Il-

illustrations of the Holy Scriptures," the "Hierophant," and other like productions.

The particular work which we propose to make the basis of some friendly criticisms, is, beyond all question, an able and interesting production. The subject itself is of prime importance to the Church of Christ, and the antagonistic position which the work occupies, relative to the commonly received opinions and established views of the Christian public, renders it eminently worthy of notice. Whatever may be thought of the general doctrine propounded in the book, and of the peculiar sentiments advanced and strenuously advocated, by the sainted author, surely no one can think lightly either of the subject itself, or of the very able and interesting manner in which the subject is treated. The author's ability and thorough scholarship are undoubted; and the earnest and amiable spirit which characterizes the discussion is worthy of the highest regard. He is also equally honest and open-hearted. He does not wish to shirk the solemn responsibility which the task involves, nor does he attempt to conceal the real question at issue, or seek to gain his point under cover of unfair and delusive statements. Already in the Preface to the book he announces clearly and distinctly the divergent conclusions to which the course of his peculiar reasoning conducts him, and he hesitates not to confess that these conclusions are utterly and irreconcilably at variance with the commonly received opinions in regard to the subject under discussion. On this point we cite the following passage: "It is certain that the conclusions to which I have arrived, and which will be found embodied in the ensuing pages, must, if built upon sound premises, present the grand future under an entirely new aspect. The resurrection of the body, if my reasonings and expositions are well-founded, is not a doctrine of revelation." (P. 3.)

Dr. Bush keenly feels the solemnity of this announcement, and is fully aware of the shock which it must produce on the minds of those whose cherished and consoling views are thus openly assailed; and, in the way of justifying his course, and obviating the charge of rudeness, he says: "If anything can be cited in the way of apology for thus going against the prevalent views of the Christian world on an important point of doctrine, it is the establishment of the principle, maintained in my introduction, of the *pro-*

gressive development of Scriptural truth. This principle I believe to be a sound one, and under its tutelage my conclusions must take shelter." The author's conviction of the soundness of his position, as well as the legitimacy and practical importance of his conclusions, appears to be strong and decided. Hence he immediately adds: "On a candid review of the whole subject, I cannot divest myself of the impression that both my premises and my conclusions are sound. If so, let it not be thought strange that my solicitude for the result embraces my readers as well as myself. Truth has the same claims upon them that it has upon me. As it must be necessarily a matter of serious moment with me to propagate that which is false, so it cannot be a thing of light import with them to reject that which is true. * * * No candid mind, therefore, can fail to appreciate the earnestness with which I enter my protest against the hasty verdict of mere prejudice and preconception. Putting, as I do, everything at stake on the score of reputation, influence, usefulness, and temporal well-being, I feel that I have a right to be heard in defense of conclusions so fraught with weal or woe to their author. When such a hearing can be secured on the part of enlightened minds, I cannot say that I cherish much concern as to the issue." (Pp. 4-5.)

These last statements the author professedly makes in view of the fact, that, as regards the practical influence of his theory, it does not in the least tend to unsettle the faith or subvert the hopes of the Christian world, and hence need not create any special alarm on this head. He says very feelingly: "If I could deem myself to have come forth as an opponent to the great truth involved in the doctrine of the resurrection—if I had invaded in a ruthless way the faith of a future life, of immortality, of retribution—I might have stronger motives for seeking to soften the sentence which I could not hope to avoid. But it is not in this character that I claim to appear before the tribunal of the Christian public. There is nothing *destructive* in the bearings of the theory here presented. I have advanced nothing that is intrinsically calculated to weaken the force of the great moral sanctions of the Gospel. I leave the sublime announcements of the resurrection—the Judgment—Heaven—Hell—clothed with all their essential practical potency, as doctrines of revelation, though placed, as I trust, upon

their true foundation, and eliminated from the mixtures of long adhering error. I may venture then to say, that whatever sentiments of repugnance the views here broached may encounter *in limine*, they will arise rather from the *hearsay results* which I have announced, than from a calm and candid scanning of the entire argument. The issue of this, I am confident, will be a far more elevated and satisfying view of man's ulterior destiny, than that which is afforded by the common construction of the subjects I have treated. The theory of the resurrection here announced, while it perfectly obviates the objections from reason, clothes the Scripture statements with a new interest, from the bare fact that they are seen to be capable of uttering their oracles in harmony with the dicta of science and philosophy." (Pp. 5-6.)

The author also very properly deprecates any harsh and hasty judgment, on the ground that his views, as any one may see, coincide to some extent with the views of Baron Swedenborg. He feels that such a discovery will most likely expose him to suspicion, and put him in an unfavorable light before the public. Hence, after claiming the indulgence of his readers for some probable "lapses of statement—some errors of reasoning—some faults of exposition"—he adds: "Especially would I express the hope that the avowed substantial identity of the theory with that of Swedenborg may not operate to the undue disparagement of the whole work. That I have been here and there indebted to Mr. Noble's able and interesting 'Appeal in Behalf of the Views of the Eternal World and State held by the New Jerusalem Church,' will be seen from the several quotations made from it; but I here repeat that my main results have been arrived at by a purely independent process. But the course of argument pursued by that writer I regard as sound and successful; and neither my convictions nor my habits allow me to consider the force of truth as neutralized by being found in connection with incidental errors. As to the claim of Swedenborg to have received his doctrine on this or other points by a supernatural illumination, I have nothing to say. The acquaintance I have been led to form with his character and writings, have inspired me, on the whole, with sentiments of respect for the man, while, at the same time, the very principle which he so strenuously inculcates, of admitting no evidence but that which satisfies

the reason, prevents me from acceding to many of his leading views, particularly in the interpretation of Scripture." (P. 6.)

The author claims preference for his theory on the ground of certain practical advantages which it is supposed to possess over the common view. Whether or not this claim is sound and legitimate, we leave to the intelligent reader to judge. The passage referred to is as follows: "It can scarcely be necessary to remark, that the theory of the resurrection, disclosed in this volume, brings the present into entirely a new relation with the future life, and clothes the subject of human destiny with an interest to which no reflecting mind can be insensible. If well founded it strikes an effectual blow at all those crude anticipations which would throw forward the awards of eternity to an indefinitely future period, interposing an interval of such an extent as greatly to relax their force as moral sanctions, and plants us in the closest proximity to the spiritual world, with all its unutterable grandeur of interest and power of appeal. The ordinary gross conceptions of the local relations of heaven and hell to each other, and to the present sphere of our existence, are done away with; and we look to the precincts of our own bosoms for the constitutive elements of each." (P. 10.)

In order to obviate the charge of presumption in venturing to advocate views professedly in advance of those ordinarily held, the author lays down in his introduction the general principle that the knowledge of Revelation is progressive, and that, therefore, it is neither wrong nor indelicate to insist on claiming for the present age scriptural and theological views in advance of those of former ages. The universal admission of obscurities in the Holy Scriptures, is, in the view of the author, sufficient to warrant any claims of the kind that may be advanced, if done in the spirit of humility and moderation. Every other form of knowledge being progressive it is presumed that the knowledge of Divine revelation is also progressive. This general principle, it is thought, no one will deny. Indeed the greatest injury that can be inflicted on the Holy Scriptures and the supernatural revelation which they contain, is to deny, in this arbitrary way, their infinite fullness and consequent capacity of affording ever-increasing measures of spiritual knowledge to the sincere and humble student of Divine revelation. Not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, will the saints

be employed in contemplating with ever-increasing delight and advantage the mystery of redeeming love; and, so far as we know, will never complete the search, nor fail to discover ever new and brighter displays of the divine goodness. If the study of the Scriptures be thus continuous, and the discovery of new and loftier views of divine truth in regard to the general contents of the Scriptures be possible, why not so also in regard to this particular subject—the resurrection of the dead? “That our collective humanity, like each individual that helps to compose it, passes through a childhood, a youth, and a meridian manhood, can scarcely be a question with any one who casts his eye at the page of history or the universal analogies of nature.” On the ground of this general principle, then, the author claims the right of looking for higher and more advanced views of divine revelation relative to the particular point under consideration, as well as in regard to all other subjects of legitimate discussion. In this connection he quotes, with approbation, the saying of Lord Bacon: “Let no man, taking the credit of a sobriety and moderation ill-applied, think or maintain that men can search too far in the book of God’s word; but rather let them excite themselves to the search, and boldly advance in the pursuit of an endless progress in it; only taking heed lest they apply their knowledge to arrogance and not to charity, to ostentation and not to use.”

The main discussion is carried forward under two general heads; those, namely, of the “Rational Argument,” and the “Scriptural Argument.” In the prosecution of the Rational Argument, he treats successively of “Objections to the Common View,” “Distinction of Personal and Bodily Identity,” and of the “True Body of the Resurrection, as inferred by Reason.”

The author having assumed that the principles of a sound philosophy and the general advancement in modern science aid us very materially in the solution of theological and Scriptural problems, deems it perfectly legitimate and safe to subject the doctrine of the resurrection to the test of enlightened reason. But both science and philosophy, he avers, interpose insuperable obstacles to the acceptance of the commonly received opinions on this subject. Foremost among these obstacles is the fact that our present bodies are constantly changing, so that they are never in exactly the same

condition—never absolutely the same; so that the body which dies and is buried, is not the same as that in which the soul formerly lived and acted. This is an old objection to the resurrection of the body, and is based on the assumption that the very same body—as to its essential elements or material particles—that formed the habitat or vehicle of the soul here, died, and was buried, is to be raised up again hereafter, and reconstructed into the resurrection body. He quotes "Pearson on the Creed," to show that this is the prevailing view on the subject. This writer, as here quoted, speaks as follows: "That the same body, not any other, shall be raised to life, which died; that the same flesh which was separated from the soul at the day of death shall be united to the soul at the last day; that the same tabernacle which was dissolved shall be raised up again; that the same temple which was destroyed shall be rebuilt, is most apparent out of the same word, most evident upon the same grounds, upon which we believe there shall be any resurrection." Further on substantially the same language is used thus: "I am fully persuaded of this as a most necessary and infallible truth, that as it is appointed for all men once to die, so it is also determined that all men shall rise from death; that the souls separated from our bodies are in the hand of God and live; that the bodies, dissolved into dust or scattered into ashes, shall be recollected in themselves and re-united to their souls; that the same flesh which lived before shall be revived; that the same numerical bodies which did fall shall rise; that the resuscitation shall be universal, no man excepted, no flesh left in the grave; that all the just shall be raised to a resurrection of life, and all the unjust to a resurrection of damnation; that this shall be performed at the last day: and thus I believe 'THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.'" (Pp. 38-39.)

Since our bodies, according to the positive teachings of physiology, are constantly changing, and we thus come to have quite a number of different bodies during our lifetime, our author finds it difficult to determine which is really and most essentially our body—the body that should have the preference in the resurrection. "If the language above quoted be construed in the utmost strictness of its import, it forces upon us the conclusion that the identical body from which the soul took its departure at the moment of

death, is the body the particles of which are to be re-collected and re-constructed at the era of the resurrection. But why shall the preference be given to these particular bodies, when, as is well known, they are often withered and wasted by consumption, swollen by dropsies, mangled by wounds, made hideous by deformities, curtailed of limbs, or become partially putrid by gangrenes? If the material particles of the body are to be re-assembled, why not rather suppose that it will be those which composed it in the period of its prime—in its utmost vigor and beauty?"

This difficulty, one would suppose, should not be deemed so very formidable, since the different bodies assumed to be possessed by us during the course of a long life, are after all substantially the same. The difficulty, if any, arises rather from the injudicious mode of stating the generally received opinions of the Church, than from the doctrine itself. It is perfectly clear that if we insist upon having the resurrection body to be constructed out of the very same elements, the identical particles, which entered into our body or bodies here, we become involved in endless absurdities. The doctrine of the resurrection, however, as generally held, does not require us to shoulder all these difficulties. It does not demand the re-collection of the very same particles that once composed our bodies, and their re-construction into the resurrection bodies; it insists only on the essential correspondence or substantial identity of the resurrection body with that which now forms the habitat of the soul. But our author finds still-further difficulties in the extensive chemical changes which necessarily take place in the material of our bodies between death and the resurrection, and objects positively to any and every supposed resurrection of the material body on this same general ground. We give his own language, so as to be sure not to misrepresent him. "But, waiving all objection on this score—the score of incessant changes going on during life—the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, in any sense whatever, encounters difficulties in our view absolutely insuperable, arising from the changes and new combinations which the particles of the dead body undergo in the interval between death and the resurrection. The putrescent relics of the goodly structure which once enshrined a human soul are dissolved into the dust of the earth. The dust springs up in the varied forms of vegetable life.

The beasts of the field crop the grasses and the herbs which derive their succulence from the constituent *material* of the bodies of buried men. Out of these eaters comes forth sweetness, and the flesh which was fed by the flesh of the fathers goes to the sustenance of the flesh of the sons. To whom shall these particles belong in the day of their final recall from these varied compositions?"

The same false and unwarranted assumption which gave rise to the former objection, we conceive, lies also at the bottom of the present difficulty; the assumption, namely, that the resurrection body is re-constructed out of the gross material—the substantial elements—of the mortal body that once enshrined the immortal spirit. This assumption is, in our view, wholly gratuitous, and does not fairly and fully represent the prevailing sentiment of the Christian world.

A difficulty apparently more serious and less liable to objection, is stated by our author, professedly based on the want of a proper and adequate relation subsisting between the dissolved earthly tenement and the future spiritual body to be re-constructed out of the elements which constitute our present earthly frame. At least the essential elements of the resurrection body, it is thought, should be at hand in the present organization, and afford some sort of prophetic intimations of what shall be the character of our future state. Analogies of this kind are found in every department of the external natural world below us, and would be thought most likely to be found in still greater abundance and perfection in the sphere of the human—the higher physical structure, related more immediately to the world of intelligence and will. The present order of the human world should be prophetic of the future, just as we actually find it to be the case in the world of nature generally. So thinks the author, and says: "We can easily conceive that a naturalist, who should never have seen or heard of a butterfly, might, upon investigating the inner structure of the caterpillar, and finding involved within it the rudiments of another organization, furnished with a curious apparatus adapted to some other sphere of existence—that he might form, at least, a very probable conjecture as to the mode of being upon which the developed insect would enter when disengaged from its present groveling tenement.

He would doubtless be at fault as to many of the details of the future economy of the insect, but he would still be able to give a very shrewd guess as to the sphere and the mode of existence into which it should emerge, and of the general laws by which it should be governed. In like manner, we see nothing irrational or improbable in the idea that a more intimate knowledge of the interior elements and functions of our physical and psychical constitution may finally enable us to educe the paramount laws of our future being, and bring us to a true 'Physical Theory of Another Life.' " From this work of Taylor, whose title is here given, the author cites a very beautiful passage, in confirmation of his views, which is as follows: "In every case, where a transition from one mode of life to another is to take place, the germs of the future being are wrapped in the organization of the present being; and, in every such instance, a well practised naturalist, in examining it (supposing it to have been hitherto unknown to him) during its initial stage, would, without hesitation, announce it to have in prospect another and higher mode of life; for he would discern within, or upon it, the symbols of its destined progression, and he would find in its habits certain instincts that have reference to a more perfect manner of existence. Now, is it so with man? We have already taken this for granted." So far Taylor. See the passage on page 140 of his work.

In regard to the closing remark and its application to the case in hand, our author differs in toto from Mr. Taylor. What one at least *seems* to affirm or take for granted, the other absolutely denies, and contends that the resurrection, in the common acception of the term, cannot turn back to any such prophetic pre-intimation of its future coming, and is utterly impossible except on the supposition of a stupendous miracle, in the sense of overriding and setting aside the ordinary laws of nature. Every other view, he contends, necessarily presupposes the existence of an intimate and *essential* relation between the present and the future body; but such a relation between the perishable elements of our earthly bodies and the living constituents of the future body, it is practically impossible to establish, or even to conceive. The existence of some mysterious vital germ, or *punctum saliens*, in the human body, which, it is supposed, will survive death and corruption, and form the basis

of the resurrection body, as maintained by some, is declared to be absurd—the relic of a by-gone age. But, even if the supposition were true, and the natural development of such a physico-spiritual body were conceivable, it would be entirely useless, in the view of Dr. Bush, since, according to his supposition, as we shall soon see, we already have a spiritual body for the soul fully formed, and ready to be eliminated from the present physical structure at the instant of death. Besides, even if a body were then to be formed, there is no reason why it should be constructed out of its own pre-existing materials. “If a man retained precisely the same body unchanged from his natal to his dying day, the difficulty would not be so glaringly insurmountable; but, even in that case, as the resurrection body is to be a spiritual body, it confounds our faculties to attempt to imagine of what use the former material and fleshly particles are to be in the formation of a purely spiritual body. Is it not as easy for Omnipotence to form a spiritual body entirely new, without reference to any pre-existing materials, as to elaborate one out of the gross component parts of a previous body? And is not Mr. Locke’s remark, in his letter to Stillingfleet, perfectly well founded, that ‘it would be hard to determine, if that were demanded, what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter which were once united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with particles of matter that were never united to it?’” (P. 43.)

The answer that is usually returned to the inquiry, as to what body is to be raised up in the last day, naturally gives rise to the formidable objections, which, in the view of the author, have not only been legitimately urged, but also clearly established in opposition to the common view. This, of course, assumes the resurrection of the very same body that once lived and died, in all its essential *material* elements, if we are to abide by the literal sense of the citations from “Pearson on the Creed.” This assumed resurrection of the same body the author denies, and asserts it to be wholly at variance with the dictates of reason and the known facts in the case—the circumstance, namely, that the human body is never absolutely the same, even for a single day, and that the essential elements of which it is composed enter successively into quite a number of other and greatly diversified bodies; hence the

difficulty of reconstructing from these widely disseminated and variously organized elements the future resurrection bodies of the saints. Adding to this prime difficulty the fact that there is no perceptible connection or organic relation between the two classes of bodies, the case becomes desperate. So, at least, we are told. "Now this, we contend, is precisely the difficulty that weighs upon the common theory of the resurrection of the body. According to this theory there is just that break—that huge interruption—in the continuous agency of the vital principle, which makes it so impossible to discover or define the *relation* between the buried and the beatified body. The latent link which connects the two entirely escapes detection, and yet it is upon the presence of this link alone that we can predicate identity of the two structures."

From the consideration of these difficulties which are supposed to encumber the common view of the resurrection, the author proceeds to discuss the second general topic—that of Personal and Bodily Identity, and the necessary distinction between them. He lays much stress on this distinction, and imagines that a proper understanding of this one point would do very much towards dissipating the mists of error which linger around and obscure the subject in its ordinary apprehension. "Without a clear perception of this distinction the true doctrine of the resurrection will fail to be grasped. When once apprehended, we are immediately freed from all embarrassment on the score of unceasing succession in particles. Affixing the seat of identity to the seat of personality, we can see the body wasting by exhalations and repairing itself by new accretions, and still perceive the central substratum of our being remaining unmoved, indestructible, and eternal, in the midst of all cycles of change. Something assuredly there is, which lives abiding and untouched in the midst and in spite of the incessant flux of our corporeal existence. In that something our personality inheres, and to it our true identity cleaves."

Whether this matter of the proposed distinction between personal and bodily identity is so vital to the question in hand may be reasonably doubted. For personality, as something purely abstract—separate and distinct from a living, thinking, and acting subject—is, we apprehend, of little account. Only when viewed in connection with a living agent does personality become a matter

of importance in a discussion of this kind; and then the same difficulties substantially, which meet us in regard to bodily identity, meet us also here. For, assuredly, no living subject can be conceived of as remaining always exactly the same. The soul, the seat of intelligence, in which personality inheres, just as really and as truly as the body, is incessantly changing, and is never for a single moment *absolutely* the same either. The saints, as to their interior life, are undergoing continual changes, and it is difficult to say whether, amidst the incessant bodily changes, there is not after all just as much of a continuity of the substantial physical being or higher bodily nature, as there is a continuity of the inner spiritual being or concrete personal life of men. For all we know there may be just as real and substantial a bond of a refined physical character invisibly subsisting between the present and the future—the spiritual resurrection body. Nor is it at all clear that so much stress should be laid on the presence in our physical system of a distinct prophetic symbol or pre-intimation of the coming future body—cognizable in our present imperfect state. Such a pre-intimation or prophecy of what is coming in the way of transmutations, and of the nature of these metamorphoses, in the world around us, is not always, nor indeed generally found to be cognizable to the senses; and yet there we see such physical changes and transmutations taking place continually in one way or the other. Admitting this fact, how can we consistently expect and so strenuously insist upon finding such pre-intimations in the case of our own present physical organization, in its relation to the spiritual and eternal world!

We pass on to notice the author's third or last topic under this general head, namely, "The true Body of the Resurrection, as inferred by Reason." His views in regard to the nature of the future spiritual or resurrection body have been already in part anticipated; but we wish to present the reader with the author's own definitions, and the reasonings by means of which he seeks to establish his sentiments. "The resurrection body is that part of our present being to which the *essential life* of the man pertains. We may not be able to see it, to handle it, to analyze it, or to describe it. But we know that it exists, because we know that we ourselves exist. It constitutes the inner essential vitality of

our present bodies, and it lives again in another state *because it never dies*. It is immortal in its own nature, and is called a *body*—a spiritual body—because the poverty of human language, or perhaps the weakness of the human mind, forbids the adoption of any more fitting term by which to express it. It is, however, a body which has nothing to do with the gross material particles which enter into the composition of our present earthly tenements." (P. 70.) We deem it unnecessary to say that this view, if strictly followed out to its ultimate consequences, strikes a death-blow at the doctrine of the resurrection as usually apprehended and taught. Indeed, the author feels this himself, and shrinks not from shouldering the dread responsibility of the announcement. After trying to explain his statements and to justify his course, he says: "We cannot be unconscious, however, that we must here be prepared to encounter the query, whether, upon the view now presented, the doctrine of the resurrection does not in fact resolve itself simply into the doctrine of immortality—whether it does not in reality exclude the present corporeal fabric from any participation in the resurrection, and virtually abolish the distinction, *as usually conceived*, between soul and body in the future life? A fair question, doubtless, in reply to which our first remark is, that if our previous train of reasoning be sound and unimpeachable, and if this be the natural, obvious, and inevitable sequence which is forced upon us, we see not why we should shrink from it. But, secondly, we observe that on no subject in the whole circle of human knowledge are we more in the dark than in regard to what is usually termed the *soul*. It is common to speak on this subject as if the soul were mere abstract thought—pure intellection—capable of subsisting in another world in the most absolute and isolated state, without any kind of connection with any sort of body. But is thought substance? In order to thought must there not be something which thinks?—something of which thought is the attribute, and not the essence? While our reason assures us that the power of thought does not pertain to the gross physical fabric which remains when the inhabiting spirit has taken its flight, we are still unable to resist the impression that it does inhere in *something* which goes forth at the same time with the vital principle, and that *something* we believe cannot be disconnected from the *ψυχή*—*psyche*." Acknow-

ledging our general ignorance of the mysteries of nature—the potent agencies which are everywhere at work—the author says: “But science has reached results which certainly warrant the conclusion that all nature is pervaded by these active energies, and that we are living and moving in the midst of elements which directly take hold of the inner vitalities of our being, and from the action of which a spiritual body may be developed by established laws, as soon as the present tenement is forsaken by its informing principle. To the question whether such a body shall be material or immaterial, we may pledge ourselves to return an answer, when the naturalist shall inform us whether light is material or immaterial; whether electricity, electro-magnetism, caloric, and the principle of gravitation, are material or immaterial; in regard to which no one is at present prepared to affirm either the one or the other. (Pp. 70–74.)

We have already given sufficient extracts to show the general drift of the author's views; but, in order to do him full justice, we yet transcribe the following passages in which he more accurately defines his idea of the spiritual body, and points out the relation of the present—rational—to the scriptural argument, on which he is about to enter. “It would seem, then, upon the whole, from a collation of all the grounds on which an opinion is to be formed, that the judgment of reason would be, *that a spiritual body is developed at death*. By *spiritual*, in this connection, we mean refined, subtle, ethereal, sublimated. By the development of a spiritual body, we mean the disengagement—the extrication—of that psychical part of our nature, with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as the Greek *ψυχὴ*, or *sensitive principle*, differs from *νοῦς*, the *self-conscious intelligence*. It is a *tertium quid*—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body. It is indeed invisible; but so are many of the mightiest agencies in nature, and so are many of the noblest entities in the ranks of created beings.” (P. 78.)

And so further on, summing up this part of his subject, he says: “It will have been seen, from the tenor of the preceding pages, that the argument from reason leads by fair and unforced inference

to the conclusion, that the true doctrine of the resurrection is that of the development of a spiritual body at death from the bodies which we now inhabit. It now remains to inquire what countenance this view of the subject receives from an equally fair and blameless interpretation of the canon of Scripture. If the teachings of the divine volume array themselves so unequivocally and inexorably against the conclusions to which we are brought by the argument from reason, that we can by no process of conciliation harmonize the two, undoubtedly we are required to abide by the Scriptural decision, whatever violence it may seem to do to our rational deductions." (Pp. 84-85.)

In conducting the Scriptural argument, our author carefully and critically examines all the passages, both in the Old and the New Testament, which are usually adduced as bearing on the subject. In trying to break the force of an argument, or to bring a particular passage to favor his own view, he frequently re-translates, and gives what he terms a more correct version of the original. His expositions are sometimes plausible and convincing—at other times horribly distorted, far-fetched, and unnatural. Before proceeding to the examination of particular passages, he furnishes a short chapter on what he styles ONOMATOLOGY; OR, DEFINITION OF TERMS. In order to prepare his readers for the coming exposition, he says at the very opening of this chapter, that since "the intimations in the Old Testament of the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body* are at best extremely dubious, so the occurrence of corresponding terms by which to express it is in proportion but little to be looked for. As the idea, however, of such a resurrection is not unknown to the Jewish writers, there are one or two phrases which are by them somewhat familiarly and technically applied to it. The principal of these are *tekoamah* and *teheyah*, the former derived from *koom*, to stand up, and the latter from *hayah*, to live. To the former the Greek word *στάσις* or *ἀνάστασις*, standing or standing again, corresponds; to the latter, *ἀναβίωσις* or *ζωοποίησις*, revivification or reviviscence. The use of *tekoamah* in this sense is probably to be traced in the main to Ps. i: 5, where it is said, 'the ungodly shall not stand—*yakumoo*—in judgment,' which many of the Rabbins understand as equivalent to a denial that the wicked shall rise at the last day. The current Hebrew term for *resuscitate* or *vivify* is

hayah, in the Piel or causative form, a pertinent instance of which occurs in Hos. vi: 2, where, in fact, both terms are met with 'After two days will he *revive us*—*yechyenu*; in the third day he will *raise us up*—*yekimenu*, and we shall *live*—*nichyeh*—in his sight.' Hence the phrase *tehayyath hammethim*—*quickening of the dead*, is of familiar use in the Rabbinical writings, and traceable to a variety of passages, which, though conveying the sense of a spiritual or allegorical revival only, they have generally interpreted according to the strictness of the letter, and built upon them the tenet of a corporeal resurrection." (Pp. 94-95.)

From the tenor of these philological or critical remarks, we may easily conjecture the special use to be made of the words which have been here introduced and defined by the respected author. These terms he almost uniformly employs in a symbolical or figurative sense, as denoting the civil and political elevation of the Jewish people, and especially also their spiritual resuscitation in the days of the Messiah.

After this brief philological excursus, the author proceeds to the examination of particular passages. It is not necessary that we should notice *all* the passages adduced and explained. The principal ones from the Old Testament are those found in Job xix: 25-27; Ps. xvi: 9-10; Isa. xxvi: 19; Hos. vi: 2, xiii: 14; and Dan. xii: 2. The memorable declaration of Job is unhesitatingly put aside as having no reference directly to the resurrection of the dead. This view of the case is supported by a reference to the exposition of Mr. Barnes, who says: "So far as I can see, all that is fairly implied in the passage, when properly interpreted, is fully met by the events recorded in the close of the book. Such an interpretation meets the exigency of the case, accords with the strain of the argument and with the result, and is the most simple and natural that has been proposed." In regard to the passage from the sixteenth Psalm, he says: "The fact of a resurrection is undoubtedly taught in these words, and yet from the inspired comment of Peter, Acts ii: 29-31, it is clear that it is a resurrection predicted of the body of Christ, and not of the bodies of men in general." The prophecy in Isaiah is referred, on the authority of Mr. Barnes, to the restoration of Israel to their covenant privileges. It is but just, however, to say that "Mr. Barnes, in agreement with Lowth, adds in this connection, 'Though this does not refer primarily to

the resurrection of the dead, yet the illustration is drawn from that doctrine, and implies that the doctrine was one with which they were familiar. An image which is employed for the sake of illustration must be one that is familiar to the mind, and the reference here to this doctrine, as an *illustration*, is a demonstration that the doctrine of the resurrection was well known! The same position was assumed in the early days of the Christian fathers." Hosea's beautiful prediction, which reads: "After two days will he revive us; in the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight"—is referred, like that of the Psalmist, to the times of the Messiah. "That an event denominated a *resurrection* was connected, in the minds of the ancient Jews, with this day, or period of the Messiah, and that this expectation is sustained by the general tenor of their Scriptures, we think beyond doubt. But this still leaves the question open as to the *true nature of the resurrection*—a question upon which we shall hope to throw light as we proceed." The other passage from the same prophet, quoted by St. Paul in his memorable discussion of the resurrection, the author proposes to explain in connection with that place. (Pp. 99-130.)

The last of the Old Testament passages to which we desire to call attention is found in Dan. xii: 2, reading as follows: "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." On this language the author makes the following remarks: "This brief passage contains, more emphatically perhaps than any other in the Old Testament, the germ of the resurrection doctrine. It is incessantly referred to by the Rabbinical writers who have treated of the subject, and has exercised a controlling influence on the literal statements of Christ and the Apostles. It becomes, therefore, a matter of the utmost moment to determine, if possible, its true sense. The question, how far it implies the idea of a corporeal resurrection, will naturally be resolved by the results of such an inquiry. The difficulties are confessedly great which attend a proper solution, and the issue may still leave some points more or less doubtful." He renders the passage thus: "And many of the sleepers of the dust of the ground shall awake—these (the awakened) to everlasting life, and those (the unawakened) to shame and everlasting contempt." The following citations will give the reader an idea of the solution proposed. "(1) The 'awaking' is evidently predi-

cated of the 'many,' and not of the whole. It will be observed that the phrase is not 'many,' in the absolute sense, which might perhaps be understood of all, but 'many of,' which plainly conveys the idea of restriction, distinguishing a part from the whole. (2) The true sense of the original *elleh—ve-elleh*, is not *some—and some*, but *these—and those*, referring respectively to subjects previously indicated. By the former erroneous rendering a distinction is constituted between two classes of those *who are awakened*; by the latter between those *who are* and those *who are not* awakened. (3) The usage which obtains in regard to the Hebrew term *kutz*=*yakatz* awake, confirms this view. This term, in such a connection, does not well admit of being taken in any but a good sense. The Psalmist says of himself, Ps. xvii. 15, 'As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied *when I awake* (*behaketz*), with thy likeness.' As the result of the whole, then we give the following as the correct explication of the passage, which will at once afford an answer to the objection, that the same thing—viz: *awaking*—is predicated of both classes: 'And many of the sleepers of the dust shall awake: these (the awakened)—shall be—to everlasting life; and those (the unawakened)—shall be—to shame and everlasting contempt.' This we have learned, since first adopting this view, is the interpretation suggested by some of the Jewish school, and is undoubtedly very ancient." This passage, also, with the events which it predicts, is referred to the days of the Messiah, and is supposed to describe what actually occurred during the personal ministry of Christ, in part, and subsequently in the course of the Church's history as carried forward from age to age by his chosen instruments. "While, then, we cannot question that the words before us refer to the cases of bodily resurrection recorded by the Evangelists, we are at the same time strong in the persuasion that they possess a vastly grander scope, and find their fulfillment in that sublime career of *moral regeneration* which forms so much of the history of Christianity from age to age. And it is doubtless to this text that we are to trace the origin of the phraseology so common in the New Testament, by which the resurrection is represented as a *resurrection from among or out of the dead*—*ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν*. This usage is very remarkable, and must be founded upon some sufficient reason." (Pp. 131-140.)

We shall now proceed to give the author's views on some of the most remarkable passages in the New Testament, which are usually cited in connection with the doctrine of a future resurrection of the body. Our main object has been all along to furnish an honest and connected statement of what the "ANASTASIS" teaches, and in order to do this fairly and effectually, we have preferred in most cases to let the author himself speak and define his position. We shall pursue the same course in reference to what he has to say on the teachings of the New Testament—appending, as occasion may be given, our own remarks in the way of explanation or criticism.

Dr. Bush, assuming "that the doctrine declared by Christ on this subject would be in the main a fuller and clearer enunciation of the very doctrine so darkly intimated in the Jewish Scriptures"—that is, the doctrine of immortality simply, or the continuance of our being in the world to come—finds it necessary to define and fix the meaning and force of the word *ἀνάστασις*, which, he observes, is most commonly employed in the New Testament to designate the future state, and is usually rendered "resurrection"—*resurgence* or re-rising. He admits that this word or phrase is "drawn from corporeal objects, and suggests, at first blush, what we may term a corporeal idea." He, however, goes on to say, that "it does not appear that any more is necessarily included in the term, in this connection, than the simple sense of *reviviscence*, without any reference to the rising again of the defunct body." Starting out with this sweeping assumption, he finds it easy to show, that, according to his method of interpretation, "the prevailing sense of *resurrection* in the New Testament is simply that of future existence—the future state or immortality." There is, however, one other term which he sees proper to define, viz., *ἐγείρω*—to raise—with its derivation *ἐγερσις*—*raising*. He admits, indeed, that "the leading idea conveyed by this word is undoubtedly that of raising in a physical sense," but thinks that its true import, in specific cases, must be determined by the truth of the doctrine, where this can be ascertained on other and satisfactory grounds.

With these preliminary statements and explanations, he proceeds to an examination of the resurrection, which, in the sense in which it is usually held, he flatly denies, on the ground, mainly, "that

it is nowhere explicitly affirmed in the narrative of the evangelists, or any other part of the Scriptures, that the identical natural body of Christ arose," contending that "the resurrection-state of Jesus was unquestionably the same with that of his glorious—pre-incarnate—or Shekinah state." We cannot stop here to state the different reasons which he furnishes in support of this singularly unfortunate and anti-Scriptural view. It is easy to see, however, that, occupying such a position, we virtually repudiate the incarnation, reduce this greatest of mysteries to the character of a mere phantom, and practically ignore the coming of God's Son in the flesh. He does not, we presume, mean all this. His greatest difficulty seems to arise from the strangely confused and inadequate ideas which he entertains relative to the words "spiritual" and "material," as applied to the body of our Saviour and to those of His saints. In speaking of the nature of the future or resurrection body elsewhere, he freely admits that we cannot positively and with any assurance assert that the refined, subtle, ethereal, or glorified body, as he chooses to call it, may not after all be *material*, just as we are wholly unprepared to define and fix the true character of electricity, electro-magnetism, caloric, and other substances of a like nature. He sees this difficulty, and is free to confess it; but practically ignores it. He finds it utterly impossible, it would seem, to distinguish between a grossly sensuous and a refined material, or physico-spiritual and glorified body. Matter with him is always identical with what is crude, earthly, perishable—essentially corrupt, and incapable of being elevated, sanctified, and fitted for the heavenly state. Hence he always speaks of the resurrection, except in his own sense, as involving gross, earthly, sensuous ideas—a view against which the whole Christian world, fully as much so as Dr. Bush, warmly and earnestly protests. That the Saviour arose from the grave and ascended to heaven in a spiritual body all Christian people everywhere believe and hold, unless, indeed, we make "spiritual" to mean something unreal, mythical, fantastic, and visionary. We cannot help feeling that with all his efforts to claim for the soul something more than belongs to abstract thought, and to clothe it with some real, substantial, and abiding vestment, as it leaves the earthly tenement, Dr. Bush is after all a pure Spiritualist—unable, from his peculiar stand-point, to grasp and appreciate the Scriptural idea of a future glorification of the

body. Hence he signally fails, in our estimation, to grasp the mystery of Christ's resurrection and its relation to the future glorification of the saints—our Lord being not only "the first-begotten from the dead," but also the glorious pledge and pattern of our own blessed resurrection.

From this general survey of the resurrection of Christ, our author proceeds to an examination of St. Paul's great argument for the resurrection of the saints, as this is made to rest ultimately upon that of our Lord. The fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians has always been regarded as furnishing the fullest statement and most triumphant vindication of the future resurrection of the body—the final glorification of the saints. Our author disposes of this elaborate discussion of the inspired Apostle, and of his beautiful and highly appropriate illustrations of the doctrine on hand, in the same easy way in which he disposed of other portions of the Scriptures, by an application of the same spiritualistic principles of interpretation which he found to be so convenient and effective on previous occasions. He can see nothing whatever in the representations and reasonings of the Apostle to favor the idea of a future resurrection of the body. In his view, both the Apostle's argument and illustrations are far more favorable to a purely spiritual resurrection than to that of the body. Referring to St. Paul's illustration of the springing grain, and the argument for the future resurrection of the body founded upon the implied analogy, he says: "We cannot understand the Apostle's reasoning, unless he means to affirm that there is something of the nature of a germ which emanates from the defunct body, and forms either the substance or the nucleus of the future resurrection body. But this principle we contend to be what the Apostle calls *spiritual*; that is, invisible, impalpable, refined, ethereal—something that is essentially connected with vital operations, something that is exhaled with the dying breath, or, in other words, that goes forth from the body *before it is consigned to the dust*—for, after the body has mouldered away in the grave, we perceive not how any germ or embryo is ever to emanate from it. With our present light we must believe that the only germ in the human body answering to the germ in the plant, and upon which the Apostle's comparison is built, is *the spiritual body itself*." (Pp. 178-179.)

There are two or three incidental passages in the writings of St.

Paul, which, from their peculiar structure, puzzled Dr. Bush not a little; and required strong efforts on his part to give them such a turn as naturally to chime in with his spiritualistic views. Two of these passages are found in the Epistle to the Romans. One reads thus: "But if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." Rom. viii. 11. The mention of "mortal bodies," as subjects of the quickening influences of the Holy Ghost, naturally invests them with an extraordinary degree of importance. The author feels the force of the word "mortal," as connected with "bodies," and seeks to get over the difficulty by attaching to the word "body" or "bodies," as here used, a "somewhat figurative" sense, denoting, "not so much the physical organization in distinction from the soul as the body considered as the seat and subject of moral corruption, and thus set in opposition to the spiritual or renewed part of our nature." This may all be very true; but if the Holy Ghost—the Lord of life—thus dwells in our "mortal bodies," and quickens them, why should they not, after such an act of grace, be also deemed worthy of a still further sanctification and a consummated final glorification? Indeed, the author in his exposition of this very passage, partially admits such a glorifying process through the effectual indwelling of Christ in us by the Holy Ghost. He says: "This principle of divine life, thus infused into the soul which inhabits a body morally dead, will gradually work outward from its centre, and quicken that body also with a divine vitality. For, as this principle of life flows from Him, 'who hath life in Himself,' and who gave such a demonstration of its efficacy in raising up Christ from the dead, the supposition is perfectly easy, that the same power is competent to a complete spiritual quickening of the whole man in his saints, so that they shall stand before him as in the highest sense *alive*, soul, spirit, and body." We ask, then, if there be such a divine quickening of the whole man, why should not the whole man also participate in the glorious resurrection and the blessed life to come?

In the other passage, found in this epistle (Rom. viii. 23), occurs the phrase: "Waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body." To get rid of the force of this passage and the countenance it lends to the doctrine of a future resurrection of the body,

it is proposed to apply the term "body" to the entire Church—the collective body of believers. Whether this application of the term "body" will help the matter any, in the way of neutralizing or preventing its application to individual believers and their hope for the ultimate redemption of their bodies, we leave to the intelligent reader to decide. To our own mind the redemption of the whole body of the saints secures, also, the redemption of all its component parts—the sanctified members of that mystical body of which Christ is the ever-living and glorious Head. The other passage referred to (Phil. iii. 21) is very similar to the one just noticed, and is disposed of very much in the same way. It reads thus: "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself." Dr. Bush says: "We have here another instance of that remarkable usage upon which we have before commented, in which 'body' is used in the singular, whereas, on the common apprehension, we can see no reason why the plural—'bodies'—should not have been employed. From repeated intimations we are assured that our resurrection-bodies are to be of the same nature with that of Christ. Of such bodies is the whole redeemed and glorified Church to be possessed." The author, however, doubts the reference of this passage to the last times, and suggests that "even if the words be taken as they usually are, as having reference to the change that shall pass upon the bodies of individual believers at the last day," the Apostle may have in view rather "the translation of the living than the resurrection of the dead saints." But how this suggestion is to alter the case we cannot imagine. Surely the spiritualizing and glorifying of the body is just as easy and just as probable in the resurrection act of the sleeping saints, when the Lord shall come, as in the translation of the living. We care nothing about the mode or form of the process, only so that our "vile body" is changed by the power of Christ, and "fashioned like unto His glorious body."

Omitting several other instances, we pass on to notice the remarkable passage found in 2 Cor. v. 1-4. This place deserves special notice, both from a consideration of its intrinsic beauty and importance, as well as from the peculiarity of the Apostle's representation. Dr. Bush says: "Several points, having an important bearing on our theme, disclose themselves in this passage. In the

first place, it cannot be doubted that the 'house from heaven,' for which the Apostle longs, is the same with the 'spiritual body' of which he speaks (1 Cor. xv. 44). Secondly, it is clear, we think, that Paul expected to be clothed upon with this heavenly house *as soon as he left the material body*. This is evident from the whole strain of his discourse, but especially from verses 6-8; 'knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord: we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord.' How the "several points" adduced can have an "important bearing" on the author's spiritualistic position, we are unable to perceive. We may freely admit all that he says about the "house from heaven," and St. Paul's earnest expectation of being "clothed upon" with this house, as soon as he left this material body, without in the least compromising our view of the resurrection; for it is altogether likely that the Apostle, with many others, just at this time fully expected and anxiously looked for a speedy coming of the Lord, when, as a matter of course, the instantaneous change from death to life, from corruption to incorruption, and from the earthly to the heavenly state, should take place. But are we absolutely certain that no "clothing" or "clothing upon" of the soul can take place, in any sense, except by the putting on of the resurrection body? May not the regenerate soul, in the ordinary process of its sanctification, become so essentially invested with the garment of salvation, that, in the event of death, and its final separation from the body, it may not be left "naked" or "unclothed?" Or, rather, may not the rudiments and initial or elementary framework of the "house from heaven" be gradually and silently forming around the struggling spirit—thus laying the foundation here already for the future resurrection-body? In our view of the subject such a thing is not at all impossible, nor even improbable. And should we refer this passage to the instant of death, may not both the "clothing," and "clothing upon," mentioned in this connection, be but the preliminary investiture of the departing spirit—the garment of life and light—the spiritual habitat of the disembodied soul, fitting it for its blissful abode in the spirit world—the *status intermedius*—until it shall attain to its consummated "adoption," the full redemption of the body? Such a supposition

is not at all beyond the range of probability, nor is it unworthy of the blessed Gospel of the grace of God.

We wish to notice only one other specimen of this spiritualistic method of interpretation, in order to get rid of an unpleasant difficulty. It is found in connection with 1 Thess. iv. 13-17. This passage is extremely strong and explicit in reference to the future resurrection of the saints, and the stirring events which are to accompany that sublime scene. To render it subservient to his own theory and make it bear testimony in favor of a spiritualistic resurrection coincident with death, the author finds it necessary to give a peculiar turn to several terms or expressions employed by the Apostle. He says: "In the general interpretation of the passage a serious embarrassment arises from the difficulty of determining the precise import of ἀΐει—"will bring." To what does this refer? Does it imply that when our Lord descends from heaven, with this predicted pomp and glory, He will be attended by an accompaniment of saints who have formerly slept in Him? If so, the following is perhaps the view which is to be deduced from the Apostle's language: "When the Lord comes, at this crisis, he shall *bring with him* his saints who have slept in him"—these saints being regarded as having "previously risen," by making πρῶτον = προτερον, and translating the future ἀναστήσονται, "shall arise," as if it were a future perfect, to be translated "shall have arisen," so as to make them to be with the Lord in their spiritual bodies, and thus in a condition to accompany Him in His descent. Assuming the substantial correctness of this rendering, the author says: "What inference, then, more fair, than that these words, instead of teaching the resurrection of the body at the coming of Christ, teach directly the reverse? The entire stress of the argument rests upon this very assumption, that the saints who had slept in Jesus were with Him in heaven, as, otherwise, how could they come with Him when He descends from heaven? But if they were with Him in heaven, must they not previously have arisen, in order that they might be with Him, and come with Him? And if they come with Him, must it not be in resurrection-bodies? Is it for a moment conceivable that this locomotion would be predicated of men's intellectual spirits, separate from all kind of corporeity? How can such spirits be said to *come*? Surely if the sleepers in Jesus have

previously *risen*, they must exist in resurrection-bodies, and therefore must *come* in resurrection-bodies, as the Lord Himself comes."

This, it must be confessed, is a very bold and unnatural assumption, based upon a violent and far-fetched interpretation of terms, especially of the phrase *οὐτω καὶ ὁ Θεός*. . . . *ἄξει σὺν αὐτοῖς*—"even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with Him." Even allowing the validity of his criticism on *πρώτον*, as if it were of like import, in the particular instances cited, with *πρότερον*, we must still regard his exposition of the passage in hand as extremely doubtful and unlikely. The whole tenor of the Apostle's reasoning, according to our apprehension, is against the proposed rendering. The author himself seems to have felt this; and hence he supplements the statement of his own views as follows: "There is perhaps, a more unforced air of probability in the construction which makes the writer to say that, as God intends to have his people ultimately with Him, as well as Christ their head, so one great object of His second coming might well be represented to be to *gather home* his sleeping and living saints in one united company, the first class to be reclaimed from the power of the grave, in which they had been resting, and the other to be translated, which would of course bring them into the same condition with that of the risen dead. Accordingly, in pursuing the thread of the announcement, He may be considered as saying, that the first step will be to raise the sleepers in the dust, and invest them with their resurrection bodies. When this is accomplished he will immediately proceed, *ἐπειτα*, then—to work that stupendous miracle upon the living saints, which shall fit them for entering into a spiritual kingdom; and, this effected, both classes shall be caught together—*ἅμα*—in clouds, or vast numbers, to meet the Lord in the air."

This statement we conceive to be just, and to constitute a far more correct and natural rendering of the Apostle's meaning than that adopted by the sainted author. St. Paul's language does not, in any way, countenance the idea that the departed saints have already arisen, or rather that they had received their resurrection bodies at the time of leaving this world, so that the day of their death was also literally the day of their resurrection. Far more natural is it to understand the Apostle as connecting the raising up of the dead, and the translation of the living saints, so as to have

all of them together to meet the Lord in the air, and thus be "ever with the Lord."

We have now finished our task. We have had under review all the leading passages of Scripture cited by the author, and so explained as, if possible, to prove his theory of an exclusively spiritual resurrection, and that in immediate connection with death. We have endeavored to give condensed but faithful statements of his views on the subject of the resurrection itself, as well as of his explanations of the several Scripture passages adduced in proof of his peculiar views. We have appended to these statements such remarks and criticisms of our own as the case seemed to require. We repeat, then, that our task is performed, and our part of the work accomplished. We leave it to the candid readers of the *REVIEW* to decide as to the character of the book which we have tried to bring in review before them. We wish only yet to say that we consider the book a very able and interesting production, eminently worthy of a careful perusal, and well calculated to throw light on a subject confessedly dark and mysterious.

In conclusion, it may not be improper to observe that the latter portion of the work which we have reviewed, is devoted to the subject of the general judgment. But, inasmuch as this subject does not legitimately fall within the province of our present discussion, we shall not take any further notice of it than simply to remark that the author's sentiments on this subject are in full accord with his spiritualistic views on the subject of the resurrection. Both the one and the other are made to run fully parallel with the current history of Christianity itself. As he knows of no future resurrection, in the proper sense of that term, so he knows of no future or general judgment. To substantiate this assertion, and give the reader some idea of the author's sentiments, we beg leave to introduce the following brief citations: "If the anticipated judgment really coincides, according to the true tenor of revelation, in point of time with the resurrection, and the real resurrection ensues immediately at death, then all argument is useless either in support or denial of the fact, that each individual soul must be, in effect, judged as soon as the spirit leaves the body. Our sentence, in truth, is passed before our grave is dug.—If adequate evidence has been adduced that the resurrection, upon accurate inquest, actually expands itself into an unfolding process, covering the lapse

of successive generations, it is far from inconceivable that the judgment, when submitted to the same rigid test, may present itself under the same aspect; and that, too, without losing any portion of its power as a great moral sanction under the divine administration.—No article of any creed in Christendom is more universally and unhesitatingly held than that each individual enters at death upon an eternal state of retribution. Consequently, no subsequent judicial sentence can be conceived as reversing that which is in effect passed at the instant the soul leaves the body; nor can the object of such a general assize as is usually understood to be announced under the title of the 'general judgment,' be to enact *de novo* a process which has really been accomplished upon each individual of the race as he entered, in his turn, the world of retribution."

ART. II.—RELATION OF SCIENCE AND FAITH.

ADDRESS.*

GENTLEMEN OF THE ALUMNI, AND LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.—It is said that in the beautiful city of Venice, when the clock strikes twelve, the pigeons in large numbers come flocking in from all parts of the city to the public square, in order to be fed. Here citizens and strangers vie with each other in their kindly office, and the whole scene is one of intense animation and pride.

Not unlike this is this annual gathering of the sons of "Our Alma Mater," in order that they may share in the social and intellectual feast its munificent hand is wont to spread before us. From city and town, from hill-side and vale, and from all the various callings and occupations of life, are the sons our of "Alma Mater" here.

And whilst they drink from the crystal streams which flow from its classic halls, they linger also beneath its refreshing shade, and seek to live over again, if only for the short space of an hour, the sweet memories of the past. *Live over again?* Nay, gentlemen; for when, on the silvery wing of time, our opportunities, our pleasures and responsibilities, have once been borne into the past, they are irretrievably gone. By no effort of the imagination, no impulse of the heart, no feat of the will, can we call before us and again enjoy our privileges past. Still, memory, like a guardian angel, always present, may, by a power akin to that of the Divine hand, call to resurrection the *issues* of by-gone days, and minister in kindly office until a thousand or more associations here come crowding in upon the heart; and the sterner, deadlier conflicts of the present are forgotten amid the recollections of the past.

And now, standing as we do along the pathway of life, and stretching almost from its remotest milestones back to the very

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threshold of our "Alma Mater," it seems right that on an occasion like this we should select for our consideration a subject which, to some extent at least, has for us a common interest. And, amid the conflict of mind and thought at present agitating the world, we have selected as *such a subject*, "The Relation of Science and Faith."

Human life is confronted on every hand, not only with a subjective consciousness, but an objective reality. This objective reality finds expression on the one hand in the order of nature, and reaches our consciousness, by its laws and forces, through our physical senses. It reaches us, however, also as from *above* and *beyond* nature, as has been attested by the universal consciousness of the race, and, as the supernatural confronts us, through our moral and our spiritual apprehensions.

In the order of nature, there is an adaptation and design for our subjective life and health. In the order of the supernatural, there is a power and influence which inspire the human heart with noble impulses, lofty aspirations, and a sincere longing and desire after something beyond itself.

For the *solution* of nature's problem, in its relations to man's highest physical destiny, we have especially the physical sciences.

And for the solution of the problem of man's relations to the supernatural, we have, reaching out from his deepest consciousness, the highest manifestations of *will*, in the form of intellectual Science; but more especially that supernatural power and grace, which is called Faith.

Now science and faith stand in important relations to each other; but are, *primarily, antagonistic*. The one involves the social and physical relations of the race—the other moves more especially in the order of the spiritual, and reaching beyond time, draws the aspirations of the human heart beyond itself, out into the order of grace. The one *attests* itself by the physical senses, and moves backwards for the realization of its consciousness through the laws which govern the *atomic* world, and here seeks the objective data which shall govern and condition its subjective life. The other accepts revelation as in the order of the supernatural, and aspires upward and onward, making the whole order of nature as subservient to its behests. The one came into embryonic life when our fathers first began to realize the significance and meaning of

these words—"cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee, and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." The other loomed forth like the first rays of the early light, faintly radiating and casting a halo, though dimly, over the moral darkness and despair consequent upon the loss of Eden; when God said, "I will put *enmity* between *thee* and the *woman*, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel."

The one is, therefore, *negative*, as to the ground of its necessity; and is the legitimate offspring of the human will, staggering and struggling in vain hope for physical deliverance from the curse of God. The other is the child of promise—budding into fuller consciousness through every step of God's dealings with His people; from the first moment of its embryonic life, on through the thunderings of Sinai—in every scintillation of prophetic fire—the songs of inspiration—the priestly offices—and in all the sacrificial types and shadows, up to the coming of our Lord.

Science, on the one hand, standing in the sphere of nature, and fretted by the ceaseless changes and contradictions incident to its progress, found itself also, as it supposed, under surveillance to the order of grace; and has shown a spirit of aggressiveness, which is not only antagonistic to faith, but largely skeptical. Faith, on the other, grounding itself subjectively in the will of God, became objective only as that will manifested itself in a self-authenticating way, in the progress of history. In this sense it is especially "the gift of God." And just as the will of God unfolded itself to the human consciousness, Faith laid hold of that will, and authenticated itself again in the spirit of obedience and trust. Thus faith is, within the human consciousness, that subjective power which binds the *spiritual essence* in man to the personality of God, and is at the same time the ground of all that is progressive in his spiritual nature.

But faith has also, from the beginning, shown a captious and exclusive spirit; and largely ignoring the order of nature, has been, in relation to science, a self-contradiction—now yielding a fascinating smile for every movement in the attempt at solving nature's

mysterious problems; and now again, recoiling within its own abstract judgment, has sought, by every possible means, to crush each progressive step on the part of science towards such solution.

The constitution of nature and the order of grace, the respective spheres of Science and Faith, are primarily antagonistic also. And when Paul, baffled in his heavenly aspirations, confessed that an incessant warfare waged its conflicts between the will of the flesh and the will of the spirit, he uttered a truth which not only finds a counterpart in the experience of every honest heart, but a truth which all history, echoing from the graves of more than six thousand years, clearly attests to all, save those who stand so completely in the order of nature as to have no conception of life's conflicts beyond the natural.

But, though primarily antagonistic, the mission of science and that of faith lead in the same path, and have ultimately a common hope, viz, *the problem of truth*.

What is truth? This is a question which has confronted the human mind since its first awakening in the sphere of thought. And having defied and put to shame the dogmatic struggles of Judaism, the intellectual developments of Asia, the philosophical and æsthetic culture of Greece, and the legalistic and forensic achievements of ancient Rome, it is not surprising that when God became incarnate and walked among men, He should have been confronted with the same question: "What is truth?"

Truth is *relative* and at the same time *absolute*. In the order of nature it is only relative; in the order of grace it is absolute. In its pursuit, Science and Faith, in all ages, have been assiduously at work; and especially before the time of Christ, joining hand-in-hand with Philosophy, and exhausting the whole range of human thought, vainly hoped for its solution. But *philosophy*, apart from a true apprehension of God's subjective character and objective power and grace, was equally abortive. Now moulded largely by the vague and crude scientific notions of the earlier ages, and now modified by the transcendental and idealistic character of their faith, it was at one time carnal and selfish, leading its votaries into the lowest scale of corruption and vice; and again, passing over into the ideal and mythical, so ignored nature as to turn it into a farce, and tangent-like, became lost, absolutely lost in abstraction.

Thus Science, in the sphere of relative truth, and Faith, in the sphere of truth absolute, during the shadowy adumbrations of the ante-Christian period, (even by the aid of the highest order of philosophical thought,) failed utterly as to any right conception of *the truth*. "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return unto the ground," clearly indicates a condition of subordination, both for the individual and the race; and now, in the light and experience of more than six thousand years, clearly attesting its realization in the sad strugglings of every human heart, leaves no longer any room to doubt that the sphere of man's physical and intellectual activity lies within the order of *relative truth*, and that of himself he can never transcend it. And hence, every effort, whether in the form of purely scientific research, or the more masterly strides of unaided reason, to solve in the order of *relative truth* the problem of truth absolute, has only been speculative, and fatally false.

And just here is the "Charybdis" into which many of our most eminent scientists of to-day are hurling themselves with a sad fatality. Proudly may we contemplate the achievements of Tyn-dall, Darwin, Draper, Mr. Spencer and others, in the sphere of scientific research. Their labors shall stand after themselves shall have been forgotten, as monuments of toil and intellectual greatness, and shall wonderfully assist in the solution of many intricate problems awaiting scientists in years to come; but just as they are great in Science, so are they also weak in all that relates to Faith, and their philosophical deductions, conditioned largely by facts and principles which address themselves to the physical senses only, are materialistic and false.

Indeed, up to the present, such has been the tendency of Science generally; and so it must remain, unless sanctified by a higher sense of the supernatural. Without presuming to enter the arena of Absolute Truth, but leaving that to be determined as a logical deduction from its observations, Science has been largely one-sided, and in all its investigations has tended to magnify *nature* as such.

Nor is this surprising! for standing, now, amid the colossal structures of inorganic nature, and tracing the results of its inherent laws and forces, as stamped upon the lofty hills and written indelibly upon the vulcan rocks, thousands of feet beneath the earth's surface—analyzing the simplest grain of sand, and then

tracing it in all its transformations up to the wonderful beds of granite, and there reading its lessons of attraction and cohesion; science has been overwhelmed with the grandeur and beauty of nature's laws.

So also, in studying the wonderful and complex structures of animal and vegetable organic life—whether from the highest form in man, and then down through the animal kingdom, with its countless modifications in form, adaptation and structure, to the animalcules, floating by thousands in a single drop of water:—or the vegetable kingdom; from the lofty pine, towering upwards until it almost penetrates the clouds, its sear leaflets catching the breeze and in mournful tones singing a requiem to nature's weary repose—the lofty oak, with out-stretched arms and deeply penetrating roots, bidding defiance to tempest and to storm—the ivy and the hyssop, leaning in graceful proportions upon hillock and rock—the flowering plants, sparkling in richest hues beneath the sunlight, and wafting their fragrance out upon the air—and thence down through the trailing arbutus, to the lowest forms of vegetable life in the mosses, and the mould of decaying wood; science stands in worshipful delight before this world of grandeur and beauty. And tracing at the same time the laws and forces here operative—from the most complex structure down to the simple or primordial cell, which is the ultimate form of all life product—its simplicity in form and structure, its physiological laws and forces, and its remarkable simplicity, alike as to its chemical and atomic properties, Science supposes it has exhausted the whole range of possibilities, and in its vain imaginations thinks it has here comprehended not only the *principle of life*, but the ground also of truth; and proudly exclaims, eureka!

But the primordial cells of vegetable life are so uniformly alike, that studied by the closest process of observation yet available for the human mind, the future development of the species may not be determined by these cells themselves. So also of the granular or nucleated cell of animal organic life. Its character is uniform for many species; and though, by the process of chemical analysis, its constituent properties are well understood; and by the powerful aid of the microscope, every modification and change through which it passes in the process of development is familiar to the scientist, as are the functions of the future organism itself; still by no

properties or laws inherent to matter as such, has the wonderful process of life been predicated.

No one, however materialistic, has yet been so foolish as to regard life, or the life process, as the result of attraction, cohesion, gravitation, affinity or even assimilation—for this presupposes a power and force which cannot be predicated of any known law or property of matter itself.

That matter, in its primitive form, is eternal, both as to the past and the future, is more than probable; for we may not conceive of the Eternal God, in His subjective power and glory, without an objective medium through which He is active. Still, in studying the life process, developing itself on every hand in and through matter—its uniform order and design—its gradation upwards in the order of a grand purpose—its relative and correlative adaptation to perpetuity, and its wonderful physiological laws and forces—Faith joins issue with Science in all its materialistic tendencies; and in a grand "*Te Deum*," unites with the lawgiver of old—"in the beginning," that is to say, in the beginning of the *present* order and constitution of nature, "God created the heavens and the earth."

But *Faith*, though born thus to a heavenly heritage, has itself not maintained a spotless and virgin-like purity before the world. Though essentially positive in character, and destined when *properly grounded*, to lead unerringly in the sphere of truth; it has been a self negation—now bursting out with the effulgence of heavenly light, and now descending into deeds of darkness. Now rising as by inspiration, it has led men to yield themselves as willing sacrifices at the stake; and now itself has become the spirit of a persecution, bloody and unrelenting. Now soaring aloft, and kindling with a heavenly flame the hearts of God's people, it has found expression in worship and praise; in architecture, in sculpture, in painting, and in all the æsthetic movements of which the human mind is capable; and now again, with a jealous eye, has watched every effort of Science in the development of man's physical and social condition; and has unsparingly hurled upon *it*, anathemas fearful and vehement. And indeed, scarcely has Science made a step in the sphere of real progress, without encountering its resistance.

Thus, in these long centuries, has the human mind in the pur-

suit of truth had a ceaseless conflict—"the will of the flesh against the will of the spirit."

But notwithstanding this antagonism, primarily, between Science and Faith, the whole order and constitution of nature look upwards in the direction of the supernatural; and never attain to any significance, until complemented by a proper sense of the Jehovah. And without, here, discussing the chronological order of creation, as usually and literally attributed to Moses; but presuming that he was dealing with general facts, rather than attempting any scientific exposition of them; the accuracy of his account, both as to order and design (studied especially in the light of the remarkable revelations science has recently made on this subject) is alike wonderful and grand.

Beginning with the vegetable kingdom, in the order of life; its process unfolding itself in regular gradation, from the lowest form of the vegetable—supplemented also, from time to time, by a corresponding type of the animal, up through a period probably of many thousands of years—was a constant struggle upwards, each stadium supplemental to, but dependent upon that which went before, until finally, it reached its highest order in man. And here again, with head erect—with beauty and symmetry of form—and endowed not only with wonderful physical resources, but incomprehensible moral and intellectual power and force, he stands, at once the peculiar and crowning glory of creation.

As the inorganic world unfolded itself in its successive stadia, as a passive nidus not only for the vegetable, but for the energies and activity of animal life; so the whole order of nature is but the objective expression of a power and force which lies behind it—a power and force which some of our most eminent scientists of to-day, (here only repristinating the views and notions of scientists many centuries ago) even in the light of much experience, attribute to some essential quality inherent to, or accidental to, the molecules of matter itself.

But Faith accepts no such conclusions. Standing midway between the finite and the infinite, it reads in every step of the creative process, from the first vibrations of "molecular contact," through every law and force of development, and up through all the wonderful phenomena of vegetable and animal organic life, an intelligent *design*, before which it bows in humble but grateful

homage. And transcending, at the same time, that sphere of intelligence and thought inherent to the physical senses only—that sphere beyond which the mere student of nature may never attain—it reaches back beyond the limits of time, and out into the eternal now; and as it is apprehended, so it apprehends, in all this, a power in no sense inherent to matter, nor accidental to it; but a power supernatural, viz: *the will of God*.

In our reference to Science, so far, we have regarded it as standing purely in the Order of Nature, as such, and conditioned as it largely has been, and always will be until it comes to assume a christological character, by facts and principles interpreted by unaided reason only. So also of Faith. In all its strugglings after truth, and in the conflicts and revolutions which time and again have hurled it from its true path, it has been falsely grounded. Though in its very nature of divine origin, it has been in the past, and is even now so largely conditioned by the purely psychological attributes of man's own nature, that it has been intensely arbitrary and selfish. Now, moulded in the fashion of dogmatic ultraism, it is necessarily dictatorial and exclusive. Traditional notions and precepts here rise before the human consciousness as with a divine majesty; and the slavish subjugation of the individual will holds the energies of the human mind in such fearful subordination, that Science, and even the arts, tremble at every step of their legitimate progress. Here the dead past, with all its sarcophagi of obsolete notions, is held as if in perennial freshness—and here, it were sacrilegious, if in the lofty strides of astronomical investigation, or in the more humble, but infinitely more important researches amid the bowels of the earth, or in the physiological forces and laws of animal organic life, aught should transpire in contravention of the notions of the fathers. All such faith is stagnant of progress; and whilst it holds its subjects with an iron grasp, it condescends in no familiar greetings for the patient but earnest strugglings of the human will, in the problem of man's physical and social redemption.

Or, assuming the purely subjective character of fanatical *pietism*, it sweeps over the domain of human destiny with an arrogance and pride, before which the glory even of chivalry may bow in silent shame.

Here, Faith joins hands with Science in being largely human. The

feelings, the emotions, and even the baser passions, condition its laws; and the *individual* rises in self-importance until, ignoring all authority, he becomes in the sphere of absolute truth a law unto himself. Such, indeed, is the *rationalism* which to-day walks not only in high places, but is casting its venomous influence with an open hand into our homes, around our fire-hearths. It skulks nauseously beneath the captions of many of our religious papers—flashes with the speed of lightning from continent to continent—infuses its spirit into our colleges and schools—breathes throughout almost every line of our polite literature—conditions the type and character of our Sunday-school books—and, riding contemptuously over the *person* of Christ, with an air of arrogant presumption self-interprets His words and precepts into a fanciful dream; and thus human reason, if not a mere caprice of feeling, is the shibboleth here, in the sphere of truth absolute.

Demonstrative and inductive thought, as it unfolds itself in the province of *relative truth*, is largely conditioned by the higher and speculative functions of the human mind, as it apprehends the supernatural in its relations to the order of nature. And just how far the *prevailing faith* of the age may be responsible for the materialistic tendencies of inductive thought, as it finds expression in the observations of Tyndall, Darwin, Mr. Spencer and others, should be the subject for earnest consideration.

But for you, gentlemen, there is a higher and nobler heritage. Born of a Faith which is purely christological, the dead issues of *arbitrary authority*, and the ghostly spirit of a *subjective pietism*, sink alike beneath the plane of your observation.

As the human mind, shaping the destinies of nations and people from the earliest hours of patriarchal life up to the present moment, has in no sense been independent or absolute, but only *relative* in the various stages of its activity; so no nation has stood independent of others, or served an end peculiarly its own.

From the hour when, amid the tranquil scenes and associations of Eden, God said: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" human life was, up to the coming of Christ, a perpetual scene of struggling activity. And whether studied in its unfoldings, as finally wrought out under the *types* and *shadows* of Judaism, the intellectual struggles of Asia, the philosophical and ethical character of Greece, the pomp and military glory of

ancient Rome, or the baser passions of barbarism; *reciprocal* influences, wrought by invasion and conquest, by commerce and trade, gave to the whole *organic race* a restless discontent, and longing after something in the future. In this vain struggle, however diversified its factors, history was but the record of human triumph and disappointment in the effort at solving its own destiny.

But amid all this confusion there came looming up, like the scintillations of electric power, beautifully but faintly illuminating the distant sky, the rays of a slender hope from the memories of Eden, in these words: "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." This hope, by God's fuller revelation of Himself to His covenanted people, became to them the ground of Faith; but was at the same time also a potential hope for the organic race. And thus, whilst Faith in the order of God's covenanted relations to His people was positive, in its teachings, the moral, the intellectual, the social, the commercial, and even the æsthetic powers and energies of the organic race, if not positively at least negatively, were but one grand movement by way of preparation for the central world-fact in the sphere of truth absolute, viz: the Incarnation of the Son of God.

And so also from the first vibrations of "molecular contact" in nature, sprung into activity amid the realms of chaos by the will of God—whether in the sun, the moon, the myriads of stars; or in this beautiful earth, from its first evidences of attraction and cohesion, up through the thermal and aqueous deposits, the secondary and tertiary rocks, the beautiful crystals, and wonderful beds of metals and coal, the liquid gases which illuminate our streets, and in a thousand ways serve the arts, our alluvial soil with its myriads of plants, its shrubbery and its trees, and in the whole order of vegetable and animal organic life, not a law or a force, not even a result, serves an end for itself; but the whole constitution of nature stands thus in the order of development, and indicates a grand fact to which it has not yet attained.

Physical nature looks, therefore, beyond itself for completion, and complements that subjective energy and longing, inherent to man's moral nature, for the apprehension of the problem of truth absolute.

But in its interpretation of nature's laws, Science has, so far, largely failed of its high prerogative; and though it has almost annihilated space, and brought the planetary system within its range of observation—though it has calculated the nature and velocity of light, the density and structure of the heavenly bodies—though it has demonstrated the nature and quality of the dew-drop which sparkles on the blade of grass, and of the breeze which wafts it again amid the sunbeams—though it has satisfactorily accounted for the phenomena of the winds and tides, and caused the gulf stream to yield up the secret of its mysterious march—though science *has* taken the lightning in its hand, and belting the earth with its silvery flash, has caused continent to embrace continent in familiar grasp—and though it has traversed the whole range of vegetable and animal organic life, and unfolded their mysteries as a scroll—in all this, no real achievement has yet been made here towards the solution of the problem of man's true destiny. The conflict between progress and decay is steadily at work, and until Science reaches out beyond itself, acknowledging its subordination, as in the sphere of relative truth only, and apprehends, as does Faith, in the supernatural, the *ground* for its observations, it must utterly fail in comprehending the significance or meaning of nature's laws. God manifest in the flesh, is the glorious hope of struggling nature, and the solution also of the problems of truth relative and truth absolute. Here is a revelation, answering at once the highest demands of Science and of Faith. In the order of nature, and yet infinitely above it—a mystery, and yet a reality—the finite and the infinite in organic union—Christ stands as the central fact for all history. In the constitution of His person—in the calm and even tenor of His life—and in His majestic control over the ordinary laws of nature, He not only invests those laws with significance and meaning, but is at once also the interpretation of every positive force in nature, from the earliest moment of "molecular movement," up to the consummation of its perfection, in the grand and incomprehensible phenomena of dynamic and intellectual force, in the order of human organic life.

Here then, in the person of Christ, as the embodiment of the Divine and human, is not only the ground and source of true Faith, but the perfection of all that belongs to nature. Here is the keynote for the solution of nature's mysterious problems—here the

ground for order out of confusion, and in the development of which Science and Faith *must cease* to be antagonistic. Here in this mystery, as it radiates its light out into the dark, and otherwise impenetrable future, Faith finds its subjective ground and objective authority—not as apart from nature, nor yet independent of it, but through nature apprehending the supernatural in its relations to the natural. Thus grounded, Faith ceases to be dictatorial and exclusive; but with a true charity, which reaches back into the depths of man's organic relations to nature, and with a profound sympathy for his purely physical conflicts with the world, it is at the same time positive and uncompromising in its apprehension of that which is above nature.

So also of Science: when it ceases to be constructive, and becomes more analytic—when it comes to interpret nature and nature's laws, from the stand-point of their highest perfection, as they have been apprehended in the centralization of the finite and the infinite in the person of the Son of God—it will bow its haughty spirit, and in worshipful admiration join in the angelic song, "Glory to God in the highest."

The highest order of perfection in the universe of nature, is found in the assumption of human nature by the Divine. Here all antagonism ceases, and man's *potential* deliverance, intellectual and physical, from the bondage of *truth relative*, is complemented by the embodiment of truth absolute in the person of "our Lord." "*I am the light of the world*," comes with a moral power and force, before which all speculative thought fades like the evening twilight.

Apprehending thus in the person of Christ the embodiment of physical and spiritual perfection, Science and Faith join hands in loving embrace; then start, respectively, on their missions. Faith, following "our Lord" through His life of suffering, catches inspiration from every noble deed—flashes into brighter consciousness under every word which falls from His sacred lips—lingers, in sad hope, around the tragic scenes of His death—and awakens to self-consciousness, joyfully exclaiming, "My Lord!" and "My Master!" as He comes again from the dead, walks among men, and then, in His human-Divine person, ascends to the right hand of the Father. Here the finite and the infinite stand in indissoluble union; and Faith, apprehending the *supernatural*, challenges

man's moral and intellectual power with the assurance of a destiny beyond this life.

Science, standing also in a right consciousness, under the inspiration of Faith, starts also—not in the highest “order of intellectual force,” as the result of “atomic vibrations,” nor yet in the complex but interesting phenomena of animal organic life, as the “unfolding simply of a primordial cell,” according to certain laws and forces “inherent to the molecules of matter as such,” but in the *grand world-fact*, God manifest in the flesh—comes at once to a realization of its divine mission. Here, Science, though standing in the order of nature, and traversing the whole range of organic and inorganic matter as the spheres of its operations, unfolds itself also amid the highest range of intelligence and thought, and aspires upwards for man's physical and social deliverance. Thus elevated by the divine presence, science not only unfolds the nature of the laws inherent to matter on every hand, but so modifies and controls them, as that they shall be subservient to man's true destiny.

In this *christological* sense, and in this sense only, can we ever realize the enthusiastic anticipations of Draper, whether in the sphere of physical or intellectual science. And, out of Christ as the centre of all truth, there is a *farcical bombast* in these words of another—“Away with that theosophic notion, that there is a boundary across which scientific thought can never step, a veil, which it can never lift, behind which the arcana of life must lie concealed forever.”

A veil, *dark as the impenetrable night*, does hang around the moral and intellectual apprehensions of man. But when Science in the sphere of “truth relative,” and Faith in the sphere of “truth absolute,” complement each other as standing in the person of Him who said, “*I am the way, the truth and the life*,” their mission will be that of true progress.

In the accomplishment of this work for Science and Faith, each of us has a personal and high calling.

God's eternal purpose will be solved in the problem of man's destiny; and if we are awake to our duty, well for us; but if in the spleen of unbelief, or in the spirit of a masterly indifference, “we clog the wheels of progress, we shall simply be *crushed* beneath them.”

The manifest destiny of the race is physical and spiritual re-

generation. And when man shall so apprehend God's physical laws, operative in nature around him, and embodied in himself, as going hand in hand with the higher laws of his spiritual nature, he will rise in true majesty and greatness.

"And imbued *only* with the sense of a glorious destiny, how will not the evils of our present moral and physical degeneration yield to the power and strength of a new heritage?"—and thus in the spirit of a true "historical development" rush forward to the realization of millennial glory.

The words of Tennyson in relation to the old year have a broader significance than he gave them; and with a prophetic beauty, sweetly in harmony with this general thought, sound like the ring of pure metal.

"Ring out, wild bells, the dying cause,
And ancient forms of party strife.
Ring in the nobler modes of life,
With sweeter manners, purer laws.

"Ring out false pride in place and blood,
The civic slander, and the spite;
Ring in the love of truth and right—
Ring in the common love of good.

"Ring out old shapes of foul disease—
Ring out the narrowing lust of gold—
Ring out the thousand wars of old—
Ring in the thousand years of peace.

"Ring in the valiant men, and free;
The larger heart, and kindlier hand;
Ring out the darkness of the land;
Ring in the *Christ that is to be.*"

"And when in future generations that harp of a thousand strings," now sadly in discord, "shall be found in tune throughout the whole range of harmony;" touched by the hand of God, "how will not this world be filled with music, and every power of soul and body be a song of praise!"

Angels, descending from the throne of God, will catch inspiration from this new earth; and with a song, like unto that when the morning stars sang together, will herald back to heaven the glorious news—"Man is physically and spiritually saved."

ART. III.—ON SPIRITUALISM.

BY REV. HENRY CARPENTER.

I leave to the spiritualist to define what is Spiritualism, while I accept the term in its common and popular sense. To attempt a definition, would be as idle as to give a permanent shape to a shifting surface of cloud. Is it an art? Is it a science? Is it a religion? Is it any or all of these? To me let it remain as I have ever seen it—a small isolated continent rising out of the sea of modern thought, distinct from art, from science, from religion, yet related to each in turn; like the Isle of Man, looking out on three kingdoms, and belonging to none. Viewed in whatever light, Spiritualism has been approached and treated by various speculators in one of two ways—either in play or in earnest. To discuss the practice, as a mere bagatelle, would be quite beyond the province and intentions of this paper. Leaving out of sight the frivolous drawing-room recreations of silly women and sillier men, I rather desire to follow the men who, often in error, are oftener in earnest than their accusers; who despise what is sordid, mercenary and mechanical; who chase through spiritual and super-terrestrial regions the illusions of a glory which they fail to realize on earth.

How has this form of imaginative faith been born among us? Dr. Johnson said on his tour in Cornwall that the farther he went West, the more he felt assured that the wise men came from the East. In the present instance, however, this new revelation has dawned on the world from the rich, wild wonder-land of the West. First of all, the European has been partially absorbing to itself the Indian element in America; and the Saxon in the process of absorption has incorporated into his ideas, language and religion, many of the half-forgotten and expiring beliefs of the ancient and imaginative rover of the prairies. The English settler on this side of the Atlantic has passed into new conditions of existence, under the action of another climate and soil; in some respects, here, and

there, he has become both physically and spiritually *Indianized*. In the old Indian religions, which were eminently spiritualisms, I have often thought we may discover one source which has largely fostered, if it has not originated, this ethereal persuasion, which has encouraged this bold advance into the spirit-world and the pretended commerce with its invisible inhabitants. Again, in every quarter of the intellectual world, science has year by year penetrated further into the realms of the unknown, has explored the secret depths of matter, has unfolded the law beneath the law, has lifted the veil of nature and shown the trembling children outside that what they had been taught to believe was the immediate working of the Divine Hand was after all some undiscovered principle of organic life, some unrecognized source of material activity; and thus the spiritual world has (so to speak) been driven farther and farther away from us, while the aching heart and bewildered fancy, shaken from their old retreat, have taken flight into more distant territories, unprofaned by the feet of such daring investigation. This unceasing and uncontrollable desire to enter every field of inquiry has roused many to "rush in where angels" would almost "fear to tread," to force open the recesses (if it might be) of the Divine secrets, and in a spirit of lawless and shallow curiosity, not to wait outside, but to try to peep under the door of that Holy of Holies which death is preparing to unlock to us all.

Another cause may have contributed to the growth of this real or fanciful faith; I mean, the decline in many quarters of a robust and healthy spiritual faith among Christians. The instinct of worship can never be wholly rooted out of any man, and therefore when religion declines, its vacant place is quickly filled by superstition, which is the base-born sister of faith. As far as may be discerned, these appear to me to be some of the fostering principles of Spiritualism:—the dying out of the Indian; the advance of materialism; the decline of reverence; the revival of superstition.

Though this may not be a problem of the first importance, it may nevertheless demand some attention from the sage and the priest: the Church of Science and the Church of Faith may fairly discuss its merits. How does it present itself to these two classes of thought? The former will prefer to review spiritualism from its mechanical, the latter from its moral side.

Scientifically considered, it is well known that until a law of

nature or a principle of physical force is properly known or ascertained, its operation has been referred to some special supernatural cause. The monk in his cell, with crucible and retort and the appliances of his chymic art, was pronounced by the unreasoning multitude to be a magician. Roger Bacon, and many more, once heretics and sorcerers, are now savans and discoverers. In many branches of modern science we are but infants at play, and especially in such as that of animal magnetism and elctro-biology. As soon as the principles of nervous life and physical sensation shall be more clearly understood, the wonder will cease; spiritualism will pass into higher science and higher religion; and the vapours of superstition will dissolve in the clear light of truth. How solid bodies can be made to rise and transfer themselves to appointed places; how human beings can be endowed with new powers, float round an apartment, pass through an open window, glide in mystic flight over a midnight lawn, as one spiritualist has been solemnly declared to have done, still remains for scientific explanation. Even this, by way of example, may receive a short comment in passing. It is now two or three years since a celebrated master of legerdemain appeared in England and attracted large assemblies by his marvelous performances. At the close he offered to his audience a solution of the vaunted miracles of so-called Spiritualism. By the aid of a very slight support placed under the arm of his daughter, he raised her body from the ground and placed it in a horizontal posture, and then explained how the human frame under certain conditions can be lifted and even propelled through the air, by the principles of animal magnetism and other purely material influences. There are few of us who have not received from eye witnesses the well-authenticated accounts of solid substances being elevated by certain magnetic action, and set in motion by a superior will, apart from all manual contact. Rather than dispute these statements, I will pass to a higher and more spiritual form of the same ethereal science.

Who will altogether deny the strange potency

“Of woven paces and of waving hands;”

—the mesmeric sleep, the far-darting vision of the seer, who, falling into a trance, yet having the eyes open, has described the distant scene and unraveled the secret, unfathomable thought. Rising into regions higher and more spiritual, how difficult is it for

us to determine how far the soul can release herself at special seasons from her fleshly fetters, and passing out of the prison walls of darkening clay, may escape for one bright, brief interval into her native sphere, in which all thoughts and things reach the emancipated spirit no longer as before through the dull avenues of sense!

Some say that gleams of a remoter world visit the soul in sleep.

How little is revealed to us of the laws which govern the spirit's inner life; how little known of its manifold and complete relations to the existences and ideas and suggestions which may visit the heart from the silent and shadowy kingdoms unseen and unsearchable by us, as men! The science of physiology has yet to be written and read; till then, what emphatic verdict may we pronounce on those unearthlike tales—the faint whispers from spirit-land, which come to us now and again, through the believers in "second sight?" Little as we know of the limitations which bound the intercourse of a soul with its Creator, still less may we know of the secret intercommunion which may be possible between spirit and spirit, soul and soul. To the vision of every devout philosopher of life, as he turns his impassioned gaze toward the hidden springs of the Real and the True, there is presented around the throne of the invisible God, a world with life more real, more true, more certain than all the passing shows and semblances which cheat and delude; and to him the universe itself is a hill of Dothan, alive with intelligence and power; to his eye, millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep. This will be admitted by all except by the thoroughly gross and materialized intellect. I might perhaps advance a step further, and assert with the poet and the priest, that there passes between ourselves and the unseen an unspeakable intercourse, silently and unconsciously conducted through Him who is Lord of Nature and Head of His Church, Mediator and the one living *Medium* between innumerable spirits united and associated with Himself, Who is the Beginning and End of all. And here it is that the man of science and religion must leave the Spiritualist, presuming, as he does, to discover new means of communication, and dictating the conditions under which such intercourse is possible.

It is well that God has invited us to summon even Himself be-

fore the bar of human judgment ; that he encourages His children to arraign His conduct, and decide on the dispensations of His providential wisdom. Be it granted, then, for a moment, that the boasted revelations of spiritualism were fully confirmed and established as being messages from the Divine Himself:—yet what, after all, is their practical value ? Look into the past history of the sober and real revelations on which Christians build their faith, and one prominent aim is ever present. Their object was to disclose in a variety of ways the will and wish of the Deity, to explain each attribute which made Him the Friend and Father of the world, to lift man out of the sea of circumstance and passion in which he strives, to gild the darkness of his present with the hopes of futurity. Not one of these or any other imaginable aim of a Divine revelation is realized by the pretended phenomena of Spiritualism. Have we learned one new hint to brighten the page of everlasting love ? Have these celestial couriers brought us any tidings to deepen the old impressions left on the heart of the world by centuries of evangelization ? What new paths have been opened to entice our tardy spirits toward a neglected Paradise ? Or can it be supposed that the Almighty has put up this new and hitherto unemployed spiritual machinery as a great supernatural toy, for the amusement and edification of a few refractory children, without adding to such miraculous displays of power a single new sentence in the gospel of mercy ? Is this like the action of a God ? The *media* employed by the Creator were men of superior moral power of deep religious belief, strong in their aspirations after the Divine. Can this be said in many instances of the “chosen vessels” of Spiritualism ? The gifts and utterances of the genuine spiritualists of yore were unpurchasable ; their revelations were made for one grand purpose, and distributed without money and without price. When is it that these latter-day gospels are not gilded with the gold which opens them ? They are not what Christianity has ever been, the open secret of God. Of what good are they ? If men hear not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.

Nevertheless there are not a few among professed spiritualists, who feel what many of their antagonists have never known—the insatiable thirst after the living God, which has marked some of the evangelists of this transcendental religion as endowed with other

faculties than those of the hireling fanatic and the wonder-working quack. For these, as for every devout enquirer into the secrets of heaven, is not the earthly temple ever open, its holy oracles ever clear? Is not every bush, ay, every tree and star, on fire with God? Why need we any further witnesses? He has spoken once to his Church out of Heaven. He is gone back for one short hour into the skies. Ere long He will speak again, not through noisy tables, drawing room planchettes, dim seances and self-acting pianos, (to the abyss with such miserable follies!) but in the clear and unmistakeable language of a healthy conscience He will speak to all who reverently approach Him, and to an age like ours, restless and fluctuating between hope and fear, and straining eagerly toward the nearer light, he will not fail to reveal Himself in the plain path of duty, not forgetful of His own invitation to inquire both night and day:—"Knock," He says, "and it shall be opened unto you."

ART. IV.—SOME LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FIRST CENTURY OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE.*

BY LEWIS H. STEINER, FREDERICK, MD.

Among the festivals instituted by Moses, in accordance with the direct command of the Lord, was one involving the fiftieth year, which was to be signalized above all others by the proclamation of "liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." Then the land was to rest, and the citizens were to return to "the social order which God had first established in the state," and at the same time to be made to feel that all had alike a part in the covenant first made by Him with their forefathers. At the close of the solemn service of the day of atonement, when the high priest had completed the ceremonies—at the close of that great day of humiliation and fasting—the air throughout the land was made to vibrate with the jubilant sounds of trumpets, and the national soul that had been bewailing its sins and shortcomings in plaintive minor strains broke forth in exultant shouts and loud thanksgiv-

*An address delivered in Lancaster, Pa., June 29, 1875, before the Literary Societies of Franklin and Marshall College.

ings. The year of jubilee was prophetic of that future jubilee, when the saints shall be forever freed from the degrading effects of sin, and thenceforth live in the freedom of the sons of God; but the Jews hailed it with joy also on account of its immediate present benefits, in that it was the beginning of a new era in the national life, when the errors of the past having been corrected and atoned for, wrongs redressed, restoration of privileges to those from whom they had been wrested made, with spirits purified and strengthened, renewed courage and greater vigor, they might more perfectly perform the duties imposed upon them by the God of Abraham.

While no divine authority imposes the celebration of such a year of jubilee upon any other nation, yet mankind has always found benefit in carefully retrospecting its history at certain fixed intervals; and deriving fresh courage and vigor from its successes honestly obtained in the past, has advanced to meet its future with greater courage and more confident hope. Such a period of national jubilee is now before this nation. It is about entering upon the hundredth year of its existence, and as the exultant sounds of the national centennial are ready to burst forth from all parts of the land, is it not fitting that our minds should be turned to a serious retrospect of the past and a diligent discussion of the prospects of the future? There is much reason for jubilation, for devout thankfulness to Him who has brought us through trial and tribulation to our present condition, who has guided us safely through the Red Sea of war and blood and the perils of intestine disturbance. There is also much reason for earnest prayer that in the future our greatest glory should consist in the fear of God and in the love of righteousness.

Recognizing the propriety of such a national jubilee, I do not hesitate to ask the attention of this audience, composed of the active members of the Literary Societies of a College, full of the enthusiasm and ardor of youth, some of whom are now about to enter upon the active duties of life, and to *commence* a career of expected usefulness; of learned graduates who have returned to the home of their Alma Mater with hearts full of love and gratitude, and who are ready to address kindly words of encouragement to their younger brethren; of grave and dignified Professors whose toilsome lives are devoted to the preparation of young minds for

the serious problems they will hereafter meet in the world, of the representatives of the energy, enterprise and beauty of this thriving city, I do not hesitate in such a presence to ask attention to a few thoughts upon "*some lessons learned in the first century of our national existence.*"

The elements which were gathered together from all parts of the globe to people and possess the territory now owned by the United States, and which under the assimilating power of the national germ were made actual living portions of the national organism, were of all possible varieties. They were induced to leave their homes by motives as widely different as their customs and languages, and yet from such a heterogeneous multitude was evolved a homogeneous life, with striking peculiarities distinguishing it from that of all other nations on the globe. No nation can rightfully claim to be the parent of the United States. Its life springs from a new germ divinely planted here and appropriating for its development whatever of energy, enterprise and virtue is possessed by those who are either by choice or birth enumerated among its citizens. Just as the animal system separates, in the process of digestion, from the food those substances that can be made available in the upbuilding and preservation of the body, making them by means of the vital power a portion of its living organism, so does a genuine national life separate from the host of those who may come under its influence such elements as may make it a full, living realization of the peculiarities of the germinal idea from which it springs. A new nation always springs from a Divine necessity, and not from any mere resolution or compact of men. A Brigham Young may secure an aggregation of fanatical followers under the banner of a quasi-religion, may invent customs and ceremonies, habits and modes of life, construct monstrous architectural enormities for the accommodation or amusement of his people, but he cannot create a nation. At best he is only able to keep the dissimilar elements together for awhile, until the palpable absurdity becomes apparent, and the travesty is too contemptible for continuation, when the process of disintegration—not of death, which can only take place where there has been life—becomes speedy and certain. The chemist has learned the complex constituents of living organisms, but his knowledge does not fit him to undertake the construction of such an organism. However far he may push his

knowledge of the material, he finds that there is back of that yet something beyond the grasp of his re-agents and the revealing powers of his microscope, which endows what he has discovered with the high attributes of life. Efforts have been made not only by Plato and More to construct ideal governments and ideal peoples, as those of Atlantis and Utopia, but time and again bold enthusiasts have even attempted to realize similar dreams in the founding of new nations, and the result has always been the same. The undertaking has been a failure. An aggregation of man without an organic oneness of life pervading it will never form a nation, can never attain a more dignified status than that of a systematized mob, no matter how much care has been given to the elaboration of laws and regulations for its control and government. The experience of some of the colonies might be recounted in illustration of this. In some cases the colonists came here imbued, not with the spirit of religious toleration, but filled with a longing for a government that would embrace only those who could intone shibboleth in their favorite key and with their peculiar accent; in others they started with a written constitution which could only have had a home and significance where a country had grown accustomed to the restrictions and limitations of aristocratic institutions. But the intolerance as well as the aristocratic constitution proved to be foreign to the national germ which was to mould the characters and lives of men in accordance with the Republic, destined in the mysterious dispensation of Providence here to grow up and develop to wondrous maturity; and hence they were excised as morbid excrescences from the body politic.

Mulford* has well said: "The nation is an organic unity; it is not an artificial fabric nor an abstract system, but it has a life which is definite and disparate, and has a development; therefore, it has not its origin in the individual nor the collective will of man; but must proceed from a power which can determine the origin of organic being. The nation is an organic whole; but the whole, in which there is the conception of the parts, cannot be determined by the parts, since there must be the predetermination of the whole to which the parts belong; but the whole cannot determine itself, and must, therefore, proceed from a power beyond itself."

* *The Nation*, 55.

1. This lesson, then, that as the nation is an organic unit, deriving its origin *from God Himself, and necessarily destined to exhibit a life peculiar to itself*, I assert, has been taught us in the century now fast drawing to a close. Necessarily the lesson was not learned at once, but only after long struggles, fierce contentions with foreign powers, and bloody fraternal battles at home. At first preconceived notions clogged all the efforts of the early settlers. They looked with greater or less affection upon the governments they had left, and clung with more or less tenacity to the laws, usages and customs of their forefathers. The idea of separate and independent existence was only attained after severe trials in the school of adversity, when they found that at the hands of the parent government they could expect no sympathy so long as they remained in the condition of dependents. Slowly the thought of resistance dawned upon their minds, but as it became clearer and more distinct, their arms became nerved to its vigorous assertion. Resistance implied rebellion and revolution, and to this end it came at last. A few farmers at Concord and Lexington, on the nineteenth of April, 1775, struck the first blow and kindled a flame that spread throughout the land, throwing a bright light upon the situation and making the necessity of separation, although it was to be obtained only through revolution, a stern fact which must be accepted by those who would be true to their manhood, true to their duty as citizens of a nation, and true to their God. In Philadelphia, on the Fourth of July, 1776, the idea of separation found its full expression in that grand Declaration, which Americans hail as the great embodiment of their first recognition of the idea of an independent existence.

Still even this utterance looked only to freedom from foreign control, to a confederation of associated states against dangers from without. It was devoid of a suspicion that a higher, national and organic life was here to assert itself, different from anything else the world had ever known before, which was to develop into forms strange and novel, and through a vigorous youth, manifesting many of the errors of that stage of existence, finally to attain to a strength and maturity that would place it alongside of the older nations of the earth. The revolution followed, and the system of government by which it had been clogged and fettered was broken to pieces. Rebellion against Great Britain became a necessity to the full devel-

opment of the idea of patriotism, and it ceased to be rebellion when "it expressed the conviction of the common people and the common will," and attained the higher dignity of a revolution. Says Rothe; as quoted by Mulford;* "Regarded abstractly, revolutions are always moral anomalies; but actually they are to be regarded as unavoidable, and therefore only apparent moral anomalies. For in human history, through the power of sin, the development cannot continue to proceed in a continuous sequence, but only through many throes and crises. The revolution, which is really the work of the nation itself, can only be regarded as such a crisis, which through external impediments becomes the condition of the maintenance of the moral life of the nation: and such a revolution therefore can only be justified when it rests on the living conviction of the people in its totality." Such a living conviction nerved the arms of our revolutionary forefathers, enabled them to withstand a long and exhausting war against the so-called mother country, and finally, under the blessing of God, to attain their independence.

But though the Declaration of Independence was based upon the asserted existence of a necessity for "*one* people to dissolve the political bonds which had connected them with another," still the oneness of the people was practically without recognition. Difficulties began to spring out of the Confederation, which menaced the prosperity that should have proceeded from independent life. Then was assembled the famous Constitutional Convention, in which deputies from the separate States were authorized to act for the whole people, and who formulated their conception of the nation as a unit in the simple but grand preamble to the Constitution they unanimously adopted on the seventeenth day of September, 1787.

We the *People* of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Whether the full conception of the organic unity that gave the nation a right to a separate existence was then even more than suspected by these statesmen, may, without doing injustice to their

*Mulford. The Nation, 132.

heads or hearts, be readily doubted. The full recognition of great truths is a slow process.

In fact two tendencies speedily appeared, antagonistic to each other—either of which would put an end to national life were it to obtain supremacy. The one, centrifugal in character, delighted in empty declamations on states-rights; the other, centripetal in nature, descanted on the necessity of a strong government. The former never appreciated the meaning of the declaration in the preamble to the constitution, never rose to a clear conception of the idea of the nation as an organism, and looked upon nationality as a convenient term to indicate confederation: the latter failed to appreciate the fact that the parts of an organic whole have separate and distinct functions, and that their vitality may be displayed in different ways, subject only to a general coördination and regulation. The former would have had constant self-assertion among the States, in order to establish the fact of their independence of each other: the latter would have destroyed the states, in order to gain an all-powerful centralization. The former naturally tended towards disintegration, the latter towards autocratic power, or what has been called "Cæsarism."

These tendencies have manifested themselves all through our history down to the present day; the strength of the national life has been shown in its intolerance of either, and the resolute determination it has manifested to suppress their predominance. When a party in power has shown a tendency to disregard the rights of States, the free spirit of the people has sternly rebuked it; when a gigantic rebellion was organized to overthrow the federal power and to establish individual state-supremacy, the people, by force of arms, put it down. Thus learning that Scylla presents dangers as perilous to the ship of state as those known to exist in Charybdis, true statesmen have labored to guard against both, and to steer along a middle course, as that freest from danger. The national life has been recognized as most prosperous when manifested in accordance with its own norm—when the functions of the federal government have been allowed their legitimate play, and those of the States such exercise as may insure their individual rights. The brain must not assume the functions of the heart or stomach, much less those peculiar to the limbs, if the animal organism is to be true to the idea underlying it. And similarly, the relative functions of the federal

and state governments must be performed normally, in that complete harmony which, history has shown, affords the most satisfactory exhibition of the true end and design of our national life.

As a special proof of the peculiarity of the life that pervades the nation, may be mentioned the rapidity with which the most dissimilar elements are made to harmonize when brought together under our flag, and to take on the form previously assumed by those who inherit American citizenship. Drawn to our shores by a variety of reasons, there are representatives of almost all the nations of the globe, disciples of all the religions cultivated by mankind. The assimilating power of the national vitality speedily shows itself in the incorporation of these into full citizenship. With some there is a sturdy struggle for the retention of their mother-tongue, for the manners and usage of the nations whose citizenship they have renounced, for the introduction of regulations and customs peculiar to other lands; but the result is always, sooner or later, a submergence of all these and the adoption of that which belongs to American life. The German, the Frenchman, the Northman, the English, the Irish, the Scotch, lay aside their peculiarities, become Americanized, and speedily manifest the national life into which they have become incorporated. We are an English-speaking people, but no true student can speak of us as in any sense showing forth the life that is peculiar to England. It is as foreign to us as that which prevails in France, Germany, or any other nation that has contributed to swell the tide of emigration which yearly pours in upon us from foreign shores. Our naturalized citizens speedily become as jealous of our honor as those "to the manner born." They rally to the defence of our flag when dangers within or without threaten its safety. They enter into the commercial and mechanical pursuits of our people, are found in the ranks of our professions and in the public offices of our country. And all this not as adventurers, but as citizens, who having sought incorporation, have become vitalized with the national life; grafted into the sturdy stalk, its life has permeated and made them parts—integral parts—of itself.

And this lesson has also diminished the fear that was once felt lest an influx of foreigners might be so great as to overpower and overthrow the form of government we have inherited. The power of remaining foreigners is really denied those who come here to

assume citizenship, by the national life they enter into. They cease speedily not only to be foreigners in name, but also in thought, habit and custom; and hence they add to the homogeneity of the nation. And such must be the case so long as the people of this nation remain faithful to the life which God has given it; so long as they honestly, earnestly and patriotically strive to keep the nation true to its real mission.

2. *The integrity of the nation being essential to the full play of all its parts, it is incumbent upon its citizens to contend for its preservation even at peril of life and limb.* What is meant by patriotism but that the citizen should entertain a love for the *patria*, akin to that which beats in the dutiful child's heart for his *pater*, his parents in the flesh? Lieber says that it designates "that sacred enthusiasm which prompts to great exertions, and has the welfare, honor, and reputation of the country at large in view," and is founded upon "that indestructible sympathy and attachment which every uncorrupted heart feels toward its own country." There is a pseudo philanthropy which demands credit for itself because it ignores any special claims of family and country, and professes to be alone interested in that which concerns men as men. It asserts a catholicity of sympathy that struggles against any metes or bounds to its active labors. But when it is closely scrutinized, and the practical results of its asserted liberality carefully examined, we shall find it is nothing but shallow pretense—a miserable fraud. As well might we expect to find true parental affection in one whose time was spent in visiting her neighbors' houses and in investigating their needs and wants, while thriftlessness and misery reigned at home—whose lachrymal glands were always surcharged with tears for foreign want, while domestic suffering failed to elicit an act of kindness or a word of sympathy; as well might we expect to see the full development of Christian activity in one whose time was passed in visiting sister churches and boasting of the catholicity of his faith, while the claims of his own church upon his time and energies were ignored—whose life was frittered away in examining and eulogizing the prosperity of the fields of labor assigned to others, while those where his own duties called him to active work were totally neglected. Fidelity to family and to church require us first to be true to the duties there imposed upon us, not only before we endeavor to extend our sympathies, but in

order that we may do so with proper success. And similarly does patriotism require us to labor for our own country, whether ours by virtue of nationality or choice, in order that we may fit ourselves for the wider and broader demands of a true philanthropy, which is as different from the bogus article as the pure metal is from the counterfeit which is only a miserable imitation.

But as filial duty to cherish and protect the parent is intensified where the life of the latter absolutely depends upon its performance, so the citizen's duty to strive for a healthy, vigorous national life is heightened when the very existence of the nation is dependent upon the possession of such vitality. Here then patriotism can at all times find a field for the due exercise of all its faculties. Its proper field is not that of pride or vain-glory, where depreciation of other lands and other governments is associated with undue exaltation of the nation. Indeed true patriotism has nothing in common with hatred of other lands, any more than, to use another's words, "a man who feels deeply attached to one woman among so many thousand thereby declares that he holds her to be better, wiser, purer than all the rest." True, the exaggerated phraseology of sentimentalism, which is at best but a poor imitation of love, admits of superlative language when the beloved is the subject, and may indulge in meaningless rant; but that love which is strongest and most enduring proceeds from *positive sympathy* for one, irrespective of all comparison of her peculiar characteristics with those of the rest of her sex. It finds its pleasure and its duty combined in its love, and is elevated by this feeling above the passion of indifference or hate towards the others. In fact, one cannot love any one object worthy of real love without, by that very fact, being made capable of appreciating whatever is lovable in the world around. True patriotism thus has no connection properly with a spirit of disparagement, but may indeed enable us "to value other countries higher in the abstract." And yet to our own nation we are bound by the sweetest tie of affection; for her our earnest efforts must be directed to keep her in that path which will make her honored among the nations of the earth, and when need arises to leave even home and kindred, and to peril life and limb for her. Because there can be no home unless it is under the aegis of national protection, there can be no security for kindred unless it be afforded by law. There can be no protecting vine and

fig-tree unless these grow up under the nurturing and fostering care of a wise, paternal government.

Nor is this idea an outgrowth of modern civilization, or a result simply of the teachings of Christianity. It is an instinct of the human heart which has been illustrated in a thousand different ways since the beginning of history. It was a heathen poet who sung

"Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,"

and yet the sentiment finds an emphatic response in every human breast. But when this natural instinct is associated with a justifiable pride in the proper performance of the peculiar mission entrusted to a country,—where the reason finds that the instinct is not blind in its attachment to an unworthy object, but gives it approval, then the arm is nerved and the courage intensified in the citizens who are called forth to its defense.

Have we not but recently illustrated the sentiment of the American people on this subject? When the integrity of the nation was attacked, and arms were employed to ensure its disruption—when the cry for help showed how great the need was for assistance—when the demand went forth that troops should be raised to prevent the success of rebellion—what was the effect upon the peace-loving citizens of the land? Did the farmer, the mechanic, the laborer, the inventor, the man of science, the student in his library, the physician at the bedside, the lawyer at the bar, even the clergyman in the pulpit, reply "the call is not for me; I have not been trained to arms; my tastes, pursuits and education have made me a lover of peace, and given me no fitness for war?" No! but on the contrary, from the length and breadth of the loyal States was there heard an earnest entreaty from patriotic lips that they might be allowed to contend for the preservation of the Union. And so a busy, money-making people were metamorphosed into an army, undergoing the drilling and instruction that all apprentices must undergo before they become masters of a novel pursuit. Through disaster and defeat, through the blunders of ignorance and want of experience, they toiled on, until at length came success and victory. They had shown how free men could fight for a nation's flag.

Should occasion ever require a similar relinquishment of the arts of peace for the toils and perils of war, we have the right to expect

that an equal alacrity will be shown by the American people—that the same patriotic spirit will nerve their hearts and strengthen their arms, as they form regiments, brigades and divisions in defence of the national flag. God grant that it may never again require, however, brothers to stand in arms against brothers, or that the people of this favored land be found on the battle field, except as soldiers under one flag, and that the flag of the Union, “one and indivisible!”

3. In order that every citizen should be fitted for the official positions to which he is theoretically eligible, it is essentially necessary that the advantage of mental education should be within his reach. The rights and privileges of citizenship in the possession of an ignorant man are as likely to be used to his own detriment or that of his associates as a razor in the hands of an infant. No prudent man would grant permission to a child to play with a loaded revolver; nor think it advisable to employ one to plan a house for him, who knew nothing of architecture; or to contract for any needed work save with those who were presumptively acquainted with such work. Trained or educated labor is demanded by the practical business man, and hence he invariably has recourse to those who have acquired skill by practice either alone or under approved masters. And as there is no pursuit, affording adequate reward to its followers, which is confined to a few, there is always room for some kind of selection among the experts. The fitness of the expert is a necessary requisite—should be the all-controlling one—to be determined before the choice is made. Where each citizen is eligible to any office, it becomes important that no one should be left in ignorance. All must be acquainted with the rudiments of knowledge, as all are liable to be called forth from the walks of private life and assigned to public duties. All should be furnished with abundant facilities for acquiring an education that would give them fitness for such duties when thus imposed upon them.

An autocracy or a monarchy may be indifferent to the education of its subjects, and may interest itself solely with the mental cultivation of the members of the aristocracy or the royal family, with possibly some few others who may be necessary to the superintendence of the wheels of government. Indeed, from a selfish stand point, they might consider education of the masses as dangerous to

their own security; just as the laws of some of the slave states prohibited instruction in reading to their slaves, for fear the latter might thereby learn something of their natural rights and of the sympathy which their wrongs had excited in the world—all of which would translate them from a state of happy, stupid ignorance, to a condition of unhappy, restless, ambitious longing to better themselves and to attain to a higher and nobler manhood. The reasoning employed to defend inattention to mental cultivation is as simple as it is unsound. It runs somewhat after this order: So long as the people are supplied with what may be needed in the way of food and clothing, so long as comfortable habitations are furnished, so long as they are kept *glebæ adscriptus*, their thoughts directed only to the natural wants of the body, they will obey the orders of their rulers without question or cavil, and will lead quiet, orderly, happy (!) lives. But all this is based upon the idea that "ignorance is bliss," which being admitted, it follows as a necessary consequence that "'tis folly to be wise." Then again, there is something calculated to charm the superficial thinker in the picture of patriarchal simplicity, where the ruler occupies the parental position to the ruled, issuing his orders to his subjects with the confident assurance that they will be implicitly obeyed, taking upon himself the care of all their wants and needs, providing for them in sickness and health, and giving them no object in life higher than that of securing his approbation and good will. But such a picture is a caricature of happiness. It is simply an exhibit of that which belongs to the infantile stage of human life, and ignores the right of individual thought and individual progress and advancement. An absolute monarchy, or an absolute autocracy, or even the prevalence of slavery, is impossible where education has given a taste of the freedom and equality which is every human being's natural and indefeasible right. They are detrimental to that progress and development in knowledge which should be open and free to all. They bind to the earth him who was made in the image of his creator, they restrict to the sphere of animal life and the narrow wants of the perishable body souls destined to survive long after all that is earthly shall disappear. Hence, irrespective of the form of government of a country, the citizens as human beings are entitled to every educational advantage that may enable them to rise above the sphere of the animal

and sensual, to learn the nature and uses of the forms of creation that were placed here in subjection to them, the characteristic properties of the forces of nature, the mysteries of the laws of thought and the wonderful facilities for expressing the same possessed by language. Only when the blessings of an education are ensured to a people, will they be enabled to make that progress in the useful or ornamental arts which will place them abreast of the column of humanity in its grand march over the broad plains of history.

But what is important to each individual, separately considered, in order that he may secure the best possible progress in the arena of life, becomes of national importance when there is no let or hindrance to his securing any position of authority which the suffrages of his fellow-citizens may indicate. Ignorance here is more than a personal evil; it is a public misfortune, as well as a public disgrace. No republic could survive if its office holders were selected only from the ranks of the ignorant and debased. Its law makers, its judges and executive officers, need that preliminary education which will make them able to command the stores of written knowledge, to understand the actual resources and present condition of the country, to appreciate such measures as will insure its progressive advance among other nations and to sustain in every possible way its honor and dignity. They should be selected on account of peculiar fitness for the stations they are intended to fill, and no man should be deprived of the opportunity of securing the intellectual training which will contribute to this fitness.

In full recognition of this lesson, the education of the masses has been a subject of intense interest to our nation during the last half century. While the number of higher institutions of learning has largely increased, and it has been a keen source of pleasure to men of wealth to pour out of their abundance into the treasuries of academies, colleges, and Universities, in still greater measure has the number of our common schools increased, until all over the States that are most prominent for their energy, enterprise, intelligence and wealth, school-houses have been planted, offering elementary instruction gratuitously to the children of the poor and lowly as well as to those of their richer and more favored neighbors. From these go forth every year those who are to control the future destinies of our land, and to protect the American name

from soil or disgrace. No amount of expenditure or care to make such schools sources of sound and useful knowledge can be considered too great. It is a wise, permanent investment, that must bring the most satisfactory results. The common school has already been the fountain whence some of our most distinguished statesmen have received the intellectual training that has fitted them to take commanding positions in the nation, and the American people are not likely to neglect in the future that which has given such satisfactory results in the past.

4. To prevent mere mental development from being used to execute wickedness, and that which will bring shame and ruin upon the nation, full and free opportunity must be granted, under the protection of law, to the ministers of religion to carry out their work of evangelization and moral instruction among the people. Mere mental culture, apart from high moral tone, will not necessarily result in honorable patriotic efforts, nor will it insure honesty and integrity. The cultivated scoundrel differs from the class to which he belongs only in his capacity to execute more successfully his villainous plans. All that mere mental culture can do for him is to increase his power of doing wrong in the community, to give an exquisite edge to the blade which he wields on the right and the left in pressing forward in his career of dishonesty and crime, to intensify the poison he naturally possesses so as to make it more fatal to his victims. "Whited sepulchres may attract the eye by their beautiful external appearance, possibly may not offend the nose if at a suitable distance, and yet they may be full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness." Similarly, the culture which has been wholly intellectual may command admiration for its extent and thoroughness, may charm the ear by its eloquent diction, and captivate the soul by the sublimity of its utterances, and yet be conjoined with a heart full of moral filth and corruption,—may indeed prove a very focus of contagion to a nation. Hence no culture can be considered desirable which loses sight of the moral nature of man. The true and the beautiful can have no abiding home unless when associated with the good.

But morality is unattainable unless in connection with religion, which is its groundwork and basis. And religion necessarily implies a recognition of some power outside of and above the sphere of humanity, from whence its precepts proceed and whose approval

or disapproval must be looked for in every human act. Hence the nation cannot be indifferent to religion. Says Lieber on this point,* "If we comprehend within this term all belief, true or erroneous, in an agent or agents overruling the actions and destinies of men, possessed of a power surpassing human power, which extends to the changes in the physical world, we shall find that men have never existed without some religion, whether it be in the form of the grossest fetish religion, adoring beings which do not even represent real or imagined animate beings, or polytheism, or monotheism. The consciousness of our dependence and of the great limitations of our power, fear or hope, desire of superior aid, or a longing for support and comfort in adversity, which every man feels that he himself or his fellow man are incapable of affording, has invariably led men to acknowledge a superior agency of some sort or other. Man has always adored. If, therefore, there were no other reason why we should promote pure religion—and there are many indeed—this would be a strong one, that man will not and cannot live without some religion, of whatever character; and if he has not a true one he will embrace a false one; if he has not belief or true faith he will resort to superstition, or rather his heart will naturally engender it. But if a religion acknowledges a God "who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity," who is love and all-pure, it needs no farther discussion to show how deeply the whole society is interested in maintaining the diffusion of such a faith, which affords the two most powerful agents of morality; namely, on the one hand, mental communion with a being who is purity himself, and, being omniscient, does not judge by signs or outward actions, but searches the motives in the deepest recesses of our hearts, and who, being almighty, affords support to all who seek it in purity from him; and on the other hand, the belief in the immortality of the soul. It extends at once the whole sphere of action; its effects and tests go beyond the mere calculation of expediency, and thus the belief must needs become the most powerful primitive impulse to good actions, uprightness, disinterestedness, kindness, love of truth, and admiration of what is truly good, beautiful, noble and great."

*Lieber's Political Ethics, II., 67.

Still the cultivation of religion pure and undefiled is not the province of the nation *per se*. It belongs to the Church—another divine institution, possessed of peculiar powers through its great Head, which are manifested in the entire renovation of sinful nature and the impartation of a spiritual life to the penitent human being. But the Church is not dependent upon the State, although the latter owes its most perfect and successful development to the purity of life, which the influence of the former bestows upon its faithful members. Hence it is necessary that the Church should be protected by the State in all its legitimate efforts to extend the influence of the truths entrusted to it for the good of mankind; that it should be allowed free scope in the work of evangelization and moral instruction among the people, because the best kind of citizens are those who are sincere followers of Christ.

The protection furnished by the State must not be in the form of subsidy or pecuniary support, which would place the Church in a dependent position, but rather by prohibiting every thing that would interfere with the due exercise of its functions. Thus it is right that there should be Sunday laws, so that those who wish to keep the day in accordance with their interpretation of the divine command may not be subjected to interruption by the noise of business or pleasure. It is right that severe penalties should be imposed for disturbance of divine worship, that the clergy should be exempted from certain civil duties which might interfere seriously with the due performance of their professional functions, that the church in some form be recognized as the guardian of morality. This can be done without discriminating between the different denominations that claim to be alike sharers of her high prerogatives and privileges.

Where the question arises in regard to religions that are not Christians, and the followers of some of these are to be found in our country—"How far can the government render them protection?" the answer must be: only so far as their services are not disturbances of public order, and their teachings not subversive of morality and good citizenship. The Christian Church, if true to the teachings of her Master, cannot ask that law be used to suppress other forms of religion, but must rejoice at the opportunity of bearing the truth to the followers of such, in full confidence that

the seed thus planted will yield a rich reward for their labor. The fanatics and hyper-pietists, who wished to drive the Chinese from our shores for fear that they would paganize an essentially Christian land, only showed by their conduct how weak was their faith in the power and vitality of the Christian religion. Far different was the spirit of those who hailed the influx of the Chinese as affording them an opportunity for earnest evangelical labor under the protecting ægis of a government that has learned not to despise the religion upon which its founders relied for strength, and whose teachings can only result in creating the highest type of citizenship.

These are some of the lessons learned by the American people during the first century of national existence. They do not contain any novelties, but are simple rehabilitations of truths that have always existed. Truth is never new save to him who meets with it for the first time, when it has the charm of novelty. It may be hidden from observation for years or centuries, but such concealment does not tend to its decay. Ever fresh and living to him who finds it, he will never go astray who follows its guidance; but great will be the condemnation of him to whom the light of truth is revealed in vain. To sin against light and to plunge into deliberate blindness will bring its own terrible punishment. In proportion as we profit by the lessons taught us in the past shall we advance to the forefront of the nations of the earth, not only in strength and wealth, but also in those higher characteristics which give durability to a national name and fame. We must never lose sight of these lessons, for if a nation becomes oblivious of its divine mission, of the imperative demands of patriotism on its citizens, of the need of intellectual culture to raise it above the plane of the animal, and of the importance of that moral and religious training which recognizes this life as but a preparation for another of eternal duration, then its downfall and utter ruin will be a mere matter of time. It will speedily become a prey to the spoiler from without, or to inevitable destruction from dissensions and divisions at home. Continual vigilance is essential to the durability of any nation, and abiding attachment to truth is sure passport to a green old age.

It is proper, however, before dismissing the subject, to glance

briefly, for time will admit only of a brief retrospect, at some peculiar results or successes attained by the nation during its first hundred years, not for the purpose of vain glory, but to show that imperfectly as we have learned the lessons already mentioned, still they have borne rich and abundant fruit. Progress of an unexampled character has marked our history. While we would avoid the excessive laudations of American optimists, it cannot be wrong to shun the dispiriting jeremiads of the disciples of the pessimist school, and to glance at the actual results of our history.

1. *Population*.—At the breaking out of the revolutionary war it is estimated that there were 2,083,000 (including 500,000 slaves,) men, women and children living in the thirteen colonies. How many of these were natives and how many of foreign birth it is impossible to state, nor is there any certainty as to the correctness of the number, since it is the result of conjecture and not of an actual census-enumeration. When the first census, however, was taken in 1790 the number is given as 3,929,214, which presents a strong contrast to the grand total 38,558,371 as furnished by the census of 1870. Assuming that the increase from 1870 to the present has been at the same rate as between 1860 and 1870, we may reckon the present population of the United States as nearly 42,000,000, in other words nearly twenty-one times more than when the oppressive measures of the English government drove the people into rebellion. Then thirteen colonies along the Atlantic coast constituted the nucleus. They were thinly settled and poorly provided with means of inter-state intercourse. Now there are thirty-eight States stretching across the broad continent, one of which is almost an empire itself on the shores of the Pacific, with a population drawn from all quarters of the globe, developing signs of the national spirit and enterprise wherever a settlement is made, and building up populous towns and cities in an almost incredibly short space of time. That which was formerly our extreme west has become the east to the Chinese, Japanese and other oriental nations.

The singular rapidity with which the foreign element becomes Americanized is as startling as the numbers in which it appears. For a while some of them may contend for their national rites and customs, may pride themselves upon their foreign origin, but they

sooner or later succumb to the prevailing spirit and esteem it a high privilege to be American citizens. Their children claim to be Americans by birth and care not to push their genealogies beyond the country which they find so congenial to prosperity and enterprise. Even the peculiar physical characteristics belonging to the countries whence the fathers came, are gradually disappearing and giving place to a type peculiar alone to the United States, so that with a singular conglomeration of surnames indicating cosmopolitan origin, our population generally presents uniform physical and mental peculiarities.

2. *Valuation of Property.*—Here the data are very inadequate to a comparative statement of what has been done in the century, but we can compare the valuation of the property of the country, exclusive of that belonging to the general government, as presented by the census of 1870, with that of 1850. The latter was stated to be \$7,135,780,228, and the former \$30,068,518,507; in other words, the wealth of the country, in the twenty years intervening between the two census, was increased more than four-fold. This includes landed estate, public works, manufactures, and personal estate of every kind whatever. True, there is a dark side to this statement, which shows a huge national debt and great indebtedness on the part of most of the States, but the elasticity of the country bears loads of this kind with great equanimity, buoyed up with the confident assurance that its present and future resources will ensure certain liquidation.

Along with this increase of wealth, which is probably more generally distributed than in any other country on the globe, there is to be found a large increase of the comforts and luxuries of civilization, some of which penetrate the humblest cottages of the land. Foreign countries are made to contribute to the daily needs of the American citizen, and the oceans are whitened with sails bearing such contributions to our busy ports and then carrying off with them our own productions in exchange. Indeed, what would have been a rare luxury to the wealthy one century ago is now simply a necessity to the humble citizen. Its price brings it within the reach of his income, and his tastes lead him to require that which his income will secure. And this is not only true in regard to material wants, food, clothing and shelter, but also to those

aesthetic wants which cultivated tastes create. Works of art are in demand, sculpture and painting are liberally encouraged, architecture is invited to unite the beautiful with the useful in public and private edifices, music finds votaries quite as enthusiastic as in the old world, and for all these branches of the fine arts money is expended with a very lavish hand. True, the taste which induces the expenditure is not always such as will stand fair criticism; our galleries of paintings contain but little of the rare results of exalted talent as compared with the acres of canvass covered with mere daubs; our statuary, notwithstanding some brilliant examples of native and foreign genius, contains hosts of figures like those exhibited in the horrible collection in the Capital for which the national treasury has been heavily mulcted; our music is not always of the classic schools of Beethoven, Mozart or Handel, or even that conjured up by the weird genius of Richard Wagner, and our architecture only at rare intervals gives us a Girard College, while it mostly delights in the perpetration of costly enormities, embodying nothing but the idea of senseless expenditure. Still it is a gratifying circumstance that wealth has aspirations after that which is beautiful, and it bids us hope that in time, as cultivation advances, we shall rise from our present contentment with that which is mere pretense, to a higher, purer and more perfect art.

3. *Intellectual Progress.*—This may be shown in various ways, and notably by the number of institutions, public and private, devoted to educational purposes, from those where rudimentary instruction is given to those devoted to technical, professional and higher culture generally. The number of such institutions in 1870 was 141,629, with 221,042 teachers, and 7,209,938 pupils, at an expense of 95,402,726 dollars. These figures most eloquently set forth the appreciation of education in the land. They show how wide-spread must be the feeling that, without its aid, the people would be unfitted to solve the great problem of the national destiny. And this is still more satisfactorily shown by the great demand for intellectual pabulum, whether of a high or low degree. There were in the year mentioned 3,871 newspapers published in the United States, with a total of 1,508,548,250 copies annually issued, and an aggregate of 164,815 libraries, public and private, containing 45,528,938 volumes. The newspaper or the printed

volume is the source to which nearly every adult resorts for information, and these statistics show how large a number of readers there must be to justify such an enormous supply.

The intellectual progress of the nation is also shown, and in a way that gives her a high position, by the number of her authors who are acknowledged as of pre-eminent worth by the literary world. Prior to 1775 we find John Eliot published his Indian version of the Bible—now a rare curiosity to the bibliomaniac—Cotton Mather his *Magnalia Christi Americani*, Jonathan Edwards his treatise on "The Freedom of the Will," Franklin his essays and scientific papers, which with a few books of scientific travels and historical contributions, are still referred to as of classic value. From 1775 to 1820 the political writings of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Hamilton, John Adams, Ames and Patrick Henry; the scientific productions of Rittenhouse, Rush, Barton, Wilson and others; the poetical effusions of Barlow, Trumbull and Hopkinson; the works of fiction of Brown, Brackenbridge,—represent strength of thought, careful research, and imaginative powers, although Sydney Smith at the close of this period asked the question "Who reads an American book?" as though there was no literature here worthy of notice. Then commenced a period in our literary history full of remarkable contributions in all the departments of intellectual labor, which have won a proud place in the libraries of the world. Bancroft, Schoolcraft, Prescott and Motley have taken their place among the historians; Irving, Cooper, Paulding, Poe and Hawthorne among the writers of fiction; Bryant, Longfellow, Halleck, Whittier, Lowell and Holmes among the poets; Audubon, Agassiz, Dana, Hare, Henry and Silliman among the scientists, and a host of others whose names would require hours to enumerate, have made contributions in every department of literature and science, which fully demonstrate the great talent of their authors and the high character of the literature of the nation. In the last half century America has left no niche in the temple of knowledge unstudied by her sons, and has made valuable contributions to them all.

4. *Scientific Progress.*—In science the nation has been no lag-gard. Since the time when Franklin *fulmen e celo, sceptrumque tyrannis eripuit*, it has always had citizens who have diligently

delled in this field. Franklin's researches into the mysteries of electricity but paved the way for those of Henry and Morse, whose discoveries culminated in the invention of the telegraph, and then the daring of an American pressed its application until the submarine cable was devised and successfully laid. And what an impulse to commerce, manufactures, and all the peaceful arts has not the telegraph given! There is something almost awe-inspiring in the thought that the slender wires that hang mid-air over land, through populous countries, over desert plains and barren mountains, as well as in the depths of old ocean, are the highways along which are constantly passing messages of business and love, announcements of birth or death, of triumph or defeat, of peace or war. It is a thousand times more wonderful than the stories of the Arabian Nights or the lying pretensions of mediæval magicians.

Again, take the art of Heliography or sun-painting; although the first germ was not the discovery of an American,* yet the honor of first taking the picture of a living man belongs to Draper of New York—a naturalized citizen. What has it not done towards the perpetuation of the loved and the beautiful! Have not discoveries rapidly followed each other in this art until its cultivators, with a bold venture, have even succeeded in catching the changing phases of a solar eclipse or a transit of Venus, and given them an enduring permanence never dreamed of in the wildest dreams of the craziest visionary? We have ceased to marvel at its triumphs, and only regret that mankind had not been blessed with its power centuries ago, so that we might now look upon the wonderful presentments of the countenances of those men of olden time, whose characters we have learned to love, reverence or adore.

And in the department of natural history our activity has been no less marked. Under the vigorous industry, earnest enthusiasm and wonderful genius of the naturalized Swiss Professor Agassiz—*clarum et venerabile nomen*—who relinquished European honors of the most attractive kind to labor and toil among the savans of our own land, not only has the Cambridge Museum, to which his energies were principally directed, risen to a magnitude and importance which makes it attractive to naturalists all over the world, but numerous others have sprung into existence, each bearing

some important contribution to the knowledge of mankind. We have learned, money-making people as we are, to recognize science as worthy of our best brains and our severest labor.

To the question "Who reads an American book?" now will the reply come from every student's laboratory all over the world, "Without a knowledge of what the savans of the new world have done, one is but poorly acquainted with any field of investigation and study." They have gained a reputation among mankind which shames the silly nobility whose only claim to recognition is based upon what its ignorant forefathers with rude muscular force inflicted on their weaker brethren, and whose childish pride is content with a display of coats of arms emblazoned with tawdry decorations. They are enumerated among the benefactors of the race, whose glory consists in enlarging the field of investigation and increasing the knowledge of mankind.

5. *Progress in Mechanic Arts.*—The practical bent of the American mind finds every employment in the invention of improved forms of machinery, and the immense collection of models which fill the cases of the national Patent-Office furnishes abundant proof of great success. By improved machinery new occupations have been introduced and old ones have been caused to disappear. It would be impossible to mention even the most important of these, without taxing the patience of my audience beyond ordinary endurance. A glance at a few may serve to show how much American skill has done for the world in this department.

Formerly our grain was cut either with the sickle or cradle, and to gather in a moderate harvest, without large assistance from those engaged in the mechanical arts of our towns and villages, would have been almost impossible. Other occupations were thrown aside, and the harvest field was made to resound with the noise of busy crowds of men toiling and sweating over the heavy grain. Now by the aid of mechanical contrivances the work is done with comparatively little human assistance, and there is no hindrance to the business of the mechanic; while the farmer more speedily and surely gathers in the rich crops which nature returns for the labor he has expended upon the soil. The mower and reaper, moreover, enables larger crops to be cultivated and more food to be raised for home-population or exportation. It has

diminished the necessity for human labor in one department, increased the material wealth of the country, and made it able to feed a larger number of citizens.

Again, the contrivances used for spinning, weaving and finishing cotton goods are mainly of American invention, resulting in increasing the quantity of the manufactured article yearly brought into market, diminishing its cost per yard, and giving employment to thousands of men, women and children who would otherwise be obliged to eke out a miserable existence, full of struggles with misery and starvation.

The printing press has been also made to receive the impress of American ingenuity. Instead of the slow movement of the old hand press, steam has been brought into requisition, and immense editions of our huge city daily newspapers are prepared in a few hours to meet the demand of a public greedy for the latest news—a demand which could not have been supplied at all by the hand-press of the older time.

The sewing machine, now an indispensable piece of furniture in every household, has lightened labor greatly, and diminished the drudgery to which the slave of the needle was doomed before its introduction. And not only has it made the plain sewing of the family an easy task, but it has opened a way for decorative work which develops the artistic taste and aesthetic faculties to an extent altogether impossible in former times. And it, with all its manifold improvements, is purely and absolutely the result of American skill and American labor.

With one more illustration I shall close. Not many years ago the American would have readily admitted that he could never compete with the foreign mechanic in the construction of accurate time-pieces, because it was believed that they must be made by hand to be of suitable delicacy, and the cost of labor in foreign countries was very much below that which was claimed to be its due in this country. Still, even here, American talent, combined with patience and perseverance, has gained a great triumph. It has devised machinery which finishes with the greatest possible accuracy all the intricate parts of the most delicate time-pieces, and its watches are now recognized as the best made in the world.

Such are some of the striking results attained by the United

States during the first hundred years of its existence,—attained while learning the lessons which its history so earnestly and impressively set before its citizens. It is proposed to signalize its Jubilee by making a public exhibition of the productions of its soil, the results of its ingenuity and mechanic talent, and of everything that will tend to show what nature has furnished and human skill has produced. In such an exhibition, North and South can honestly strike hands, not over a silly rhetorician's "bloody chasm" but with fraternal grasp and loyal zeal for the success of the nation in the future, as they gaze upon the wondrous results of her past success. And where should such an exhibition be held but on the spot where the first blast of liberty was blown, the reverberations of which have been echoing and re-echoing over hill and dale for these hundred years? And as young and old wend their way to the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia, to meet not only this grand display from our own country, but magnificent contributions from other nations and peoples that have been invited to bring all they may have of taste and skill, let their minds ponder the lessons learned in the past century, and dedicate themselves anew to the duty of preserving the liberties, which are offered to all by our Constitution, from peril, whether it come from foes within or foes without. Amid the rejoicing over the triumphs of American art and industry, let the memory recur to the old Independence bell, that first proclaimed "liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof," and then to the wonderful realization of its prophetic sound, through the blessing of a merciful Providence; until, full of a sense of profound obligation for the past and of absolute dependence in the future, the lips shall burst forth in the words of the Psalmist—

Bless the Lord, O my soul; and all that is within me bless His holy name.

Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all His benefits.

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ART. V.—THE COLONIAL LITERATURE OF PENNSYLVANIA.*

BY REV. PROF. J. H. DUBBS.

THERE is somewhere an ancient legend, which relates how an artist, who had attempted in vain to carve a statue out of a block of marble, almost in desperation quenched the brand that was burning on his hearth, and shaped it into the masterpiece that gave him fame and fortune. With somewhat similar feelings of discouragement, though without the slightest anticipation of similar success, we turn aside to-day from the grave and stately subjects which might be supposed to be best suited to an occasion like the present, to spend an hour in the contemplation of a theme so humble and homely, that it has, probably, hitherto received less attention than any other which we could possibly have selected. Let others carve the marbles of Pentelicus—we will be satisfied with a rough block hewn from our native forests.

COME then, abandon for the present your relations with Apollo and the Muses; let all the ancient classics sleep, while we contemplate the first beginnings of literature in our native state. The fountains of Helicon may be brighter and purer, but it is not for us to despise the tiny streamlets that refresh the wilderness.

HAVING chosen as our theme, THE COLONIAL LITERATURE OF PENNSYLVANIA, we deem it proper to premise that we use the word literature in its widest sense, as embracing the written productions of laborers in every department of human knowledge, and that we do not limit it to the class of writings which are distinguished for beauty of style and expression, and are more generally known as *belles lettres*.

THE period to which we direct your attention is one which, though occupying a recent position in the history of the world, is

*An address delivered at the annual opening of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Penna., Sept. 2, 1875.

yet, as far as this young country is concerned, already covered with the mists of hoary antiquity. It properly begins with the year 1638, when Peter Minuit—a German, and at one time a deacon in the Reformed church of the city of Wesel*—founded the first Swedish colony on the western bank of the Delaware; and extends to the Declaration of Independence, in 1776, whose glorious centennial we soon propose to celebrate.

It has been remarked that the literary history of a nation, or of a province, is sure to begin with a mythical period—an age of "Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire"—in which fact and fiction are strangely blended. If such a period is to be accepted in the literary history of Pennsylvania, it must be supposed to end with the arrival of William Penn, in 1682. Though there are no traditions of Trojan wars and Argonautic expeditions; though we have no Nibelungen, to relate how Siegfried slew the dragon and won the beautiful Chriemhilda; yet it is true that, until very recently, our accounts of the early settlement of Pennsylvania were so vague and contradictory that they appeared to be almost mythical. It is but a year or two ago since we learned the particulars of Minuit's treaty with the Indians, which was, indeed, "the only treaty which was never broken." The Indians, by this treaty, ceded to the Swedish crown all the lands from Cape Henlopen to the falls of Trenton, and thence inland to the Susquehanna. This territory was carefully surveyed, and the boundary marked by a line of cedar posts, which were still seen in their places sixty years afterwards.† "It was in fact the Swedes," says Dr. Reynolds, "who inaugurated the peaceful policy of William Penn, for which he has been so deservedly praised, in his purchase of land from the Indians, and his uniformly friendly intercourse with them."‡ In short, every day serves to clear up more of the mystery that has hitherto obscured this portion of our history, and to give to the early Swedish settlers that credit which is their due. The recent translation and publication, by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, of Acrelius' "History of New Sweden," has but stimulated inquiry; and we are now promised translations of the Diary of

*See an article by Prof. Seidensticker, in "Der Deutsche Pionier," for January, 1875.

†Acrelius' "History of New Sweden," p. 23.

‡Ibid., p. 15.

Peter Lindstrom, the engineer who made the first map of New Sweden, and the Life of William Usselinx, who was the first to propose to Gustavus Adolphus the establishment of a Swedish colony on the banks of the Delaware; so that in all probability the period of the dominion of the Dutch and Swedes will soon be made as clear as any other portion of our national history.

Meagre and unsatisfactory as our knowledge of these early settlements may be, we have now to encounter statements of English origin, so strange, with particulars so fantastic, that "although most historians have felt bound to take notice of them, they have done so in a hopeless spirit, being unable to determine whether what was written was true, or whether it was not pure romance."*

In 1648 a little book was published in Middleburg, in Holland, of which a copy is preserved in the Philadelphia Library, which is thus entitled:

"A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW ALBION, and a direction of adventurers with small stock to get two for one and good lands freely * * * together with a letter from Master Robert Evelyn, that lived there many years, showing the particulars thereof."

This pamphlet purports to contain a description, by a certain Beauchamp Plantagenet, of "the glorious settlement of New Albion, the property of Sir Robert Ployden." "That part of America, or North Virginia," says the author,† "lying about 39 degrees on Delaware Bay, called *The Province of New Albion*, is situated in the best, and same temper as Italy, between too cold Germany and too hot Barbary; so this, lying just midway between New England, two hundred miles north, and Virginia, one hundred and fifty miles south, where are now settled eight thousand English and one hundred and forty ships in trade, is freed from the extreme cold and barrenness of the one, and heat and aguish marshes of the other; and is like Lombardy, a rich, fat soil, plain, having thirty-four rivers on the main land." The settlement is said to have been under the direction of the Albion Knights, for the conversion of the twenty-three heathen kings.

We find in this pamphlet glowing descriptions of no less than ten magnificent lordships and manors, in the possession of valiant

* Westcott's "History of Philadelphia," Chap. III.

† Proud's "History of Pennsylvania," p. III.

knights and gentle dames, one of whom, a certain Lady Barbara, is called "the mirror of wit and beauty." One of these manors, Mount Ployden, is described as "the seat of the Raritan king, on the north side of the province, twenty miles from Sandhay sea, and ninety miles from the ocean, next to Amara Hill, the retired paradise of the Ethiopian king."

There is a certain element of truth underlying all this high-sounding jargon; but how much of it is mere guess-work, it is probably now impossible to ascertain. It has, however, been discovered that Sir Robert Ployden received from Charles the First—who was always more ready to give away provinces than to pay his honest debts—a grant to a province in America, and that he attempted to found a settlement, which proved a failure in consequence of financial embarrassments. On this slender foundation it is probable that Beauchamp Plantaganet founded the story of New Albion, with all its gorgeous chivalry.

We turn from this mythical age, in which we too might be in danger of suffering our imagination to get the better of our judgment, to the second period of our literary history, which properly extends from the arrival of William Penn, in 1682, to the establishment of the first newspaper in Philadelphia, in the year 1719.

There is a very general impression that Pennsylvania was, in its earlier days, a kind of Bœotia, given over to hopeless ignorance, and heartily despising literature and art as proper works of the devil. The facts of the case will, however, we think, abundantly show that in no state of the Union were letters cultivated so early and so successfully. But a few months after the arrival of William Penn, Enoch Flower established a boarding school in Philadelphia, and within three years of that era, William Bradford, the first printer, had set up his press, and was almost constantly at work. It is curious to compare these facts with the almost contemporary utterances of the Governor of Virginia: "I thank God," said he, "we have not free schools nor printing; and I hope we shall not have these hundred years. For learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world; and printing has divulged them libels upon the government. God keep us from both!"*

*Chalmers, Vol. II., p. 328.

The first book printed by Bradford was, of course, an almanac. It is entitled: "*Kalendarium Pennsylvaniense, or America's Messenger, being an Almanac for the year of Grace 1686, by Samuel Atkyns, Student in the Mathematics and Astrology.*" This Samuel Atkyns—whoever he may have been—may therefore be regarded as the first Pennsylvanian author.

But Bradford soon had other work to do, besides the printing of almanacs. George Keith, the first preceptor in the Friends' Public School, became involved in a fierce controversy concerning the Society of Friends, which resulted in the organization of the "Christian Quakers," sometimes called "Fighting Friends," because they believed in the lawfulness of defensive warfare. The struggle was intense; no blood was shed, it is true, but the quantity of ink that flowed was positively dreadful. Pamphlets flew with fearful rapidity, and in the confusion which ensued, Bradford found it prudent to remove to New York, and Keith himself returned to England, where he became a clergyman in the established church. The "Keithians" generally followed the example of their leader, and were mainly instrumental in the foundation of the first Episcopal churches in the city of Philadelphia.

After the storm there was a season of quiet, during which men began to direct their attention to polite literature. At this time Gabriel Thomas wrote his quaint, "History of Pennsylvania and West New Jersey," in which he informs the world that "children born in Pennsylvania are not only well-favored and beautiful, but are in general observed to be better-natured, milder, and more tender-hearted than those born in England." If this statement is incorrect, it is certainly not because our author had not abundant opportunities for observation. "I was," he says, "an eye witness to all contained in this book, for I went in the first ship that was bound from England for that country, since it received the name of Pennsylvania. I saw the first cellar, when it was digging, for the use of our Governor, William Penn."

Of the state of literature in the province he says: "In the said city (Philadelphia) are several good schools of learning for youth in order to the attainment of the arts and sciences, as also reading, writing, etc." And then in the same paragraph, and in the same breath, he continues: "Here is to be had, on any day of the week,

tarts, pies, cakes, etc. Happy blessings (*i. e.* the learning and the pies), for which we owe the highest gratitude to our plentiful Provider, the great Creator of Heaven and earth.”*

Our author appears to regard professional men with but little favor, for he continues :

“Of lawyers and physicians I shall say nothing, because the country is very peaceable and healthy. Long may it continue so, and never have occasion for the tongue of ~~the~~ one nor the pen of the other, both equally destructive to men’s estates and lives; because forsooth, they have a license to murder and to make mischief.”

These extracts from the writings of the staid historian of this primitive era may serve to prepare us for the productions of the poetic muse. Unfortunately, they create the impression of having been made with an imported machine, which the colonists had not yet had time to get into proper running order. Rhythm was not of the slightest consequence, and their rhymes did not even jingle. Still, it may be well, on account of their antiquarian interest, to give our readers a few extracts from these ancient poetical compositions.

In 1692, Richard Frame, of whose personal history we know nothing, published in “what he called verse,” “A Short Description of Pennsylvania,” containing the following reference to the settlement at Germantown, quoted by Whittier in the Introduction to his “Pennsylvania Pilgrim:”

“The German town of which I spoke before,
Which is at least in length one mile or more,
Where lives High German people and Low Dutch,
Whose trade in weaving linen cloth is much,—
There grows the flax, as also you may know
That from the same they do divide the tow.
Their trade suits well their habitation,—
We find convenience for their occupation.”

Four years later, in 1696, Thomas Holme, one of the Judges of the County Court of Philadelphia, composed a “True Relation of the Flourishing State of Pennsylvania,” of which the following extract, in which he describes the trees growing in the province, is a favorable specimen :

*Memoirs of Hist. Soc. of Penna. vol. I., p. 121.

"Cedar, beech, maple and black walnut fine;
The ash, oak, hickory, and sweet-scented pine;
With such abundance more, both great and small,
That scarcely any man can name them all.
Mulberries, hazel-nuts, strawberries and plumbs,
Which pleaseth those well who to eat them comes;
Brave huckleberries, which are very dainty,
We have them each year in exceeding plenty;
Cranberry sauce and tarts do we make when
We greet our friends, ladies or gentlemen;
Grapes, walnuts, chesnuts, many things beside,
Which God by nature doth for us provide.

"Here's men do plant great orchards here,
Which brings great store of fruit to them each year;
Great stores of cherries and divers sorts;
Planters bring them to town in boats;
We may admire how all of them are spent,
I never saw so many but in Kent;
Some make of them a very pleasant drink,
Which they call cherry wine, I do think;
Good peaches we have in such plenty great,
The half of them the people cannot eat;
Here's apple, pears and quinces in such store,
And in a few years we may have many more;
And fruit trees do grow so fast in this ground
That we begin with cider to abound."

Our author deems Bradford, the printer, worthy of especial notice:

"Here dwells a printer, and I find
That he can print both books and bind;
He wants not paper, ink, nor skill;
He's owner of a paper mill.
The paper mill is here hard by,
And makes good paper frequently."

Holme expatiates also on the linen and woolen manufacture "camblet, serge and drugget;" and of an intention to build a saw mill near the Schuylkill:

"The saw-mill at Chester before
Was not enough; we've wanted more,
That all the benefit may reap
Of buying boards and plank good cheap."

He also has something to say about schools :

"Here we have schools of divers sorts,
To which our youth daily resorts.
Good women, who do very well,
Bring little ones to read and spell,
Which fits them for writing ; and then
Here's men to bring them to their pen,
And to instruct and make them quick
In all sorts of arithmetick."*

From a literary point of view all this is, of course, nothing but miserable trash ; but there is about it a certain *naivete* that renders it endurable. Let it not be forgotten that these books constitute the *incunabula* of our literature, and that we consequently read them with a degree of interest and sympathy which we would refuse to grant to similar productions of a more recent date. When we find Thomas Makin, in his "Encomium Pennsylvaniae," boldly "breaking Priscian's head," we do not feel inclined to be critical, but are rather pleased to find a Pennsylvanian at so early a date attempting, however imperfectly, to compose verses in the language of the Mantuan bard. It does not hurt our feelings to read, in Dickinson's "God's Protecting Providence" (1699), how the author's hero, Robert Barrow, after having been wonderfully delivered from a long captivity among the Indians, is said to have died "rejoicing in the downfall of George Keith, and testifying stoutly against the stipendiary clergy and the militia." Time, that old "*edax rerum*," has wonderfully smoothed down these asperities, so that what would have enraged our ancestors can only provoke a smile from their descendants.

The literary history of this primitive period would be incomplete without some reference to the pioneers of that great German immigration to which our State is indebted for the chief elements of its present prosperity. Most of these were, indeed, strangely erratic in their religious notions, but they were, at any rate, men of high classical and literary culture. First came Pastorius, the German Quaker, whom Whittier has recently immortalized in his "Pennsylvania Pilgrim." In the fatherland he had been an author of no mean repute, and even in America we are told he wrote,

* Westcott's "History of Philadelphia," Ch. xli.

"—in half the languages of man
His 'Rusca Apium,' which with bees began,
And through the gamut of creation ran."

It is creditable to our German immigration that such a man as Pastorius should have been its pioneer. While we could wish that it had been the privilege of a Pennsylvanian to do justice to his memory, we cannot fail to be grateful to the poet who has given him a tribute more enduring than sculptured marble or monumental brass.

After Pastorius there arrived a confused multitude of Mennonites and Labadists, and mystics of every shade; but among all these various sects there is none more curious and interesting than the Society of the Women in the Wilderness, which, about 1694, under the leadership of John Kelpius, erected the monastery on the Wissahickon, near Philadelphia, around which a modern writer,* in a once-popular novel, attempted to throw the glamour of poetry and romance. There, says Whittier,

"Painful Kelpius, in his hermit den
By Wissahickon, maddest of good men,
Dream'd o'er the Chiliast dreams of Petersen,
Reading the books of Daniel and of John;
And Behmen's Morning Redness through the Stone
Of Wisdom vouchsafed to his eyes alone!
Whereby he read what man ne'er read before,
And saw the visions man shall see no more,
Till the great angel, striding sea and shore,
Shall bid all flesh await, on land and ships,
The warning trump of the Apocalypse,
Shattering the heavens before the dread eclipse."

The stone of wisdom, through which Kelpius beheld his visions, would even now be a most desirable possession; but unfortunately—so runs the legend—when the seer felt the approach of death, he feared that his treasure might fall into unworthy hands, and therefore bore it to the banks of the Schuylkill, where, after gazing upon it long and fondly, he cast it into the depths, whence it has never been recovered. As to what occurred when the precious talisman fell into the waters, we would be left entirely in the dark, were it not that we have an illustrious precedent in King Arthur, who,

*George Lippard.

when he came to die, compelled Sir Bevidere to take his magic sword Excalibur, "and fling him far into the middle meer:"

"And then, behold! an arm,
Clothed in white samite, mystic, wonderful,
That caught him by the hilt and brandished him
Three times, and drew him under the meer."*

Of course the scene was re-enacted when Kelpius threw the stone of wisdom into the river—and then there came a dusky barge that held three weeping queens with crowns of gold, who bore him with them to the isle of Avalon.

We come now to the third or historical period of the literary history of our Commonwealth. It begins with December 22, 1719, when Andrew Bradford issued the first number of the *American Weekly Messenger*—a poor, miserable sheet, it is true, but, like the first swallow of spring-time, it was the harbinger of a brighter era. Several years later, Samuel Keimer began the publication of a second paper, which was modestly entitled *The Universal Instructor in all the Arts and Sciences and Pennsylvania Gazette*. Keimer appears to have been confident of his ability to instruct all mankind, and it was his constant trouble that an ignorant world refused to receive his gratuitous instructions.

He was something of a poet, too, for when Benjamin Franklin, in 1723, applied to him for work as a journeyman printer, he found him composing an elegy to the memory of another poet, Aquila Rose—literally *composing* it—for he had his composing-stick in his hand, and was setting up his verses in type without ever committing them to paper. Such poetical facility is rare, and its rarity is a blessing to the world. Poets like Rose and Keimer remind us of the couplet:

Swans sing before they die; 'twere no bad thing
Did certain poets die before they sing.

At this period the Governors of the colony were, almost without exception, men of distinguished literary ability. Thomas Lloyd, the first Deputy Governor, had graduated at Oxford with distinguished honors, and was one of the best classical scholars of his age. The most eminent of them all was, however, James Logan, a statesman and a scholar, who was for many years the Mæcenas

*Tennyson's "Morte d'Arthur."

of our struggling authors. Equally distinguished as the author of Latin treatises on obscure scientific subjects, and as an accomplished translator of the works of classical antiquity, his fame is preserved by the great Loganian library, of which he was the founder.

But there is one man, of all others, in whom the literary history of the Colonial period appears to centre. Take him all in all, the world has seen few greater men than the Philadelphia printer, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

Apart from his services to his country and the world as a statesman and as a scientific philosopher, his influence on our literature, though unobtrusive, was practically unlimited. "Poor Richard" was beloved in every household, and his quaint utterances became the prototype of the homely humor and wisdom which are to the present day affected by our most popular authors. During his whole public life he labored incessantly for the good of the community, and almost all our more ancient literary and benevolent institutions owe their existence, in part, at least, to his energy and public spirit. Among these we may mention the Philadelphia Library, the Pennsylvania Hospital, the American Philosophical Society, the University of Pennsylvania, and last, but we hope not least, Franklin and Marshall College.*

Franklin was but twenty-one years of age when he established the "Junto," a literary club, which was maintained for upward of forty years. At its meetings, which were held every Friday evening at the old Indian King Tavern, he gathered around him all the brightest minds in the Province, and, though few in numbers, they constituted a literary circle which has never been excelled in the history of our country. Among these were Thomas Godfrey, the inventor of the quadrant, and his gifted son, the author of the "Prince of Parthia," the first drama ever written in America; the Bartrams, father and son, of the elder of whom Linnaeus said that he was "the greatest natural botanist in the world;"

* Franklin College, one of the institutions now consolidated into Franklin and Marshall College, was founded at Lancaster, Pa., in 1787. It was named after Benjamin Franklin, who contributed largely to its funds, and who personally laid the corner-stone of the first college building. On the latter occasion he was accompanied by Hector St. John Crèvecoeur, the author, who in his works has left a record of the event.

Beveridge, the Latinist, and Ralph, the poet and historian, "whom," as some one has said, "the great Alexander Pope himself honored with an insulting couplet." There, too, at a later period, was probably Daniel Rittenhouse, who still ranks as our greatest American astronomer, with men like Benjamin Rush, Francis Hopkinson, John Dickinson and Hugh Williamson, who were equally distinguished as citizens of their native country and of the republic of letters. Perhaps, too, the historian Robert Proud, who was, like his "*History of Pennsylvania*," "a most stately, old-fashioned article," may have occasionally honored the "Junto" with his presence; but it can hardly be supposed that the old Tory should have been intimate with men whom he must have regarded as incipient rebels.

It was, however, not only in the circle which gathered around the person of Benjamin Franklin that letters were cultivated: the whole Province was full of literary activity. The Swedish pastors wrote extensive accounts of their mission, which were published in their native country. The Germans, too, were no less active than their English brethren. Christopher Lower, of Germantown, was at the head of the largest publishing house in America, and not only printed several editions of his large German Bible before any American printer undertook its publication in English, but issued several hundred German volumes, many of which enjoyed an enormous circulation. The Protestant monks of Ephrata, with incredible labor, composed and published their quaint volumes, bearing, according to the fashion of the times, such titles as "*Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver*" and "*The Song of the Solitary and Forsaken Turtle Dove*." The Lutherans composed the "*Halle'sche Nachrichten*;" Schlatter wrote a *Journal of his Travels*; the Moravians issued volume after volume, principally concerning their wonderful work among the North American Indians.

In brief, wherever we look, we behold signs of literary activity which were truly wonderful, considering the depressing circumstances by which the colonists were surrounded. Many of the books published were, of course, prompted by theological controversies which have long been forgotten; they were

Dull, doubtless, but with here and there a flash.

With the approach of the Revolution, however, *political* writings became more numerous, and in the satires and broadsides of that period there is not only plenty of wit and humor, but we find many evidences of a high degree of literary culture.

Upon the Revolutionary period we do not on this occasion propose to enter. We have said enough, we think, to show that as Pennsylvanians we have no cause to be ashamed of the literary labors of our forefathers. On the contrary, their faithful, though humble, efforts in the cause of religion, literature, and science, demand at our hands the fullest recognition and the most sacred veneration. Their energy and perseverance in the face of the most appalling difficulties, not to speak of their unquestionable literary ability, cannot fail to command our constant wonder and admiration.

We owe it to ourselves, no less than to our ancestors, to give them the honor which is their due; for any people which affects to despise the past, is taking the most certain course to insure its own destruction. Like a branch abruptly cut off from the tree on which it grew, it must speedily wither. To the superficial observer it may appear as though the Colonial period of our literary history were a mere chaos; but closer observation must behold in all these apparently conflicting elements the working of the life process which has produced the present, and which must, in one form or another, continue working until the end of time. As in geology it has come to be felt that the old cataclysmal theory is no longer tenable, so in history we cannot admit the existence of a chasm that can sever the present from the past. To do so would be to deprive history of all its meaning, and to throw disrespect upon the plan and purpose of Almighty God.

The success which attended the literary labors of our ancestors during the Colonial period should also incite their descendants to generous emulation. It is to be feared that our good old Commonwealth has failed to maintain the relative literary position, in comparison with other portions of our country, which it undoubtedly held during the period immediately antecedent to the American Revolution. This acknowledgment may be humiliating; but the fact being known, the noblest motives of patriotism should

nerve the educated young men of Pennsylvania to nobler struggles and more brilliant triumphs.

There is, however, a higher motive to literary labor, which appeals especially to the present generation; a motive which does not spring from any local allegiance, but is as wide as humanity itself. We are living in a skeptical age, in which we are constantly confronted by the most refined and insidious forms of unbelief; when almost everything that we read is saturated by the subtle poison of infidelity; and the fact lays an obligation on every Christian scholar, not only to become acquainted with the contents of his faith, but to defend it against its enemies. To meet these new adversaries we must present the truth in new aspects, for it is idle to affirm that ancient methods must be sufficient to meet every emergency. Just as well might we advise our government to arm our soldiers with the match-locks and flint guns used by our ancestors, while surrounding nations are in possession of needle-guns and chassepot rifles. There was a time when England boasted that she had obtained the mastery of the world by means of her fleets, which she affectionately termed her "wooden walls," but what could the whole fleet, with which Nelson won at the battle of the Nile, accomplish in opposition to a single iron-clad steamer? Just so it is in matters of religion, as well as in polite literature and science. The arguments and modes of expression which suit one age may not answer for another, and it therefore becomes us to consider carefully the nature of the weapons which we draw forth from the armory of truth.

The present age stands greatly in need of a genuine Christian literature, and let those to whom God has granted the requisite talent labor without ceasing to produce it; not in the pursuit of vain ambition, but in the hope of bringing a worthy tribute to the cause of our blessed Saviour.

It is a grand thing in these days to be a student, and we plead with you to magnify your office. Our country is more in need of faithful students than of heroic warriors. The Church of the living God—attacked by the powers of darkness on the right hand and on the left—claims your faithful service. The cross needs soldiers who understand its mystery—who, having come to comprehend

the contents of their faith, are able to maintain and to defend them.

In short, from every walk of life, from the highest to the humblest, there comes a special call for faithful students. *Ora et labora*. "The night cometh when no man can work."

We are living in dark and troublous times, and sometimes we think we recognize in them some of the signs that are to precede the second coming of the Son of Man. But, what if we be really approaching the eventide of the world's history? Commend us to the spirit of the stern old Puritan legislator, who, on the celebrated "dark day," when alarmed by the unusual darkness it was proposed to adjourn the legislature, rose and exclaimed: "Either this is God's day of judgment or it is not. If it is not, it is useless to adjourn. If it is the day of judgment, I prefer that my Judge should find me doing my duty. Bring in the candles!" and they brought them in.

The true student of history does not suffer his mind to dwell on dead antiquity to the exclusion of the present and the future. His reverence for the past is not mere antiquarianism; it involves an earnest determination to press onward with the stream of history. While, therefore we plead with you to reverence the past, we urge you to press forward manfully and to prepare yourselves to take a worthy part in the contests of the future.

As we journey onward together, let us remember that to labor solely for the applause of men is foolish, if not criminal. In another hundred years the names of the most distinguished of the present generation will be as thoroughly forgotten as are those of the pioneers of our Colonial literature. Yet it is cheering to remember that the aloe may bloom a century after the hand that planted it has returned to dust and ashes; that not a single seed of truth will ever be lost, though it may require ages to develop the full glory of its flower and fruit.

"Even so

The world forgets, but the wise angels know."

ART. VI.—PAUL AT ATHENS.

BY REV. P. S. DAVIS, D. D.

FIFTEEN hundred and fifty-six years before the birth of our Lord Jesus Christ, and seven hundred and eighty years before the common era of Olympiads, Cecrops brought a little band from Egypt, and landed on a rugged promontory in the Egean sea. There already, it is thought by some, he instituted the Areopagus—a court, from which laws were given to a nation, and which was destined to excise a controlling influence on the civilized world. The time is so far back that it is almost lost in the twilight of fable. The belief of the people in those early ages was, that their very divinities vied with each other in their efforts to become the tutelary deity of the colony. Neptune, in his chariot—a beautifully tinted sea-shell, drawn by dolphins—rose up from the foam and proffered his trident. But Minerva, the patroness of wisdom, war, and all the liberal arts, quickly alighted upon the highest point of the sea-girt rocks, and snatching the honor from the god of the ocean, gave her name to the place. These men afterwards built her one of the most magnificent temples the world ever saw; and sixteen centuries from the time that Cecropia became Athena, that temple, surmounted with her image adorned with shield and helmet, glittered in the sun and dazzled the weak eyes of St. Paul, as he sailed into the Piræus to preach the gospel in the city.

The city itself was indeed a wonder. It seemed to rise out of the waves like a crown of gold set with many a gem, and flashed in the light for miles over the blue waters of the Egean. Nor did it prove to be a mere gilded cloud when more nearly approached. Its foundations were laid down upon a rock, and its twenty-two miles of walls were so massive that an assailing enemy once stopped in the midst of an assault to admire the strength and beauty of the masonry. But rising in marble whiteness far above

the walls, were the Acropolis, the Parthenon, and fanes to nearly all the divinities of the heathen world. There were academies, and theatres, and palaces with pillared porticos. Every building was a model of architectural beauty, and all the city was adorned with olive groves and fountains and statues of gods and heroes. Powerful armaments guarded her shores, and argosies brought the wealth of far-off countries to her ports. The civilization of the world centred there, so that Athens was a tiaraed queen holding a golden sceptre, and the richest jewel in her crown was wisdom. Greece was the land of intellectual culture, and Athens was "the eye of Greece."

And the glory of Athens was not simply that she had numbered men of genius among her citizens. It was not simply that Themistocles had destroyed the fleets of Xerxes and driven back the hosts of Persia. It was not simply that Pericles had been her wise ruler. It was not simply that Phidias had made an image of Minerva out of ivory and gold that was said to be absolutely faultless, or that Demosthenes had pronounced orations no word of which could be altered except for the worse. It was not simply that individual poets had struck the lyre and brought forth sounds that still float like fairy music around the sunny isle. The effect of all this upon the masses was very great. The world had never seen a city whose common people were so cultivated in many respects. Works of the highest excellency in art were to be seen wherever they looked—in the temples and groves, and in every niche and corner of the streets; and these so elevated their tastes, that they turned away from deformity with pain, and want of symmetry in any object was grating to their sensibilities. Every artisan, to be accepted, must be an artist; and the common vessels used in the culinary departments of their homes have furnished the models for our finest ornamental vases. Sages and statesmen, orators and poets, taught the people in the public places. Everything was open to competition; and a popular historian has declared that no modern university has so excellent a system of education, by which he seems to mean one so calculated to reach, and fire, and train the minds of the populace. "Let us for a moment," he says "transport ourselves in thought to that glorious city. Let us imagine that we are entering its gates, in the time of its honor

and glory. A crowd is assembled around a portico. All are gazing with delight at the entablature, for Phidias is putting up a frieze. We turn into another street—a rhapsodist is reciting there; men, women, children are thronging round him; the tears are running down their cheeks; their eyes are fixed; then every breath is still, for he is telling how Priam fell at the feet of Achilles, and kissed those hands—the terrible, the murderous—which had slain so many of his sons. We enter the public place—there is a ring of youths, all leaning forward, with sparkling eyes, and gestures of expectation; Socrates is pitted against a famous Atheist from Ionia, and has just brought him to a contradiction in terms. But we are interrupted. The heralds are crying—‘Room for the Prytanes.’ The general assembly is to meet. The people are swarming in on every side. Proclamation is made—‘Who wishes to speak?’ There is a shout and a clapping of hands. Pericles is mounting the stand. Then for a play of Sophocles; and away to sup with Aspasia.”*

The brilliant essayist was right in his estimate of all this. Its tendency was to stimulate and cultivate thought and speech. The rude native sailors halloed to their fellows from galley to galley in classic Greek. They rushed up between the long walls and crowded the theatres at night to listen to the comedies of Menander, and they hissed at the mispronunciation of a single syllable. Language, we are told, was so unusually elegant and refined among the people that a simple old huckster woman, who sold herbs in the market, distinguished Theophrastus as a foreigner by the affectation of a single word.

To this illustrious city the great Apostle of the Gentiles had come, fleeing from Barea, but with his heart full of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Much of the glory of the place then lived only in history and in song. There were many traces of decay. The long walls were dilapidated, and indeed the Piræus or port was no longer regarded as a part of the city. The men of genius had fallen asleep. But though the eagles had taken flight, the eyrie remained. The eye of the stranger still rested with wonder upon temples and porticoes, and upon statues and masterpieces of art.

**Athenian Orators*, by Macaulay.

The bazars, all neat and clean as a public square in a modern city, were filled with people. The olive and plane trees, and thickets of "torrent-loving shrubs of Greece," in which nightingales sung from dusk until midnight, still rendered their grateful shades, and helped to make the whole city look like a well kept villa in a summer garden. We may quote an interesting author on this subject. "Let us walk with the Apostle," he says, "from Phalerus to the city. As he steps on shore at the port, he sees before him the splendid temple of Ceres, another to Minerva, and another to Jupiter. A little farther on are some altars, and pausing to read the inscription, he finds on one of them the dedication, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD; perhaps Jehovah, the great god of the Jews, or rather of all people and of the universe. What is yonder temple with neither door nor roof? It is Juno's, burnt by Mardonius, at the time of the Persian invasion. He enters the city gates and on either hand are painted porticoes, with bronze statues of the most illustrious characters which the city has produced. On the left is the Pnyx, with its bema cut from the solid rock—the bema which still rivets the traveler's gaze—the very spot whence the orator poured forth his thunder against the prince of Macedon. Advancing onward, he beholds the statues of Conon, and his little less celebrated son Timotheus; and then another painted portico, on whose walls is portrayed the battle of Montinea, and in the foreground of it may be seen the commanding figure of Epaminondas. His eye now rests on a statue whose kindling features and vehement action bespeak a whirlwind of thought within—it is Demosthenes; he whose phillippics Paul had studied (and not in vain) at Jerusalem. Here are statues of Harmodius and Aristogeton, of Miltiades and Themistocles. There is Philip of Macedon, and near him is the more mighty conqueror still, Alexander the Great. Beyond is the majestic figure of Solon, the Athenian legislator, erected in front of a portico, where in glowing colors are represented the capture of Troy, and the glorious struggle of the band of patriots against the hosts of Persia on the field of Marathon. Paul would scarcely enter the idolatrous temples by which he was surrounded; or in one, that of Demus and the Graces, he might have seen a statue in bronze on which an Israelite would have gazed with interest—that of Hyrcanus, the Jewish High Priest.

On the left he passes the Areopagus, or Mars' hill, ascended by sixteen steps from the forum or market place on the southeast, and on the platform at the top (a circuit of some fifty yards) is the court of the Areopagus, the Senate of Athens, the august assembly that determined the weightiest matters of policy and settled the religion of the State. At their bar was Socrates arraigned, and there Paul was soon himself to plead. In front of him rises aloft the eternal citadel, the Acropolis crowned with the marvel of every age, from Pericles to the present, the Parthenon. "The Lord of heaven and earth dwelleth not in temples made with hands," or He had dwelt in this. By the side of it on the height stands the champion of the city, Minerva Promachus, wrought in bronze with helmed head and spear in hand; a colossal statue, visible from a vast distance to the wayfarer by land and the mariner by sea. To describe all the temples and statues at Athens would be an endless task. There was every conceivable variety of structure and sculpture. There were statues colossal, full size and diminutive; some in bronze, others in marble; others in stone, others in wood; others in pottery, some plain, others painted; others overlaid with ivory, or gold, or silver; some isolated, others projecting in relief from the wall."*

We have every evidence that St. Paul was well acquainted with the history and literature of Greece, but we may well imagine from this description, how the effort to perpetuate the fame of heroes and scholars, as this expressed itself in Athens, must have struck the mind of one whose early life had been spent in Jerusalem, in whose circuit no image was to be seen! But it was not simply the statues of warriors, statesmen and poets, that made such a deep impression upon his mind. The vain-glory of earth was doubtless sad enough to him, but the objects of Athenian *worship* which he saw overpowered him with a sense of their falsity, and inspired him with a desire to declare to them the only true God, who after all was an unknown being to them; for in his most direct walk from the Peiraic gate, past the Agora to the Acropolis, he saw not only images of all the gods on Olympus, but that catalogue exhausted, he beheld representations of impersonal virtues and vices—the

*Lewin's Life and Epistles of Paul. Vol. I., pp. 270-273.

thoughts and ideals of genius expressed in marble, or made to speak from the living canvas.

No wonder that the Apostle felt an oppressive loneliness in the midst of the strange scenes by which he was surrounded, and that his heart was stirred within him when he saw the people wholly given to idolatry. Long before this Cicero had come there with the reverence of a pilgrim, and years after the time of the Apostle Pausanias traversed these memorable places and scrutinized everything in the spirit of a superstitious antiquarian. But now Paul's chief desire was to urge men to forsake their vanities and seek the living God. He first preached to the Jews whom he found there; with what success we do not know. He was probably reviled by them as usual, although he met some devout persons;* but at any rate the chief mission of his life was with the Gentiles. Soon "certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics encountered him," and this gave him an opportunity to fulfill his mission. "Some said, What will this babbling say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he preached unto them Jesus and the resurrection. And they took him and brought him to the Areopagus, saying, 'May we know what this new doctrine whereof thou speakest is? For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears: we would know therefore what these things mean.'"[†]

Although the Apostle was not taken to the Areopagus for the trial of any charges brought against him, but simply to hear what new thing he had to say, yet we are reminded that he was taken to the place "where the most awful court of judicature had sat from time immemorial, to pass sentence on the greatest criminals, and to decide the most solemn questions connected with religion."

Howson, the well known biographer of the Apostle, whom we may quote at the risk of some repetition, thus speaks of it: "The judges sat in the open air upon seats hewn out of the rock, on a platform which was ascended by a flight of stone steps, immediately from the Agora. On this spot a long series of awful causes connected with crime and religion had been determined, beginning with the legendary trial of Mars, which gave to the place its name of Mars'

*Acts xvi: 17. †Acts xvii: 18-20.

Hill." A temple of the god was on the brow of the eminence; and an additional solemnity was given to the place by the sanctuary of the Furies, in the broken cleft of the rock immediately below the judges' seat. Even in the political decay of Athens, this spot and this court were regarded by the people with superstitious reverence. It was a scene with which the dread recollections of centuries were associated. It was a place of silent awe in the midst of a gay and frivolous city. Those who withdrew to the Areopagus from the Agora, came as it were into the presence of a higher power. No place in Athens was so suitable for a discourse upon the mysteries of religion."*

It is evident that those who sat in the Areopagus felt themselves authorized to pronounce judicially upon the religion of St. Paul, although those who brought him to the tribunal scarcely supposed that what he said would be worthy of great consideration. They in all probability thought that the novelty of his theory might amuse them for an hour, "for all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing."†

And yet there is no point in the annals of the first planting of Christianity which seizes so powerfully upon the imagination, as that at which the Apostle is brought into contact with the worldly wisdom and honor that here found its highest expression. He was confronted by the world life that had gone out in its utmost grasp after the divine, and he was bound to challenge all that was false by the presentation of Him who was the Truth. It is this that invests the Apostle at this time with such wonderful interest. "Paul in Athens! Once the bigoted Jew, now the champion of Christianity, amongst the vaunted sages and philosophers of the great metropolis of letters. How curiosity is on stretch to know his reception! They who were stirred by the trumpet blast of Demosthenes, will they listen to one no less eloquent, and of deeper feeling, and advocating a cause of far higher and of everlasting import? They who followed with delight the speculative flights of Plato, in his vain searchings after truth, can they fail to be ravished by the full light poured upon

*Life and Epistles of St. Paul. Vol. 1, pp. 374-375.

†Acts xvii. 21.

their darkened vision, direct revelation from the Deity? Oh! that Paul could have met Socrates in the market place, and that Plato had written the dialogue! But Socrates and Plato had long passed away."* It made no difference. The revelation of God was not to stand in the wisdom of men, and what Paul said has been recorded for us by St. Luke, with the Holy Spirit for his guide.

It has often been regretted that the English translation of the Apostle's speech makes it seem abrupt, and calculated to irritate its auditors, when in fact it is marked by graceful courtesy and consummate skill. Neander has some remarks upon this subject which are very forcible. "The discourse of Paul on this occasion is an admirable specimen of his apostolic wisdom and eloquence: we may here perceive how the Apostle (to use his own language) to the heathens, became a heathen that he might gain the heathens to Christianity. Inspired by feelings that were implanted from his youth in the mind of a pious Jew, and glowing in zeal for the honor of his God, Paul must have been horribly struck at the spectacle of idolatry that met him wherever he turned his eyes. He might easily have been betrayed by his feelings into intemperate language. And it evinced no ordinary self-denial and self-command, that instead of beginning with expressions of detestation, instead of representing the whole religious system of the Greeks as a Satanic delusion, he appealed to the truth which lay at its basis, while he sought to awaken in his hearers the consciousness of God which was oppressed by the power of sin, and thus aimed at leading them to that Saviour whom he came to announce. As among the Jews, in whom the knowledge of God formed by divine revelation led to a clear and pure development of the idea of the Messiah, he could appeal to the national history, the law and the prophets, as witnesses of Christ; so here he appealed to the undeniable anxiety of natural religion after the unknown God. He began with acknowledging in the religious zeal of the Athenians, a true religious feeling, though erroneously directed; an undeniable tending of the mind toward something divine. He begins with acknowledging in a laudatory manner the strength of the religious sentiment among the Athenians, and adducing as proof of it, that whilst

*Lewin.

walking amongst the sacred edifices, he lighted on an altar dedicated to the unknown God."*

The great historian will be proven to be right, if we compare our English translation with the true rendering of the original. In our common version it reads thus: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious; for as I passed by and saw your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription: *To the Unknown God*. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you" (Acts xvii. 22-23). This has been more properly rendered "Ye men of Athens, all things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion. For as I passed through your city, and beheld the objects of your worship,† I found among them an altar with this inscription: *To the Unknown God*. Whom therefore ye worship, though you know Him not, Him declare I unto you."

Any one who compares these two renderings can see the difference. He will see that the Apostle tells them that their altar to an unknown God proves both their desire to worship and their ignorance of the proper object of worship. He refers gracefully to their city, and to their pride of origin; but shows that all men are made of one blood, and that the place and time appointed for each nation's existence is only a part of one great scheme of a common Father. He quotes their own poets to prove this, and argues that if all men are the offspring of God, we ought not to think Him like unto graven images of gold, or silver, or stone. He reminds them of their fruitless gropings toward God; that in times past God had overlooked this ignorance, but now had revealed Himself and called upon men to repent and prepare for the judgment of Christ, whose resurrection was the proof of His divinity.

As long as the Apostle confined himself to the doctrines of theism the representatives of both schools of philosophy seemed to listen

*Planting and training of the Church, Book III, Chap. vi., p. 115.

†δευσιδαιμονιστερους. They were careful or solicitous to enrol as their own every God that was adored on the face of the earth, although it was death for any private person to disturb the religion of the state by introducing any deity not recognized by the proper authorities. Their anxiety not to exclude one through whom they had received a favor, although unknown, seemed to have induced them to build the altar of which Paul is speaking. See below.

‡σεβάματα. Evidently not devotions.

to him with attention; but when he spoke of the resurrection, some ridiculed him, and others expressed a desire to hear him again—perhaps through earnest desire for further enlightenment on the subject, but just as likely as not, to intimate politely that further discourse was not agreeable to them at that time. Very few of them became believers.

The idea of the resurrection transcended all of their philosophy. They had dreamed of a future life for the soul, but there was a limit to the power of their deities even in that direction. Orpheus, who could move the stones with the sweetness of his music, could not bring Eurydice from the regions of Pluto. And now, when they were told of a reversal of the law of death, in such a way that even the bodies of men were to be re-invested with a new and undying life, they held the whole idea in derision and scorn. Their reasonings had not taught it to them, and to the Christian faith they now chose to be strangers. The whole conception of salvation through One who Himself had died as a malefactor, that entering the gates of Hades he might come back a victor, was to the Greeks foolishness.

They never heard the Apostle again. After these things Paul departed from Athens. Directed by the Spirit of God, he left the city wedded to its worldly wisdom, and there is no evidence that he ever returned to it. Certain it is that we read in the New Testament of the establishment of no church in that far-famed place. We have letters of the Apostle to the churches in Rome, Corinth, Galatia, Ephesus, Philippi, Collosse, and Thessalonica, but "we have no epistle of Paul to the Athenians"—an omission under the circumstances speaks volumes, and tells us what momentous issues were involved when the ambassador of God departed from Athens.

The whole struggle of heathenism, as this culminated in Greece, was an effort to reunite the divine and the human. All pagan mythology was an attempt to incarnate divinity and to deify humanity—a half-conscious prophecy that God must become man if men were ever to become the children of God. And yet when He in whom dwelt the fullness of the Godhead bodily was declared to them as the One through whose resurgent power man might be enthroned in glory, they turned madly away from Him. The light for which Socrates cried in agony, shone not into their hearts when

the full Sun of Righteousness dawned upon the world. The mystery to which the Stoics and Epicureans each thought they had the clue, the one in stolid pride, the other in unbridled indulgence—the mystery of man's happiness, which could be solved historically only by the resurrection from the dead—*remained* a mystery for them. For the resurrection of Christ was laughed at, and Paul departed from Athens, leaving the sphynx and the griffin on the helmet of Minerva, to say, "You have closed your eyes to the True Light of the world; now solve the riddle for yourselves or die."

It is wonderful to look back at the history of Athens and see what a crisis—what an era making epoch—the departure of Paul made in the annals of that once proud city. The decline which had already commenced, went on so rapidly from this point, that eighty short years found her in utter desolation. Already her political supremacy was a matter of the past, so that foreign kings no longer sought the title of "citizens" for their children, and her commerce had gone in large measure to Corinth. But now the last and brightest star in the crown of her glory was to be dimmed. Her academies of philosophy—the fountains from which imperial Rome had drawn her inspirations—were superseded by the Christian schools at Tarsus where Paul was born, and at Alexandria, where St. Mark took the poor cobbler for his first pupil. Athenian glory had passed away forever, and the ghost of her greatness wailed like a lost spirit around the Acropolis.

And how was it with the Apostle? Was his mission a failure? In answering these questions, we may use the language of the historian whom we have already had occasion to quote: "Whatever may have been the immediate results of St. Paul's sojourn at Athens, its real fruits are those which remain to us still. That speech on the Areopagus is an imperishable monument of the first victory of Christianity over Paganism. To make a sacred application of the words used by the Athenian historian, it was 'no mere effort for a moment' but it is a 'perpetual possession,' wherein the church finds ever fresh supplies of wisdom and guidance. It is in Athens we learn what is the highest point to which unassisted human nature can attain; and here we learn also the language which the Gospel addresses to man on his proudest emi-

nence of unaided strength. God, in His Providence, has preserved to us, in fullest profusion, the literature which unfolds to us all the life of the Athenian people, in its glory and its shame; and he has ordained that one conspicuous passage in the Holy Volume should be the speech in which His servant addressed that people as ignorant idolaters, called them to repentance, and warned them of judgment. And it can hardly be deemed profane if we trace to the same Divine Providence the preservation of the very imagery that surrounded the speaker—not only the sea, and the mountains, and the sky, which change not with the decay of nations, but even the very temples, which remain after wars and revolutions, on their ancient pedestals, in astonishing perfection. We are thus provided with a poetic and yet truthful commentary on the words that were spoken once for all at Athens; and art and nature have been commissioned from above, to enframe the portrait of that Apostle, who stands forever on the Areopagus as the teacher of the Gentiles.”*

God has never condemned human wisdom as wisdom, but he has humbled it by reducing it to subserviency. It could never find Him out to perfection. He must reveal himself to man if man is to know Him at all; and one lesson with which He sought to impress the world is that its wisdom must sit as a disciple, not stand as a critic of the disclosure He has made. He has never condemned art as art; He has not said that we must eat and drink to His glory and yet that the whole sphere of our æsthetic nature can find no room for activity in the sphere of our spiritual being. But “a religion that addresses itself only to the taste of man is as weak as one that addresses itself only to the intellect.” It has no real power to raise men above the present order of the world.

Among the Greeks the highest wisdom and beauty culminated in the service of their gods; but they deified vice. Lascivious Venus had more votaries than chaste Juno, Bacchus more than Apollo, and the people became so sensual that Athenian immorality became as proverbial as Athenian cultivation. Alcibiades the model citizen was a notorious profligate, and the greatest philosopher of his times denounced the gods as too impure for human companionship.

The general lesson which we here learn is the insufficiency of human culture to raise man up to God, to take away sin or clothe

* Conybeare and Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*. Vol. I. Pp. 331-332.

him with holiness. It might as well hope to overcome the law of mortality. After it has done its best, it finds that it belongs to an order of things that is deciduous and crumbling, and that it must accept of the higher power brought into the service of humanity or else fall back from all its vauntings to destruction.

Men may have Utopian dreams of what the civilization of the world is to do for our humanity. They may think that the ideal republic of Plato is to be realized, and what God has done for us in Christ may be excluded as an element of help or of hope. The supernatural constitution of grace let down from heaven in the person of God's dear Son, may be so undervalued and ignored, that its withdrawal might not be considered as great a calamity as some other things. It was so with the Athenians. Once during the Peloponnesian war, news came of their defeat on the Asiatic coast and "no one slept in Athens that night." Once before during that same war a plague broke out in the city, and all the streets, and the five mile passage, between the long walls that ran down to the Piræus, were covered with those whose spotted flesh and swollen tongues told only of death. Then it was, if we have read the history aright, that they called on all the gods on Olympus in vain and when the pestilence was abated they, in gratitude, erected the altar to an *unknown god*. But the departure of the messenger who came to declare to them that unknown God, kept no one from festal joys. That night the city reflected its glory in the water like a proud bride looking into her mirror, and no one thought of the coming or going of the Apostle. Perhaps some young philosopher wondered what had become of the earnest stranger from the Levant, and whether he would again attempt to impose upon their credulity by preaching Jesus, or how he would try to reduce the resurrection to scientific conditions. That, it may be, was all that was said. And yet the departure of Paul sealed the doom of the people—left them gazing at ice-bergs that shone but could give no light; left them like famishing men in a banqueting hall before tables laden with flowers which could not appease hunger, and must fade like any perishing thing of earth—a wondrous illustration of the fact, that while God will bless any individual who believes on him—an Areopagite like Dionysius, or a woman like Damaris—yet multitudes and cities can have no hope if they turn away from the Gospel of His Son.

ART. VII—HAS MAN SPIRITUAL PERCEPTION?

BY GEO. N. ABBOTT.

IN order that no reader may be disappointed, let it be understood at the outset that I do not propose to answer the above question. There is, however, great interest, sometimes, in questions which we cannot answer immediately. A spirit of inquiry is doubtless one of the greatest promoters of philosophy; which in fact, is said to have its origin in wonder. Rightly to interrogate nature is one of the most effective methods of extracting her secrets; and the lawyer often makes his most convincing argument in questioning the witnesses. I will not, however, in this instance pretend to have arrived at that advanced stage of inquiry where the inquirer, peering through the clearing mist of uncertainty, and catching glimpses of the brightening truth, can put his interrogatories in such a manner as to indicate mentally reserved assertions; using the question-form simply for the sake of modesty; but whoever may think to spend a few minutes over this essay must expect only the satisfaction arising from sympathy with one earnestly *desirous* to know what are the proper functions of man's higher intelligence.

It might, perhaps, be expected that one, even in the most dubious attempt at methodic inquiry, should be able at least to define his own terms; but there are cases, it seems to me, where to do even so much is very difficult; and a natural case of this sort would be where the existence or non-existence of something as yet unknown is in question. Suppose, for instance, that the probability of the discovery of a type of being between the gorilla and man were under discussion; who could be expected to predict at what point of intermediateness the first discovered specimen of the new being would appear, or in what particular an advance on the structure of the lower order would be most prominent. If an animal should be found with an intermediate-sized brain, or

with a considerable power of speech, or even with a decidedly anthropoid foot, and a habit of "walking uprightly," either of these characters would doubtless entitle it to be ranked as an intermediate being. Here a certain range of indeterminateness would attach to the very object to be looked for. On the other hand, if the question were, whether a certain plant could be successfully grown to the north of a given isothermal, the kind of plant forming the subject of the question might be as definite in all respects as the name of any species in an affirmative proposition.

Now it might be supposed that the mere terms of the question set down as a heading need involve no more indeterminateness than attaches to the name of a cereal species; but when it is remembered that the spiritual, as something absolutely heterogeneous to the natural, is by some at the present time seriously held in doubt, may it not be reasonable to leave the absolute nature of the spiritual somewhat undetermined, at least until special ground shall appear for making a determination. But whatever may be the distinction, or lack of distinction, between material essence, psychic essence, and spiritual essence, a spiritual perception, in order to have any distinctive character, should be in some sense supersensuous, should have objects not accessible to sight, hearing, or touch, or to any power of apprehension usually co-ordinated with these. But here, again, whether such supersensuous power of cognition should be purely a psychic or spiritual one, independent of nerves and brain, or whether the psychic itself be always conditioned by nerves and brain, may perhaps be left as undecided as the similar points above mentioned.

As respects the general notion of *perception*, most persons, I suppose, regard their perceptions of objects as immediate or direct cognitions of them. There does not seem to be any process of reasoning between the sight of an object moving along the road and the *perception* of a horse. But suppose I am in a region of country where mules are about as common as horses; and that I am a quarter of a mile from the road. In such a situation, if I see a wagon moving behind what I immediately judge to be a draught animal, I may hesitate about pronouncing the draught animal a horse, until I have strained my eye-sight to take as accurate an impression of it as the circumstances will permit; and

even then I may be compelled to leave the question undecided. In such a case, then, what my perceptive faculty would decide upon instantaneously in a place where only horses are used as draught animals on the highway, the same faculty would seem to decide less promptly in circumstances where nicer discrimination is to be used.* Still, in the ordinary use of the term *perception*, we, no doubt, mean a seemingly immediate cognition of objects; that is, such a cognition as is possible without a conscious process of reasoning or inference; however much of latent reasoning there may be involved in every mental act above the most elementary impressions of sense. Whatever be the theory of perception, it is evidently capable of cultivation; and the more it is cultivated, the more extensive and reliable will be its activity.

Now although philosophers generally distinguish between sensation and perception, it is still true that perceptions, at least in many cases, cling to, or cohere with, sensations; so that the special organs of sensation become in a manner the organs of perception. Thus, we perceive tones through the ear; and we say a person has an *ear* for music, meaning that his ear makes fine discriminations between musical tones. We say, too, that a person has a good *eye* for colors, and a delicate *taste* for flavors, as if the fine perceptions indicated were incorporated in the special sense-organs; while yet the psychologist tells us that, "in the eye, it is no longer ray of light, nor is it yet color; in the ear, it is no longer wave of air, nor yet is it sound; it is solely a content in the eye or the ear, out of which an intellectual energy will produce a color or a sound. As yet it stands wholly in the living organism, and has not come out in the consciousness, and is the same thing for either blind instinct or a clear perceiving." Thought, in these cases, does its work so quickly, and with so little effort, that we credit the ear and eye with doing all the work; and possibly with greater justice than those admit who make the bodily organ a mere servant or instrument of the mind. At all events the sense-organ through which a percept is obtained seems to stamp a character on the per-

*Some regard a percept as a mere *intuition*, having no particular relation to a name or species. But it will be found that the conscious determinations of a nameless intuition involve the same discriminative judgments which are roughly hinted at in the given example.

cept. It not seldom happens, too, that percepts from the same objects do not even harmonize aesthetically with each other. A fine singer is by no means sure to have a beautiful countenance; nor is a bird of beautiful plumage certain to possess an enchanting song. The peacock, you remember, when enviously desiring the notes of the nightingale, was told that "Not all good things are conferred upon one." It makes a difference, then, through what sense-avenue we form our acquaintance with an object. Were we to know the nightingale only through its plumage, and the peacock through its vocal utterance, we should put a very different estimate on the attractions of both from what we do by a different mode of acquaintance.

In this view it becomes of some importance to know how many and what are the organized avenues or channels through which the mind acquires percepts. In childhood I was taught that man has five senses; but in these latter days men have become dissatisfied with the old land-marks of science, and several additions to the recognized senses have been proposed. Two or three years ago, Dr. Raymond delivered a lecture* in New York on the "Seven Senses,"—disclaiming, by the way, that the views he set forth were either new or original. The sixth sense he called the "Muscular Sense;" its function being to bring to consciousness the strain or effort of muscular contraction or exercise. His seventh sense was called the "Associated Sense, or the Sense of Association;" its office being, as I should understand him, to correlate and coördinate the action of the other senses, so as to give unity to their various intimations. In other words, the business of this seventh organ seems to be to have a sense of what the other senses are about, and to interpret or rectify their single impressions which otherwise, from their one-sidedness or partiality, might lead to false perceptions.

Another authority, too, gives us seven senses; but the two additional ones do not correspond with those just mentioned. Dr. K. V. Stoy, professor at Heidelberg, adds to the list of five senses the sense of temperature, and that of pressure. The sense of pressure would seem to be closely related to the muscular sense, or sense of

*See Tribune Extra, No. 5.

muscular tension; but Dr. Stoy appears to make a distinction between them, without, however, erecting the latter to a special sense.

These brief references will suffice to show the fact, that there is no longer a universal agreement about the special channels of communication which exist between the mind and the objective world.

We will not stop at present to consider why men of science should differ on such a point as the number of senses belonging to man. That a greater number than five was thought of before the present generation, as possible to some beings, is well shown by a passage which the lecturer above mentioned quotes from Voltaire; in which "an inhabitant of Saturn is asked by a traveler from Sirius, 'How many senses have you in Saturn?'" and gets for an answer, "We have seventy-two, and we mourn every day of our lives that we have not more." It is certain that sensation is greatly varied in the different grades of the animal kingdom. Says Tyndall: "In the lowest organisms we have a kind of tactual sense diffused over the entire body; then, through impressions from without and their corresponding adjustments, special portions of the surface become more responsive to stimuli than others. The senses are nascent, the basis of all of them being that simple tactual sense which the sage Democritus recognized 2300 years ago as their common progenitor. The action of light, in the first instance, appears to be a mere disturbance of the chemical processes in the animal organism, similar to that which occurs in the leaves of plants. By degrees the action becomes localized in a few pigment cells, more sensitive to light than the surrounding tissue. The eye is here incipient. At first it is merely capable of revealing differences of light and shade produced by bodies close at hand. Followed as the interception of the light is in almost all cases by the contact of the closely adjacent opaque body, sight in this condition becomes a kind of 'anticipatory touch.' The adjustment continues; a slight bulging out of the epidermis over the pigment granules supervenes. A lens is incipient, and, through the operation of infinite adjustments, at length reaches the perfection that it exhibits in the hawk and eagle. So of the other senses; they are special differentiations of a tissue which was originally vaguely sensitive all over."*

*Address before the British Association at Belfast (1874).

The sense organs are not, then, to be looked at merely as highly condensed sets of optical, chemical, acoustic, etc., apparatus, inserted ready-made in the animal structure; for though this is doubtless one view that can be taken, yet it is equally true that they are outgrowths from a central subject reaching out in all directions for communion with the surrounding world. It does not seem to be certain, either, that the senses have in man or any animal as yet come to the highest practicable perfection. How are we certain that what is effected by supplementing human sight with optical instruments could not be accomplished through a higher perfection of the simple organ of vision? We know indeed that great differences of visual power exist—some eyes having a microscopic, and others a telescopic character; and that these characters, as well as the greatly variable degrees of clearness, are liable to great changes with the progress of individual life. A greater clearness than any eye possesses, along with a greater adjustability of the several parts, might, for aught we know, give to the naked eye a power as much beyond that now possessed as the latter is beyond the power of the rudimentary visual organ of the snail.

A farther suggestion with regard to the possible variability of perception through sense may be got from a consideration of the undulatory theory, which most scientists at present adopt as a basis for the conception of sensation. A low rate of wave-motion, ranging say from 16 to 38,000 vibrations per second, affects the consciousness through the sense of hearing, giving the phenomenon *sound*. A higher rate is perceived, it is supposed, in electrical sensation; a still more rapid oscillation is recognized as heat; beyond heat in the upward scale is light; and beyond light, chemical action.* It is not meant that each kind of sensation in succession takes up the scale exactly where another leaves it, but only that in a general way this may be the order of maximum sensations of the given kinds. Now it is not so easy to see why sound, for instance, should not be extended over a greater range; so that the ear might appreciate tones of a lower or higher pitch than it does. That *some* ears can indeed do so appears from observation

*See Tribune Extra, No. 5. Sound and Hearing, by Prof. Louis Elsberg.

of animals. It is said to have been shown that "the ear of a calf is so constructed that the lowest sounds only are heard, and that its limit must necessarily be beneath ours;" and that many insects "both hear and produce sounds shrill beyond our cognizance." At the same time the hearing of some persons is limited to a considerably narrower range of pitch than the one designated. "The squeak of the bat, the sound of a cricket, even the chirrup of the common house-sparrow, are unheard by some people who for lower sounds possess a sensitive ear.* Wollaston mentions a curious experiment among several persons with a series of small pipes; different individuals in succession finding the limit of their perception of sound. It appears, thus, that the limits of pitch are subjective, not objective; and it would seem that undulations of all conceivable velocities could be apprehended as sound, if only a hearing organ of sufficient range of perception could be developed.

But difference of perceptual range is not confined to the ear; it belongs to the eye as well. It is said not to be unusual to meet with persons lacking a clear perception of red, the *base* tone of color. Other cases seem to indicate indistinct perception of the higher optical tones. But whatever differences of sight there may be at either limit, no eye with which we are acquainted takes in the whole solar spectrum. The lower heat rays and the upper chemical rays make no cognizable impression on the visual organ; though there is every reason to believe that a similar organ of greater range might utilize these rays, either in extending the list of colors or, as is considered more probable, in repeating the spectral tints both above and below what is for us the visible spectrum.* Thus might light become as universal an object of perception as, a moment ago, it was suggested that sound might become. As all rhythmic motions could in theory be translated into sound, so all could be translated into light. For aught we know to the contrary,

*Tyndall on Sound. P. 73.

**Mr. Stokes has observed that light of certain refrangibility and color is capable of experiencing a peculiar influence in being dispersed by certain media, and of undergoing thereby an alteration of its refrangibility and color. * * *

* * * Thus, rays of so high a degree of refrangibility, that they extend far beyond the extreme limits of the spectrum visible under ordinary circumstances, may be rendered luminous, and converted into blue and even red light."

—*Fowne's Chemistry*, p. 87.

too, all motions might be translated into heat, flavor, or odor. Universal, however, as each kind of sensation might be in theory, in practice the sphere of each is quite limited. In every analysis of an object we are obliged to supplement the defective percepts obtained through one sense by those gained through another; and a person lacking any one of these avenues of connection with the external world is apt to exhibit what appear to others distorted or sickly conceptions of things. The difference of impressions through the different senses is such, too, as to suggest almost anything sooner than a likeness of cause for the impressions.

Besides other differences, that in degree of power to assert objectivity is very prominent. It is natural to ask why light and heat, so closely related that they overlap each other on the solar spectrum, give us, the one a clear presentation of external being, the other only a dark intimation, utterly "without form, and void." May we not innocently imagine that, to beings more perfectly constituted, the sensation of heat, or even that of taste or smell, might give as distinct a rendering of objective existence as sight does to us? The lack of objective assertion in some of the senses leads to a substitution similar to that which a blind person adopts when he reads with his fingers. Our chemical senses, taste and smell, being inadequate for the proper recognition of chemical phenomena, we are compelled to study chemistry by the eye, using, thus, largely indirect and circumstantial evidence of what transpires in our experiment. The connection between the sign and the thing signified becomes, however, so sure and familiar that the indirect evidence scarcely differs from direct, so far as certainty is concerned. If dilute sulphuric acid be poured on what bears a general resemblance to limestone, and effervescence ensues, the opinion that it is limestone gains important confirmation. A change of color from blue to red in litmus paper may be just as good proof of the presence of an acid as the taste of it would be, and in some cases even better. So the form of a crystal is one of the indications of chemical composition. Indeed, perhaps the optical phenomena should not always, strictly speaking, be classed as indirect evidence. For instance, the change of color and the excitement of a taste, as just now referred to, may prove to be essentially the same fact grasped

by different senses. The same undulatory influence may possibly affect both color and taste in some way as yet unknown.

But at all events the visual criteria are generally preferred on account of their much greater distinctness. Very few persons have the peculiar perception which the two men are said to have possessed, one of whom detected a flavor of iron, and the other a taste of leather, in wine drawn from a hogshead in the bottom of which was afterwards found an iron key attached to a leather thong. Most men would, I think, be much inclined to distrust a claim to any such refinement of sensibility in the gustatory organ, until, by the force of ocular proof, they should be brought to acknowledge that "seeing is believing." The discovery of iron at the distance of the stars, by the spectroscope, is, doubtless, an easier matter than the detection of a key in a hogshead of wine at our feet by a trial of the liquid on the tongue. Again, we do not trust our sense of temperature to make nice distinctions of heat and cold, but construct an instrument to be observed by the eye. Our instrument, or set of instruments, for this purpose, has the additional advantage of reaching degrees of heat and cold inaccessible to the direct sense-criterion. Within what are called ordinary temperatures, however, direct sense perception might doubtless be cultivated up to far greater accuracy of discernment than is usually attained.

Another case of the auxiliary use of the eye is in the study of acoustics. The wave-theory of even sound would hardly be demonstrable without the aid of sight. It is the eye that detects the vibration of the string while the ear hears the tone. By an ingenious contrivance burning-gas may be sent past an organ-pipe in such a manner that the pulsations of air in the pipe, as it is sounded, shall impress themselves through an elastic membrane upon the gas-current, and thus occasion a flickering in the flame that is fed by it. Again, by a set of revolving mirrors this flickering flame can be converted into a beautiful ribbon of light with a serrate edge, furnishing a basis for calculating the exact rate of vibrations in the organ-pipe. If a pipe sounding the octave to the first is used, the number of flame-points in the edge of the luminous ribbon will be doubled, showing that the octave note has two vibrations to one of the fundamental note. Here it will be seen that the connection between

the serrate ribbon of light and the air-pulsations is unquestionably indirect; the one furnishing quite certain evidence of the other, without being, in any sense, the other in disguise. But the brilliancy of the exhibition is such as to draw attention from persons who would be but indifferently interested in a scientific experiment on tones simply. Even when sound is wrought up into the most charming music, it seems hardly to receive such universal appreciation as brilliant objects of sight. Stage-singers find it necessary to put a considerable amount of action into their performances in order to win the highest popularity; and even instrumental performers add to popular effect by making the movements of the hands and body tell upon the eye of the listener. In dreams, where the sense-forms have the freest play, sights seem to take the lead with almost every one, over all other sense-impressions. Now and then it may occur, as in the case of Rousseau's *Dream of Heaven* or Coleridge's *Kubla Khan*, that dreams may take the form of music or poetry; but the great mass of dreams would seem to be of a different character. Indeed, sight would seem to be the special sense of cultivated man. Hearing is, to be sure, of immense use in receiving communications through speech. But much of the value of words lies in their symbolization of what can be either physically or mentally intuited. The writer or speaker who addresses vividly the visual imagination is pretty sure to entertain a large proportion of mankind.

But is this state of things with regard to the comparative use of sight strictly necessary? Are we compelled to give such prominence to external vision and to its mental congeners? Allusion has already been made to the fact that the blind can substitute the sense of feeling for sight, learning to distinguish with a quickness which appears to ordinary persons little less than miraculous, the raised letters over which their fingers are passed. Their tactual perception seems to approximate—nay, almost to surpass—the rudimentary vision developed at the ends of the tentacles of some lower animals. Again, the hound pursues his prey by scent; using his olfactory perception with as much apparent objective assurance as if he had the eye of the eagle directed upon his mark. We might easily imagine that, while he so eagerly scents the tracks, he has prominent in his psychic being a visual image of

the object of pursuit, and that this visual image is what gives zest to the chase. But are we certain of this? Would it not as well comport with his carnivorous nature to suppose the anticipated *taste* of his prey is what haunts his imagination, and hastens his footsteps? It is not the study of natural history that the dog is pursuing. He may care as little about the external appearance of what he hopes to feast on as the patronizer of a boarding-house does for the color of the ox from which his slice of beef-steak was taken.

If it is to be objected on Vergil's principle: "So you bees make honey not for yourselves," that the dog hunts in the interest of his master, and not with the immediate expectation of appropriating the results of his own labors, it may be replied that this is only one of the numerous instances in which man turns to his own account the agencies of nature, while yet nature acts obediently to her own laws; and that an animal's use of his senses is to be interpreted chiefly in the light of his primitive nature and condition, at least in so far as no reason exists for a different interpretation. The dog belongs to a family of animals, many of which are gifted with a power of pursuing by scent, and often himself, in a cultivated state, hunts in this way for his own individual benefit. In default of a better knowledge of animal psychology, may we not theorize that probably he distinguishes objects largely, on an epicurean principle, through considerations of pleasure and pain, rather than by the pure unselfish light of the Platonic idea? and that, hence, his *marks* of a given animal or vegetable would be, in general, quite different from those by which a zoologist or botanist thinks of the same? This suggestion is not necessarily negated by the fact that animals often use the same senses as ourselves in discovering their objects of interest; as when the eagle and the grey-hound sight their prey. The thought does not need to follow closely and exclusively the lead of the sense employed. The lumber-dealer and the botanist may look at an old pine forest with equally absorbed eye-sight; the one having in his mind's eye visions of money, the other, hundreds of concentric layers of growth. The same fountain may send out streams in different directions; and in like manner the same sensation may be the starting-point of different thought-currents. A similar cultivation of the senses is equally

available for a variety of purposes. To be able to grasp the perspective of a landscape is as useful to a railway engineer as to a painter of natural scenery; and if either of these personages were found without his significant instruments, peering into the distance, it might be quite impossible to judge from appearances whether his imagination was indulging in a train of beautiful imagery, or in a train of freight-cars. The cultivation of a nice perception of distant objects is equally necessary for the sailor and the rifleman; and a fine discrimination of colors belongs as well to the useful art of dyeing as to the fine art of painting.

Not only is it true that the same kind of sense-perception may take different turns in thought and action, but substantially the same thought may have been variously initiated; so that in a given case a certain form of knowledge or mode of cognition may have a questionable origin. How many persons in mature life remember whether they first learned to read mostly by hearing pronounced those combinations of letters which form words—that is, by the “word-method;” or by the “phonetic method” were taught the elementary sounds and their combinations into words in connection with the representation of sounds by letters; or by a more laborious self-exertion they spelled out their reading from syllable to syllable; or by the labor-saving pictorial method, amusing themselves with a pictured “ape,” “boy,” “cat,” and so on down to “zebra,” they conned the lettered names along with the portraits. The mist about the morning horizon of memory bedims many an inception of mental activity. We know something of how we commence and pursue our planned investigations, but how we came by the knowledge we had of subjects before investigation, is the obscure problem; a problem, too, that covers a large share of the mental treasures of the race; for few undertake to assure themselves of the truth of their views by methodic research. Indeed, the work of retracing the course of one's own intellectual development back to its primitive percepts bears a resemblance to reviewing a book of science whose first pages, containing the statements of principles, have been worn out and are gone. To theorize about how one would proceed to acquire what time has given him in a great measure unconsciously involves many liabilities to error; and an attempt to repeat past experiences of cognition *de novo* is

very likely to substitute unwittingly old and complex impressions for new and simple ones.

Then again, the observation of the psychic phenomena of children or of young animals, though capable of furnishing valuable evidence, is yet far from sure to result in correct theories; because, among other reasons, the gaps of observation may be variously filled by the fantasy of the observer. Besides, there are cases where even careful attention fails to determine with certainty how the psychic movement links itself with what is externally evidenced.

Considering all the difficulties, it does not seem very strange that modern philosophy should have got in a muddle about the origin of such an idea as "outness," or distance (*i. e.* from the subject), including the so-called "third dimension" of solidity; Berkeley and many after him assigning to it an origin in tactual perception exclusively, while others still hold that distance and all spatial relations are recognized through the eye. One might imagine that an observation of a chicken of tenderest age pecking at its food with the precision of a sharp-shooter, and adapting the nervous stimulus to the required range of movement as if it had studied the dynamics of nerve-force, would settle the question. But some of the best physiologists are of opinion that the human infant does not take a "bird's-eye view" of things; and hence that analogy in this case is not a safe guide. The eye of the infant, in other words, is supposed to be less mature than that of many of the lower animals, as regards a power to suggest distance. An argument to strengthen this supposition is drawn from cases in which

- persons old enough to describe their own experiences intelligibly have come into possession of sight for the first time through a surgical operation. In such cases, it is said that a proper appreciation of distance is wanting until after a considerable use of the newly-opened eyes, in connection with that of the tactile and muscular senses.

On the other hand, the author of a recent work on psychology urges it, among his objections to the wave-theory of light, that it makes sight too purely subjective, and does not harmonize with that distinctness of externality and solidity which, in his view, characterize intrinsically the perceptions of sight; notwithstanding

the fact that disciplinary experience is necessary to the correct estimate of dimensions and distances.

But Berkeley seems not to have been satisfied with denying to sight a power of apprehending the so-called third dimension (including all distances in the line of the visual axis); but in regard to those remaining attributes a cognizance of which is commonly accredited to both sight and touch he remarks: "The extensions, figures, and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch called by the same names; nor is there any such thing as an idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses."* Even this seemingly strange statement is said to find apparent confirmation, too, in cases of persons born blind, to whom sight has been imparted by an operation. Instances are given of such persons being unable to recognize by sight objects which they were before familiar with by the sense of feeling, until after repeated experience in coördinating the two kinds of sense-impressions. An account of the case of a young woman who had been blind from birth, written by the operator who procured for her the enjoyment of sight, speaking of her difficulty in recognizing objects by sight alone, and of her need of comparing the visual and tactual characters, thus making her educated sense instruct her inexperienced one, remarks: "It was curious to place before her some very familiar object that she had never compared in this way, such as a pair of scissors. She would describe their shape, color, glistening metallic character, but would fail in ascertaining what they really were, until she put a finger on them, when in an instant she would name them, and laugh at her own stupidity, as she called it, in not having made them out before."† The youth whom Cheselden couched for cataract is also related one day to have taken up in his arms a cat which he had not yet learned to distinguish from a dog by sight, though he knew them both well by touch, and after feeling her attentively so as to associate the two sets of cognitions, to have put her down, saying, "So, puss; I shall know you another time."

But such confusions of the testimony of the two senses, one of

*See Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, p. 303.

†Cited by Carpenter, Mental Physiology, p. 186, from *Medico-Chirurgical Transactions*. Vol. XXXVIII.

which is a new and almost untried acquisition, may prove very little with regard to the essential likeness or unlikeness of the data they furnish: especially when we know that the untutored eye can be similarly confused in making what we should regard as a very simple comparison of visual objects alone; it having been credibly recorded that certain Australians "were quite unable to realize the most vivid artistic representations," that "on being shown a picture of one of themselves, one said it was a ship, another a kangaroo, not one in a dozen identifying the portrait as having any connection with himself;" and, what is still more remarkable, it having occurred that intelligent individuals, mistaking a mirror for a door or a picture, have critically surveyed their own persons, regarding them as altogether foreign to themselves; an art critic in one case going so far as to analyze his own character from a reflection which he took to be a portrait.

No doubt, the percepts coming through the different senses have their unique phases; but it is questionable whether such general notions as those of distance, figure, and motion need retain any *essential* peculiarities from the fact of their having been in any particular case perceived or estimated through a particular sense-organ. For instance, why need there be a mental difference between ten rods measured by the eye, and ten rods measured by pacing the ground with the eyes closed, provided the two measures chance to agree?

Taking now a retrospect of what has been said thus far, it might seem that our thought has made a complete turn-about since it was stated that the sense-organ through which a percept is obtained stamps a character on the percept; and that it makes a difference through what sense-avenue we form our acquaintance with an object. Our latest inferences, that the same sense-impression may suggest different thoughts, and that the same general conception may have been suggested by different sense-impressions, appear to point towards a possibility of doing without even so many senses as are ordinarily claimed for man, and to hint at the notion that a single sense of sufficient range might do all the work. But the *sufficient range* is a very important consideration. The oscillatory theory of sensation, before alluded to, gives us to understand how very small the entire range from the slowest-waving sensible sound

to the swiftest-quivering perceptible light is, when compared with the whole of a scale that should exhaust the variation of numbers. The word *etherial* is, perhaps, not fine enough to suggest the nature of the medium through which the higher-pitched thrills of nature may be transmitted.

The question may naturally arise, then: *Have we an unnamed sense or set of senses for perceiving those intensely rapid thrills?*

In a universal spectrum, far above the super-luminous chemical rays, may be the *vital* rays, or the *vital tones*; which, indeed, may not be limited to this high pitch, but may shade down through chemism, light, heat, etc., till they find their sub-base in the rhythmic pulse-waves, and breath-flucts. Mark, I do not say it is so; but it *may* be so. And if the Platonic *self-motion* (*αὐτοκίνησις*) be allowed as the characteristic of psychic activity, then thought itself may involve wave-motions of exceeding great rapidity, and may thus require to be apprehended through an appreciation of such high-toned music. The expression "to hear one's self think" would, in this view, come to be almost more than pure metaphor.

Now of course any such wave-hypothesis, extending over vitality and thought, would be entirely provisional; but adopting it for the purpose of a brief consideration of consequences we see:

(1) All sense-perceptions, including the hypothetical psychic order, would have certain characters and implications in common. All would be in a certain sense tone-perceptions. The man who dwells in the thought-world would, as it were, listen to transcendental strains. Time and space, being essential conditions of all motion however refined, would be implied alike throughout the whole scale. Hence the preception of *spatial dimensions*, with the consequent *figures*, could not *a priori* be assigned to a single sense, but might be distributed to several; and Berkeley could be saved the trouble of proving either *a priori* or *a posteriori* the essential difference between tactual dimensions and visual dimensions; though some *apparent* difference might exist, owing to the imperfection or partial efficiency of all sense organs.

(2) While there might be certain gaps in sense-perception, that is, certain portions of the extensive scale of possible sensa-

sion unoccupied by the function of any sense, there might also occur cases in which the same ground would be occupied by different senses; which seems actually to be illustrated by a partial coincidence of heat and light rays.

(3) As the sense-scale is ascended or descended, a variation of sense-perception must occur, which is illustrated, even within the range of the same sense-organ, by the difference between base and treble tones, as well as by that between red and blue colors. This kind of variation would, very likely, be increased by a successive introduction of new sense-organs, magnifying respectively certain tone-characters or effects, and diminishing or annulling others. Then, by combinations of these differences, an infinitude of variety would result. There would then be no lack of substantial specific differences among percepts.

(4) All natural objects, in so far as they involve capabilities of various motions, would also involve possibilities of exciting various qualities of sensation, which qualities would become the marks* of objects. These marks, in the case of complex objects especially, might be distributed among the functions of several senses. Indeed, it would be easy to think of a complex object as a "harp of a thousand strings," furnishing employment for all the senses at once, when it is set fully in motion. But as a few touches on an instrument are enough for its recognition, objects in nature would often be recognized by a few characters, perhaps appreciable by a single sense; though of course the partiality of presentation in such cases would give a peculiar coloring to our notions of objects, unless previous complementary presentations held in memory should supply the wanting data. A man, for example, might be known by his voice, his step, his countenance, his general figure—by either of these or by all together; but if knowledge of him were limited to a part of these characters, it would make a difference what characters were cognized; as was well illustrated in one case by the disappointment felt by a person who, having no proper use of his eyes in earliest life, knew his friends by other senses; but

*Marks might also result from the power in a body to "absorb" or modify motion; as when a body takes its color from an absorption or a modification of a part or the whole of the light falling on it.

afterwards having sight imparted, found them less handsome than he expected.*

In this brief list of deductions from the hypothesis of a general sense scale, we have in substance, as will have been seen, retraced in reverse order the suggestions previously made. This, however, is no proof of the truth of the hypothesis either in detail or in general. Especially in detail there is great liability to error in any unproved scheme. Of course it is understood that the proposed scheme is none of the present writer's, except as regards the bare suggestion that possibly vital and mental activities may involve undulatory motions which, on a general scale of such motions in nature, may have their places in part above those of light and chemism. This suggestion may have in it the least of truth. Even though it be true that thought in its most abstract forms may involve cerebral action, including some sort of undulation of either nerve-matter-nerve-force, or ether in or around the nerve-matter; and that such undulation, or some effect of it, in order to the consciousness of cerebral action, may be transmitted over nerve fibres to the appropriate sensorium, it still will not necessarily follow that the undulation will be of the order above suggested. But however this may be, is it at all probable that the maximum of vibratory motion has been already approximately measured by science? Is it likely that nature so far consults the convenience of human modes of numeration as to avoid any movements requiring to be expressed by unsuitably long rows of figures? or that she is so considerate towards human mechanism as to refrain from cutting up space and time into such atomic fragments as can not be measured by instruments? If nature be thus cautious about over-stepping the boundaries of easy computation, may we not hope that human science will soon compass all her doings? If, on the contrary, she sets no such bounds for herself, limiting her activity only by keeping within the intrinsically possible, then there will be in such wave-theories as those of heat, light, etc., an implication of a vast range of unexplored possibilities which, nevertheless, nature herself may have utilized.

It will have been observed that all that has, thus far, been

*Library of Natural History, edited by A. A. Gould, p. 28.

directly suggested in the way of spiritual perception does not go beyond introspection into the subject's own mental activity. Whatever be the normal place for introspection in a properly graded perceptual series, it seems natural to give it the first mention among cognitions of psychic objects; because what takes place within the psychic subject seems to offer the nearest phenomena not usually classed as material; provided the psychic activities of the subject *are phenomena*, that is, *possible objects of direct cognition*. Now this very point appears to be denied by some, so that we are refused perceptual admission to even the vestibule of the spiritual edifice. The author* of a series of articles in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, written in a style of admirable explicitness, asserts:

"We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts."

Were this statement less perspicuously worded, we might be inclined to soften down the meaning to something like this: Our self-inspection has not the directness of external observation, and may in some sense be compared to our looking towards the mirror of a reflecting telescope, to see an object behind us. That is, there is somewhat of reflectiveness in all self-cognition. But this is not what the writer intends. He seems to mean rather that the way in which we stand affected by our relations to known external objects furnishes a criterion for our inferential judgment with regard to ourselves. If we find ourselves predicating, This object is good, that one vile; this one is beautiful, that ugly; this is red, that blue; we have in these judgments of ours upon these familiar objects grounds of inference about our own make-up. All this is, doubtless, quite true so far as it goes; but how do we know that these judgments about objects are our judgments? Is it not knowing something of myself to know that I am uttering a judgment, whatever its character? It is the radiant object that we see, and the mind radiates in its judgments. Instruments help to analyze radiance, and thus to refine our knowledge of its sources. So by carefully filtering or sifting our judgments through external objects

*C. S. Peirce. See *Jour. Spec. Phil.* Vol. II.

we may get the means of improving our self-acquaintance. But we can see the sun shine if we do not distinguish in it hydrogen, iron, sodium, etc.; and so we can perceive that the ego thinks, though all the subtleties about the manner of thinking may not at once be apparent.

Possibly one other criticism on the use of the term *introspection* may be admissible. Like so many of our figurative names for various cognitions, it carries the notion of *ocular* perception. By the too exclusive use of terms of this order, we are sometimes led to question a proposed cognition in case it be not "as plain as day." We have seen in our discussion that not all radiance is luminous. Neither is every significant self-utterance as plain as daylight. If the child does not so early recognize in the hot stove a ray-emitting substance as it does in the gas-flame, because not born with its thermal eyes open, it will be pretty sure in time to "come to its senses" so as to perceive the one fact just as *certainly* as the other, if not just as *clearly*. And the fact that it does not say "*I*" so soon as it does other words is not so much proof of the lack of any ground of direct self-cognition as of the present obscurity clouding its perception, which, clearing up by time, will leave the ego to be apprehended by no very round-about method.

In order to do better justice to the writer just now referred to, I ought, perhaps, to quote one other of his general conclusions, as it may shed some light on the one above discussed. "We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions."

Such a sweeping denial of the existence of an intuitive function at all would seem to include the non-existence of introspection; so that but one proof would appear to be required. But the author of these propositions regards introspection as "not necessarily intuitive;" though he says he means by it "a direct perception of the internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it *as* internal." This definition taken as a whole appears to indicate that *direct evidence* of any kind is what is wanting with respect to the ego; while, in the case of objects generally, not so much do we experience a lack of directness of evidence as a want of cumulative sufficiency at any one instant of time or point of space, to furnish the ground of an instantaneous presentation. In other words, the

evidence comes piece-meal, and has to be combined into a unity by mental inference. The writer's view can best be illustrated by a quotation from his argument on objective intuition: "A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling; but not immediately, for he requires to move his fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare the sensations of one instant with those of another."

"The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity of the succession of the vibrations which reach the ear. Each of those vibrations produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a single such impulse be made upon the ear, and we know, experimentally, that it is perceived.* There is, therefore, good reason to believe that each of the impulses forming a tone is perceived. Nor is there any reason to the contrary; so that this is the only admissible supposition. Therefore, the pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity with which certain impressions are conveyed to the mind. These impressions must exist previously to any tone; hence, a sensation of pitch is determined by previous cognitions."

The sum of the matter appears to be that objects furnish only more or less scattered and unsystematized data, which the mind tries to gather up and construct into a unity of presentation, *supplying lacks* of impressions, as in the case of the "blind spot on the retina," from its own store of cognitions.

Now what I would ask is to have this in general admirably stated theory of inferential perception extended to the ego, in common with all other objects.† The stock or stone is not, to be sure, allowed to judge its own case; but it is permitted to *testify* in its own case; and we draw inferences from this testimony as valid, if not complete. Why then should the ego be allowed to say nothing of itself? Why should it, if brought into court at all, be brought

*The difficulty here, however, is to be certain that we have a *single* impulse. Applying the edge of a card to a rapidly turning toothed wheel will furnish a tone, formed by the successive strokes of the teeth against the card. But the single strokes also probably give short tones, though perhaps often undistinguishable as such.

†If after all, the writer referred to, in denying to the mind a power of introspection, only means in substance to deny that one, taking as it were for a guide a sort of intellectual lantern, can survey the inner chambers of his being, and take an inventory of his powers and faculties in the state of quiet slumber, I certainly have no quarrel with him.

only to show its pleasure or disgust, its interest or indifference towards certain objects? The behavior of objects towards each other does indeed form an important class of data for judging of them. The more sensitive any object to the presence of others, the more valuable, in general, is the testimony given. The ego, being an exceedingly sensitive object, at least in the ego's own view, may thus form a very fit subject for this kind of experimenting. But why should not the ego be the primary, rather than the secondary object in the case?

Perhaps the right of the ego to give testimony in its own case can be better seen in view of the fact that, beyond the reach of touch, nature generally appears to present, as it were, her psychic side to our senses. Light is not a mere placid and motionless medium, but a living activity. Stöckhardt, in his *Chemistry*, says: "As we discern in ourselves the visible body, and its ruler, the invisible spirit, so we recognize in external nature bodies which we can handle and weigh, and *forces* and *powers* ruling these bodies and having no weight." He thus recognizes a psychic and an anti-psychic character as distributed throughout the universe. In calling the anti-psychic the visible he uses the language of common life. The almanac, though the work of science, says on the same principle that the sun rises and sets. Take away what he calls *forces* and *powers* from what he calls *bodies*, and how many sensations should we ever after get from the latter? Is it not quite as truly the force of gravity that we weigh as it is the body which that force "rules?" Of course we are not to separate body and force otherwise than as two opposed polarities of the same entity; but the term *body*, in so far as it is a symbol for spent force or force in equilibrium, will, if unmoved by any foreign force, and if we let it rest, and do not by any force of ours disturb its equilibrium, rarely exhibit any very striking phenomena to our senses.

It is not the cold, dull iron, but the iron roused by the powerful force of heat until its particles fairly quiver with excitement, that glows to the eye like sunshine. Less animated with caloric force, it sends out genial rays of warmth. Water, too, on being highly heated, exhibits a force directly correlated to the muscular sense.

* P. 21.

When properly *embodied* in this heated state, it becomes almost an ego, doing the muscle-work of a multitude of men,—work which costs man expense of psychic energy. In the form of steam, then, water is revealed as power or force; and in this force-form how do we imagine it to be exalted to kinship with what generates our own motions. Even when the falling water turns the wheel, the force of gravity is the real phenomenon. It was a scintillation from the same force that shot into the mind of Newton at the moment of the apple's fall. As soon as this ever-living force was fairly perceived, the principles of all free motion, terrestrial and celestial, began to be revealed. Indeed, *energy*, instead of being, as conceived from an old stand-point, something naturally latent or hidden, is really the only thing known. Science never flourished until it directed its attention to forces and energies—to the live side of existence. Motion is conceived to be everywhere. The hum of business would be heard in the flint and the diamond, if our physical ear were like the ear of science. The atom, the last relic of unyielding solidity, will probably in the end melt away, and evaporate into the transparencies of number and order.

Since this change of tactics the success of science has been wonderful. Not more sure is that embodiment of force, nitro-glycerine, to tunnel the solid mountain than is a proper conception of forces to penetrate and light up the opacities of being. It is pleasant in this connection to read the words of Prof. Balfour Stewart, uttered so lately as August 26, at Bristol, remembering that their author is regarded as one of the best expounders of the just-named conception: "It cannot be doubted that a great generalization is looming in the distance—a mighty law, we can not yet tell what, that will reach us, we can not yet say when. It will involve facts hitherto inexplicable, facts that are scarcely received as such, because they appear opposed to our present knowledge of their cause. It is not possible, perhaps, to hasten the arrival of this generalization beyond a certain point; but we ought not to forget that we can hasten it, and that it is our duty to do so. * * *

* * If governments would understand the ultimate material advantage of every step forward in science, however inapplicable each may appear for the moment to the wants or pleasures of ordinary life, they would find reasons patent to the meanest capacities for

bringing the wealth of mind, now lost on the drudgery of common labors, to bear on the search for those wonderful laws which govern every movement, not only of the mighty masses of our system, but of every atom distributed throughout space."

One degree of universality of a "mighty law" was indeed already grasped in the Newtonic perception of gravity; but now, it seems, a higher and profounder significance of such a law is "looming up" in the distant mental horizon. It is worth noticing that it is the eventually to be grasped "law" that is to clear up the "hitherto inexplicable" and "hardly received" "*facts*," and not the inexplicable facts that are to enact the law in the first instance. Just in accordance with this view is it that not the elliptic orbital motions of the planets first revealed to Newton the universal law of gravitation; but this law rationalized the otherwise mysterious motions, and "worked out, instantly and absolutely, a complete revolution in the whole science of Astronomy;"* and all this, notwithstanding the fact that Galileo and Kepler had already so mastered by experiment and observation many of the particular phases of motion as to have accurately formulated them, setting their stakes, as it were, by trial just where pure theory was destined to set them; the difference in favor of the latter being, however, that its triumphs were to be at once without limit either in space or time.

Another illustration of the fact that Nature shows herself to advantage on her liveliest side, and in her most animated moods, is given in the case of incandescent metallic vapors, which by virtue of their intense vibratory motions shed their own light; and in this light make their own mark so legible that, whether simple or combined, they can be distinguished through the spectroscope as far as light can fathom distance. But we need not multiply illustrations. We know that every experiment on matter is designed to cause it to display some force or energy, and that it is also designed to make matter more intelligible. We know, too, that the man who frequently performs on himself the experiment of *thinking* is generally better acquainted with himself than one who seldom makes this experiment; and for what better reason than that thinking is a

* Mitchell, *Popular Astronomy*, p. 192.

cognizable object? We may have "unconscious cerebration,"* for we leave unnoticed very much that is in itself noticeable; but we certainly do have some conscious cerebration, or *results* of cerebration. Intuitive self-perception in the most literal sense may be wanting, as all intuition in the same sense may be; but that the mind takes successive impressions of its own throbs and thrills cannot really be made more sure by argument. What can be more certain than that one can generally, if called upon, repeat the thought of the last moment with considerable accuracy, although the stimulus or occasion for that thought may no longer exist? Its revival or repetition without a present objective cause shows that some impression, or set of impressions, was made which still lingers; and that it was a cognizable impression must be granted, to account for our knowing what is called for when we are asked to repeat our last thought.

So far, then, as spiritual or psychic self-cognition is concerned, the drift of thought has served to carry us into a forgetfulness of the disclaimer at the outset of an intention to answer the question placed as a heading. Within the sphere of the individual ego, the spiritual appears to be as directly cognizable as any other phenomena. But the question whether man is capacitated for spiritual perception has a much wider application than this subjective one; and it is as to this wider application of the question that a pretty general feeling of ignorance probably prevails. Assuming our position, then, on the apparently firm ground of self-consciousness, we are nevertheless standing on the brink of an uncertain ocean, distrusting our powers of direct vision, by ever so much peering, to discover whether there be life in its depths or pearls on its bottom. "We have heard the fame thereof with our ears;" there is no lack of *testimony*; but would that the billows would waft along one of these phosphorescent tracts in which we might get a glimpse of the truth for ourselves! But is there even phosphorescence for us in the spirit-realm? Is spirit in any proper sense radiant? or is each individual spirit light and self-conscious within, but closed around by windowless walls, cutting off, abso-

* Keeping up the notion of vibratory cerebration, we might imagine some cerebral activity pitched on too high or too low a key for our perceptive self-consciousness.

lutely, all direct communication? No doubt the common view of men is that, while they know their own thoughts, they, if they please, have these thoughts exclusively to themselves. They have but to bar their own mouths, and all that transpires within is an absolute secret. If this be unqualifiedly so, our question must have a negative answer, so far as one class of spiritual perception is concerned. But only asking that a view more promising to psychic science may have the benefit of the doubt, we may conceive the spiritual, as a possible object of perception, to be divisible into two parts or classes, the personal and the impersonal spiritual—or, in other words, spiritual beings and spiritual truths. These classes would of course admit of subdivision; but as our present consideration of them is to be very brief, it will not be worth while to draw nice distinctions. Possibly it might be objected that there is no impersonal department of the spiritual; and I am not indisposed to allow that there is some force in the objection. Still, from the ordinary stand-point of abstraction, there appears to be a distinction between truth by itself and its personal incorporations.

For our present purpose spiritual truth may be extended so as to include the purely theoretical side of all science. Using the term *idea* with somewhat less than Hegelian strictness, we may include in the department of spiritual truth the whole region of intellectual ideas. Here there are presented two opposite views: the one maintaining that ideas result wholly from experience; the other, that they are innate. The experimental method of attaining them may be roughly illustrated by the procedure of the bee-hunter, who, after allowing the chance-discovered bee to load itself with the honey in his box, watches the direction it takes in its homeward flight; and, when by repeated trials with this bee and those by which it may afterwards be accompanied, he has well established the direction, carries his box with bees inclosed to another location, and there likewise determines the direction of their home by their flight; and so pursues the same method until, by a kind of rough-cast triangulation, he fixes approximately the place where the treasure he seeks must be located, and then going thither, searches from tree to tree until perchance he finds it. The bees which he has observed have flown in different directions; but there has been unity of aim. Now it is the unity of aim in a variety of

phenomena that the philosopher seeks. This gives him, by the *practical* method, an idea or law of the phenomena. By way of example we may recall to mind again the discovery of the principle of gravity. Before the days of Newton it was perceived that the motion of the planets in elliptic orbits round the sun involved, for some mysterious reason, a deflection of the planets' naturally rectilinear motion *towards the sun*; and that a similar movement of the satellites around the primaries involved a like deflection towards the latter; also, that the fall of bodies towards the earth's centre must have a cause, and that the tides must be due to some agency of the moon. What was lacking was a *unity* of all these indications. A dim presentiment that there might be such a unity seems long to have been felt. What was the full meaning of all these particular tendencies of bodies towards other bodies? The indication was not of course that, as in the case of the bees, all bodies are tending towards some one point in space. The case was not so plain as that. The tendencies were shown, too, for the most part, at any one moment, merely by slight deflections, and not by a direct aim. The complexity of the problem was much increased by this fact. The mental triangulation by which an idea is sought for through the contemplation of phenomena is, thus, more difficult than that employed in bee-hunting. No wonder, then, that years rolled on while philosophers puzzled their brains over the knotty question about the true significance of planetary motions. But at last a unity of perception in some way worked itself out. All the phenomena in the case pointed to the *one fact* that all bodies throughout the universe attract each other precisely on the same principle as the earth attracts the falling apple.

Thus far we have been looking for our central idea from a circumferential stand-point. We have been conceiving of a few external observations as telling circumstantially upon a profound secret at the very heart of nature. That our present view is the one actually accordant with the history of the case may be plausibly argued from the fact that the first partial formulations of the facts regarding motion clung almost as closely to what had been observed as the tables of the average expectation of life do to the statistics of longevity. Kepler's first law of planetary motion, "Every planet revolves in an elliptical orbit around the sun, which

occupies the focus," meant, when first made out with reference to the planet Mars, that after long observation of the actual motion, and a tedious trial of successive hypotheses in order to get at some regular shaping of the orbit, the ellipse was finally found to fit the case, and hence was adopted as the type of the planetary courses; but did not mean that every body moving under the influence of a central and centrifugal force *must describe one of the conic sections*. The latter is a pure theoretical deduction, and came later in the history of science, which is just what the experimental theory of the origin of ideas would seem to require.

But while the generalization of experience may furnish ground for a pretty fair theory of scientific cognition, especially if ancestral experience be taken into the account as handed down to descendants in the form of what might be termed ready-made experience; yet there are interesting phases of the subject from other points of view. Indeed it might be imagined that the bare fact of looking for a unity of significance in phenomena implies a preconception, dim perhaps, of the unit-idea. It probably only requires a sufficiently general mode of analysis to bring an answer out of every intelligible problem; and so the ability to state the problem has great significance. The spirit of inquiry which men indicate to some extent almost everywhere may be imagined to issue from a mental substrate of embryonic ideas struggling to come to the light. But, at all events, there occur now and then instances of striking facility in the development of ideas, such as naturally to suggest either an unacquired knowledge or an intuitive acquisition of it. It would in some instances seem as if individuals, by a happy conjuncture, have an ear at a focal point in nature's "Whispering Gallery," where the scattered rays of truth meet, and give an audible utterance to nature's laws.

How often in discourses on the powers of mind do we meet with passages like the following: "The imagination sometimes anticipates, at any existing epoch of information, a subsequent epoch, when all the facts collected up to that date justify the anticipation. They are interpreted by a law, or by a mode of force which puts them forth. They arrive at length in sufficient number, and in relations obvious enough to vindicate the previous divinings of imagination. Hardly a great man, from Pythagorus downward, can

be mentioned who did not have fore-feelings of the genuine scientific direction, in number and mathematical relation, in the qualities of motion and their application to planetary phenomena, in the sphericity of the earth and stars, in the law of musical intervals, in the applications of the arc and conic sections, in the position of the earth in the solar system. Before the facts were in, the method was surmised; sometimes the law itself was hinted at and imperfectly formulated."*

Can it be that the forces of nature are radiances as well? and that the imagination here spoken of acts as the mind's eye? Is it certain that our impressional apparatus is less sensitive than the magnetized steel needle that scents the poles from invisible electric waves? In the auroral light we have indeed those same electric waves rendered visible. So, too, the invisible rays of the solar spectrum above the violet can, by the intervention of certain media, be converted into lively color. How do we know but that the most vacant space is full of instruction, if we will lend an attentive ear to its "still small voice?" Is there not, in this view, some intelligible significance in the words of the Psalmist, anticipating, perhaps, the discoveries of still future science: "Their (the heavenly bodies') string (musical tone) is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world?"

It will be observed that the kind of perception about whose possibility a question is here raised is not, strictly speaking, to be thought of as occurring *before* experience. An affirmative answer to our question would not take the side of innate ideas in the strict sense. The question is simply whether an experience much more ethereal than what we ordinarily imply by the term may not possibly result in cognitive action. If a battery of the size of a percussion cap is powerful enough to send a thrill through an ocean cable that shall give a signal at its farther end, if every disturbance in the atmosphere of the sun is marked at the earth's distance by an oscillation in the magnetic needle, may not our psychic organism be impressible in some way by extremely subtle agencies?

Here it may be objected that, though the nerves may be ever so sensitive, the signal which they give can be interpreted at first only

* See Jour. of Spec. Phil., Vol. VI. Theories of Mental Genesis, by John Weiss.

in the light of better known facts. For instance, a person having some tender spot may feel in it an obscure and apparently causeless sensation of pain. A short time after a storm occurs. The same succession may be repeated until at length an association is established, so that whenever the peculiar pain occurs, the storm is anticipated. But even here it cannot be denied that the cause of the sensation is logically connected with the cause of the storm. Neither can it be denied that the experiential interpretation could possibly be *anticipated* by a mysterious agency called instinct; at all events, if the subject were an animal. A brood of chickens but a few days old, on hearing from their mother, herself tied, the peculiar croak which hens make on the sight of a hawk, ran instantly away from her, and took shelter under a currant bush ten feet distant. They understood the tone of warning, and took exactly the proper steps for protection against the threatened evil; although it is very doubtful if they had ever seen a hawk. Some explain such instinctive perception as being an heirloom of ancestral experience; the chick having a hereditary dread of hawks recorded on the brain. In this view, instinct would be in a measure referable to the innate idea. Possibly ordinary sense-perception may admit of a similar reference. The eye, as an instrument for quickly constructing a distinct image from a succession of impulses, perhaps each by itself dark, may be looked upon as a net-work of ancestral experiences, automatically active in summing up the meaning of elementary data, as if it were a "calculating machine" for this purpose. The multiplication table is a sort of numerical eye for the child who has simply memorized it. As a counterpart to this view of sense perception, we may look at the want of a sense-organ—a lack of eyes, for instance, in some of the fishes of Mammoth Cave—as evidence of a want or interruption of ancestral experience.

But again our train of thought is broken in upon by the objection that, though an analogue of hereditary instinct may, perhaps, produce the phenomena of some child-prodigies, and might convert an obscure feeling into the anticipation of a storm, even on the subject's first experience of the kind, it cannot so easily be thought as a diviner of truth unknown to previous experience. As it has not been proposed to make the subject of our inquiry perfectly clear,

but only to suggest a few bearings of our question, we will only observe that the development of new truth does not necessarily imply an equal evolution of new power to apprehend truth: the education of the eye of the watchmaker, acquired in the prosecution of his art, could undoubtedly be diverted to the uses of anatomic study, either in his own case, or if you please, in that of his progeny, so far as the results of experience become hereditary. So a power of mental grasp acquired by a course of metaphysical speculation, may be turned over to physical research, probably without any violent transformation in the power itself. While, then, it is the least of our desire to deny real progress of mind with every revolution of science, it does not seem necessary to pre-suppose any miraculously sudden increment of mental power, in order to conceive the possibility of an analogue of intuition as a method of perceiving what lies beyond the supposed limits of sense.

Turn we now to give a moment's thought to the question, whether the individual spirit can perceive the motions of other spirits. Nothing, it seems, could be more interesting than to know that spiritual or psychic converse is really practicable. The opening up of any new means of communication and interchange of thought is hailed with delight. The more ethereal the medium through which the new form of communication is made, the more does man esteem himself exalted by the acquisition. But as regards the possibility of a more direct method of conveying impressions from person to person than the ordinarily recognized ones, any attempt at discussion is beset with two special difficulties. In the first place, the subject has been rendered repulsive to the largest class of intelligent persons, by the extravagant vagaries of spiritualists so-called, whose pretended exhibitions of spirit-phenomena have been so gross as almost to make the mention of the theme disgusting. In the second place, there is very great difficulty in obtaining even a small amount of clear and reliable evidence of relevant facts. If one can withdraw his attention from the degrading pretensions of modern spiritualism, he may find open to view a wide field for scientific exploration, yet a field wherein objects wear a wonderfully vague and changeful aspect. If one could be persuaded to believe implicitly the stories and traditions

relating to dreams, omens, miraculous occurrences, apparitions, warnings, second sight, remarkable coincidences, and such like, which have been recorded, he might think the dearth of materials not so striking as has been suggested; but, probably, very few intelligent thinkers of this critical age would venture to found a science on materials of this kind. Evidence of all kinds has now to be closely scrutinized and tested, before it is admitted to serious consideration as truth. Even if one consult his own experience, and that of well known friends, he will still find it exceedingly difficult to discriminate between subjective impressions, the work of one's own brain, and impressions referable to an objective cause. In dreaming, one may sometimes be conscious enough to raise the question at the time, whether what is passing is dream or reality; but how disappointed we sometimes are, to find that what a moment ago was determined by logical tests to be real is after all but "the baseless fabric of a dream!"

But the difficulty in procuring clear evidence does not always deter men from pursuing inquiries. Amid what a maze of uncertainties has almost every science taken its start! Chemistry, which commenced with alchemy, and geology, which required centuries of time to prove that fossils were ever alive, are two competent witnesses to this point. But persistent observation gradually clears up obscurities, and gives form to what was at first shapeless; as witness the fact that science now sits in judgment on the chemistry and geology, not of the earth only, but of the sun and planets. One great fault with the more honest "spiritualists" has been that they were so eager for the possession of an *art* of spiritual communication as to be unwilling to wait for the slow growth of a science, on which alone so subtle an art could be intelligently founded. If a spirit—"whether in the body or whether out of the body"—can send out an influence that shall affect another spirit, the effect upon the other is naturally to be expected, not in the form of either sounds or sights, but in some form appropriate to that peculiar order of influence. If one in any case sees forms, or listens to words, in consequence of an influence of this kind, such visions or sounds must be considered as indirect effects—transmutations of the original impressions, or associational additions to them.

Perhaps this point cannot be better illustrated than by a narration of recent experience, with a prefatory warning to the reader, however, that the case to be narrated very likely comes actually into the psychic sphere only on the subjective side; the objective psychic element being quite possibly due to fantasy, as so often proves to be the case. The writer a few nights since, retiring late, fell shortly into a drowse; in which state he seemed to himself to be standing with his wife just outside his house, and there to hear some one distinctly call her by the family name, "Mrs. A——." He instantly became conscious enough to hear from his wife, who had been asleep before his retirement, a sort of vocal indication that she too had heard something. The question immediately arose, whether she might have dreamed the same thing simultaneously with himself. In a moment the doubt was solved by her waking, and asking if *he* had just called her; and adding that she had heard (not her surname, but) her given name, "M——," distinctly uttered, and thought he called her, and that she had answered, "what?" as she supposed. There could scarcely have been a second's difference in the time of the two hearings of the different names of the same person. Now, if it be possible that the cause of the two psychic impressions was a common one, the impressions must have been differently translated by the persons receiving them, in accordance with the respective assumed hypotheses with regard to the origin of the call; the one thinking it to be the address of a comparative stranger to his wife, and shaping the name accordingly; and the other imagining it to be the familiar voice of her husband.

The occurrence would probably be set down by most as an "accidental coincidence;" which, possibly, may be all the interpretation required. It might, indeed, have been that some sound was heard by the two persons, which was resolved into words by each; still the peculiarity remains that both heard the same one addressed, and conceived the address to come from a personal source. Of course, no one would think of attaching any great amount of meaning to such an occurrence. But, if every phenomenon means something, it may not be amiss to take cognizance of the little things of experience. An ardent admirer of the atomic theory would doubtless give more to see an *atom* than a mountain.

The atom is his *unit* of material being, in the conception of which he sees the whole fabric. The more elementary the study of psychic science can be made, the more reliable will be its results. In this view of the value of little things, it may be worth while to notice in reference to the question, whether psychic power can send out radiance, that animals certainly do radiate heat, and that the fire-fly can, apparently at will, transform vital energy into light; or at all events, can *radiate* light. We know, too, that the electric eel can give shocks of great force, as well as generate electric sparks; and that this ability is not absolutely peculiar to this kind of animal, is proved by the fact of occasionally a human person's being found possessed of the same sort of power.

Now, considering that these radiant and communicable forces, known to be possessed by animals, are so kindred with the sun's own rays, is it a very wild generalization to infer that all animate beings are radiant beings? Of course, the supposition that there may be grades of radiance characteristic of each animate order, up to the most rational, would be a hypothesis wholly without proof. But what many may think of sooner than of questioning the hypothesis would be the question: Of what use can such an infinitesimal emission of energy as we can suppose in the case, be as an agent of communication? As well might we think of reading by the light of a star of the seventh magnitude, or of warming ourselves by moonlight, as to think to get wisdom or pleasure from the faint emanations from human thought or emotion!

Here, once more, Nature comes to furnish some relief to the argument on the other side, by offering examples of agencies extremely weak in some respects, but much stronger as measured by other aspects. Tyndall says, "No doubt every luminous ray is also a heat-ray; but the light-giving power is not even an approximate measure of the calorific energy of a beam." Now, the moon-beams, after having their *invisible* heat-rays absorbed by the atmosphere, sometimes reach us with illuminating power enough almost to turn night into day; and yet the best experimenters have found extreme difficulty in detecting signs of heat in them. The reason assigned for the difference of effects is that the eye is sensitive to an exceedingly minute influence of light. The adaptation of spiritual or

psychic influence to psychic susceptibility may be, for aught we know to the contrary, still finer.

We will omit any special consideration of possible influence from disembodied spirits, or from the great Sun of spiritual being—closing with those memorable words of Hamlet:

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

ART. VIII—FAITH AND ITS OBJECTS.

If we start with the general idea of faith as trust or belief, trusting in or believing in, and then regard it as an activity especially of man's spiritual nature, we shall find that it grows out of his need of God. He is made for God, and cannot rest until he rests in God. This idea of faith is of course very general, and if we aimed at a concise definition we would need to distinguish the need here referred to from other necessities of our nature, as for instance, that of our knowing faculties. To know God here also is one of the deepest necessities of our nature, and the knowledge of God lies at the foundation of all other knowledge. We speak of faith, however, as starting in a want of the spirit, and as referring to the apprehension of the God by our moral nature.

This want of our moral nature in its broadest sense is our sense of dependence. Man is dependent on God, and therefore he needs God. His life is only relative; it has no absolutely independent existence, but must draw its constant supply from God. Hence he must look to God in the way of trust or confidence, much as the child looks to its parent.

This trust or confidence, however, passes into a more positive state when it becomes a reaching out after and a real apprehension of God as He is pleased to come to man in meeting his spiritual need. In this sense it becomes an activity of the spirit in relation to God, like the activity of the senses in relation to the material world, or like the intellect in appropriating truth. As the natural world in a certain sense enters our being through the senses, so that what we see and taste becomes a part of ourselves; or as we appropriate

intellectual truth through our thinking faculty, and make it our own, a part of ourselves; so faith really appropriates what our spiritual nature needs from God.

In this most general sense of faith there is implied for its activity a movement of God towards man. Just as the natural world must confront man with proper conditions before he can see, or taste, or hear, and just as truth must be brought to challenge the intellect, and by its presence stir up the activity of thought, so must God come to man, and by His presence enkindle the activity of faith. This implies already in the original order of things a revelation. The approach of God to man through revelation is primary, man's apprehension of Him by faith is a responsive activity. Without such approach of the divine, the human might have a sense of want, but it would perish in its want.

Hence in His original creation in Paradise God revealed Himself to man, and made known to him His law and grace; His law in the command requiring obedience, and His grace in the promise of life. The union and communion here offered, it is proper to observe, could not have been consummated by faith alone on the part of man. This would have been only the necessary condition on the human side. The union would have been effected rather by God's coming into communion with man in the way of spiritual life, the inflow of truth and grace from the absolute fountain of life.

In the trial man failed by unbelief. He believed and trusted in the arch-deceiver rather than God, and so he fell, fell away from God, and thus lost the normal bond of union with Him. This separation from God left him a prey to the ungodly and infernal powers of spiritual darkness, and as a consequence his whole nature came to be depraved.

In providing redemption for man, God comes to him a second time to open up the fountains of love, of truth and grace, in order that they may flow into his being and that he may live and not die. This approach on the part of God requires that He should break through the barriers of sin, death and hell. Sin must be removed, the law vindicated, and death overcome, before God could again confront man, and bid him to look and live. Hence the incarnation, the life, and death, and resurrection of Christ. And that the communion might begin in the sphere of the spirit, where

the fall began, the presence of God in redemption is now made to confront man in the Holy Spirit. Life is offered to him a second time, and he is called upon to believe, and in believing to open his spirit to the inflow of grace from above.

But although all the barriers that stood in the way of God's approach to man are now removed, so that Christ represents Himself as really standing at the door and knocking, in order to find entrance into man, yet there is still on man's side the hindrance of sin and unbelief, the one the cause of the other. How can God dwell with sinful man? God is holy, and His presence where sin abounds brings with it only judgment and condemnation. But the divine presence now, through the Spirit, itself carries with it the pardon of sin and its antidote. It is the presence of redemptive life, and man is challenged to believe in God's love to him, notwithstanding his sin. The very act of believing then so far as man is concerned opens the way for the divine presence in its redemptive power.

At this point the question in regard to justification by faith presents itself. Just as long as the sinner feels himself guilty before God and his sin unpardoned, he resists God's approach because he knows that it carries with it for him condemnation. He is challenged to believe that God is ready to regard him as righteous, free from guilt and sin, if he believes in the Lord Jesus Christ, with a full surrender of himself to Him. And yet such an act of faith implies that he *is* in some sense delivered from the guilt of sin. We can only say in reference to this point, that here the divine and human factors come together in the work of salvation in a way that is a mystery. The case is analogous to that of the man with a withered hand, when Christ commanded him to stretch it forth. He had no power of his own to do so, and yet faith required him to obey. The command itself conveyed the ability through his faith.

What, now, is the true object of faith in the justification of the sinner? What is he to believe? Is it the proposition that Christ has made full satisfaction for all his sins, and that there is for him now full and free pardon? That certainly is involved, but that is not the object of his faith in the proper sense. He believes, properly speaking, not in a proposition, but in Christ who confronts him with His redemptive work, carrying in His own person par-

don for sin and grace to renew and sanctify him. And the gift received by faith is, not merely the pardon of sin, but Christ as his Saviour, carrying into his soul the actual deliverance from the fetters of sin, and in this the removal of guilt.

This is the reason he is, and must be, justified by faith and not by the works of the law. Not because a full and perfect conformity to the law would not justify him, were that possible, for Christ Himself said to a certain one "this do" (*i. e.*, obey the law by loving the Lord, etc., and thy neighbor as thyself) "and thou shalt live." But no one can obey the law perfectly in this spirit of love without receiving Christ, who is the end of the law to all that believe. And he can receive Christ only by faith, because faith here is just such receptivity on the part of the spirit as is necessary for His entrance into the soul.

Would it not follow from this that it is only by receiving Christ that man becomes righteous, and that his justification is therefore predicated of an infused righteousness, according to the Roman theory? We answer, no, because his very act of faith puts him in such right relation to God objectively as that God can now look upon him as reconciled to Him even before he has become subjectively perfectly righteous. This carries, with it, indeed, the guarantee that in Christ he shall be freed actually from all sin in his sanctification and glorification. But the Roman theory reverses the order here. Acceptance with God is measured by the degree of sanctification attained, and thus justification and sanctification are identified. Moreover, the Roman theory left the fact of being in grace and accepted of God in uncertainty. This is sometimes overlooked in the present controversy with Rome, which is made to turn on the certainty of the external rule of faith or dogmatic teaching. The infallibility of the pope is held up against the various and varying confessions of Protestantism, and a certitude is claimed for the former which the latter does not possess. In the time of the Reformation the question of certitude turned on a different point, *viz.*: subjective certitude, the certitude which faith brings to the believer.

It may indeed be said that this latter, subjective certitude, must depend on a certainty in regard to the teaching of the Church. Protestantism itself has, at times, unwittingly fallen into this same

Roman error when it supposed itself to be farthest from Rome; as in the 17th century, its scholastic period, when it placed the certainty in regard to the inspiration of Scripture and belief in certain passages of Scripture in the place of the testimonium spiritus sancti, as held in the time of the Reformation. And large sections of Protestantism still manifest a tendency to rest here, when they place belief in the inspiration of Scripture as the first article in a summary of the Christian faith.

The question here becomes perplexing, for we seem to be in a vicious circle from which there is no escape. But the right relation of the two Reformation principles helps us to solve the difficulty. Faith here, we may say emphatically, must have its rights. Christ and the everlasting verities of our holy religion must have a self-authenticating power which is on an equality, to say the least, with any external testimony. Nay, with the Reformers, we give it chief place, without by any means leaving out of view the necessity of the Scripture as the rule of faith.

We could show, we think, that such was the case when our Saviour challenged the faith of His disciples in His person, and we could show that the same was the case in the Apostles' preaching. Neither the inspiration of the Scriptures, nor the infallibility of the Church, demonstrated to the mind, formed the foundation for the certitude of faith in Christ.

There are two points here that seem to call for further elucidation. First, in regard to the object of faith in justification. The Reformers made this to consist in the forgiveness of sins, and the object of faith was for them the promise of pardon through Christ. When *Osiander* brought out the idea that the whole Christ is the object of faith, and that His righteousness is formed in us, he was opposed, and even Melancthon urged against him that in his theory the forgiveness of sins was not made sufficiently special. But while the Reformers did thus make prominent this point, they did not separate it from the reception of Christ. The Christological principle does not contradict their position, but it complements it. The Christological is broader than the soteriological.

The other point pertains to the question of certitude in regard to salvation, or the forgiveness of sin, as it was often stated. God's word gives us assurance of this on the condition of faith; then our

faith itself gives assurance of our justification and the truth of the word at the same time. We must not separate Christ, as He is present by the Holy Spirit, from His word—the one is in the other. No external word, in itself, can authenticate Christ to us, for He is greater than the word. But the word is Christ's word, and when He comes He is recognized as the author of it. So the Old Testament word pointed to Christ, and was evidence of His mission and claim when He came. And He pointed the Jews to this testimony, "What think ye of Christ? whose son is he?" And He convicted them of error and unbelief by quoting from the Old Testament against them. But this did not secure their faith in Him. Only those who were of the truth heard His words, and they recognized in His words the same that spake unto them in the Old Testament word.

It may be said that the Mohammedan and the Buddhist, and all false religionists, claim also this subjective certitude. That is true, and it is true also that they claim to rest on an infallible revelation; so that the point made by introducing them holds quite as forcibly against the certitude that is based on external infallible teaching, as upon that which rests on a subjective apprehension of the truth. Nay, the argument, that because there is what is regarded as an assurance of faith in false religions, therefore there can be no validity in the assurance of faith in the true religion, proves too much. For the same argument would prove that there can be no certainty anywhere; for there is no true science but has error arrayed against it, and that by those who claim sincerity and believe their error. No external word from God asserting the efficacy of prayer could convince Tyndail that there is such efficacy in prayer, because he would ask that that word should be authenticated in his mind by its agreement with the truth before he would believe it is God's word; for, he would say, God cannot contradict Himself. But God in His natural creation confines all events to the operation of natural laws. How then can He ask us to believe a divine word which is in conflict with His word in nature or science? So we come to the point where our Saviour leaves it. "He that is of God, heareth God's words." It is only to faith, which grounds itself in a right relation to the truth on the part of the spirit, that saving truth can authenticate itself; and a mere his-

torical faith, or a conviction wrought by external testimony, cannot authenticate saving faith, for that would make the less authenticate the greater. The two evidently go together. The one does not prove the other, but both unite as one and the same divine word.

This does not mean that Christianity cannot maintain its truth against unbelieving science. It can answer every objection, and show that science does not contradict revelation. But it cannot, by such demonstration to natural reason, convert unbelieving science to saving faith. Christ Himself did not attempt to convert men in that way. "If ye were of the truth, ye would hear my words."

This seems to be a digression from the point we were considering in regard to justification, the ground of which we found to be, according to Protestant teaching, not infused righteousness, *justitia inherens*, but imputed righteousness, *justitia putativa*, in the true sense. We hold up here again the case of the man with a withered hand. He believed, and in believing received power. If he had waited until he had a sense of power given him before he believed, he would not have stretched forth his hand at all. So now the challenge of Christ through the spirit awakens the slumbering energies of the soul, and requires the sinner to believe that he is accepted of God for the sake of Christ's merits, as a condition for his subjective sanctification. This must be the starting point, without which any effort to attain to righteousness in any other way must prove futile, for whatever is not of faith is sin.

But our digression has brought out what we wish to make prominent in the treatment of our subject, viz., that just as it is not a proposition which is the object of faith in justification, so also neither the Bible nor the Church is the primary object of faith, but the Lord Jesus Christ.

If it be true that man's deepest spiritual want is God, fellowship and communion with Him, as we assumed in the beginning of this article, and Christ is God revealed to us for our salvation, then Christ, immediately and directly, is the true object of faith. Faith apprehends Him as bringing life, spiritual life, of which He is the source. Just as really as the disciples trusted in Him, and by faith received His present help when He was on the earth, and just as really as they received Him as a present Saviour

through the baptism of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, and realized that His presence with them was closer, and His life was more really in them than when He was with them in the flesh, so He is in like manner the immediate object of the believer's faith now. To these assertions there is a general assent among Christians. But in order not to misunderstand them, we need to consider the relation of the means of grace to Christ and to faith; otherwise we might fall into the error of the fanatics of the Reformation, nay of the mystics of every age, who proclaim an unmediated Christ, and deny the means of grace; or of those who retain the use of these means, and yet, in regard to some of them at least, turn them into empty signs, and thus render them nugatory, or else find in them a magical power.

Against the error of the first we must assert the historical character of Christianity. Christ established a kingdom or economy of grace, in which, since His departure from the earth, in His glorification He continues to dwell through the Holy Spirit. Hence the Church is called His body, and His promise is, "Lo! I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." As the soul is present in the human body, filling it at all points with life, so Christ is present in His mystical body, the Church, and there continually reveals the power of His glorified life. The Church does not stand between the believer and Christ, as though he may come to the one first, and then to the other. The graft that is inserted in the tree is placed, not only in union with the limbs and trunk, but at the same time with the life that is in these, and which is present equally and directly in every portion.

What is true of the Church in general, is true of the means of grace appointed in the Church, the Word and the Sacraments. We are concerned here first with the relation of the means of grace to Christ, and then afterwards with the relation of faith to the means of grace. It has been asserted by some that faith is the medium of communication between Christ and the believer; that what the waves of the air are to that which sets them in motion, producing sound, and what the wave of ether is to the object setting it in motion producing light as effect, such a medium is faith, by which Christ conveys Himself and His salvation to the soul. This analogy, besides being very poor because taken from inorganic nature,

where analogies are seldom found in the Scriptures, is at fault because it leaves out of view the Holy Spirit and the means of grace.

How is Christ present as He challenges faith on the part of men? Evidently through the Word of God. Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God. The preached Word is the form in which Christ continues His ministry on earth, calling men to repent and believe on Him.

Christ through the Holy Spirit is in the word, for the end and purpose for which the word is given. This union of Christ with the word is not effected by faith, although unbelief may cause that the one is not heard with the other. The word is not a mere record and statement for the intellect, but it is a living word, as though Christ still speaks to men calling them to Himself. The susceptible spirit hears his voice, and recognizes it as the voice of the Good Shepherd.

So also Christ is in the sacraments as forms or elements of the whole Gospel. The offer of salvation is made through the word, the sign and seal is presented in the sacraments. There is grace in the sacraments, according to their objective constitution, independent of the faith of man, but the grace is only for him who believes. It may be difficult to present the specific character of the grace in the sacraments as compared with the grace in the word. We can only reach this by inquiring what the Scriptures make known to us in regard to them. In holy baptism there is present the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the washing away of sin by the blood of Christ; in the Lord's Supper there are the body and blood of Christ for spiritual nourishment. Without attempting to explain more particularly the difference, we may say that it is Christ who is present in sacrament and word. Through the Holy Ghost, who takes of the things that are Christ's and makes them ours, these, the word and the sacraments, are the form or mode in which Christ Himself confronts us.

From this we can without great difficulty ascertain the relation of faith to the word and sacrament. In these means of grace Christ touches us, so to speak, makes His salvation reach us and elect us. Faith responds to the approach of Christ in and through these, and fixes itself on Him who is their life and substance. "It is not faith that makes the sacrament, but this is rather there as the object

of faith, which it must sooner or later lay hold of." We may distinguish, according to Luther, between the *essence* of baptism and its *power*, between its *validity* and its *beneficial effect*. He is speaking here of infant baptism. Hence in the Heidelberg catechism the baptized child is required to answer, "I am not my own, but belong unto my faithful Saviour, Jesus Christ, who has purchased me with His precious blood," etc., etc. All that is here spoken of as belonging to the child, belongs to it by baptism; yet it is evident that this inheritance can become real possession in the way of subjective experience only by faith.

The sacramental is always God's approach to us. Hence we cannot properly place faith in antithesis to the sacraments. We cannot properly say, "the believer receives the grace of God by faith, and not through the sacraments." He receives it *through* the sacraments, as appointed means, *by* faith.

Those who regard the sacraments as empty signs, and yet continue to observe them, are formalists in the bad sense, because they cling only to the form and reject the substance. This class observe the sacraments merely because God has commanded them to be observed. Baptism has nothing in it, but God has commanded us to be baptized, and it is our duty to obey. Or, in some cases, the benefit of baptism is regarded as magical. The mind is naturally inclined to associate something with such observances, and if it knows not the true it will substitute the false.

There is a strong tendency in certain sections of the Church to put doctrinal propositions in the place of Christ as the object of faith. To believe in the proposition that Christ has made atonement for sin, that God is willing therefore to pardon, and then to take home to himself this truth, this is looked upon as the course faith should take. Not a doctrinal proposition, but Christ is the true object of saving faith.

Then there is a tendency sometimes to divide Christ. His death on the cross is set up as the only fact that faith need embrace. All else is only subsidiary to this. He became incarnate only in order that it might be possible for Him to die on the cross. He kept the law because it was His nature to do so. He arose from the dead because His work of making propitiation by dying was over, and He ascended because He had nothing further to do

here on earth. Perhaps there is a tinge of caricature in this, but we make it in order to expose the error. Not the death of Christ, but Christ Himself is the true object of faith. First Christ, and then His work performed for our salvation, is the right order here. His work in every portion and element of it derives all its significance and value from His divine-human person. He is Emmanuel, God with us, and upon Him the believer rests his faith, and finds eternal peace and rest.

T. G. A.

THE UNION MOVEMENT.

LETTER FROM DR. PELTZ.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE MERCERSBURG REVIEW:—The article in the REVIEW for April last, on "The late union movement of the two Reformed Churches," seems to oblige me to make a brief declaration, which you will please publish in the next number of the REVIEW.

The excellent author makes the mistake of attributing motives to the Committee of the Reformed Church in America, which he would not have made had he known how thoroughly he has been led astray in his inferences.

Without an opportunity of consulting with my colleagues of that committee, I feel assured that I speak their convictions of what is just and fair, when I protest against anything of the kind being put on record as history in this case, *except the paper adopted by both committees.* (a)

That paper presents some of the inducements in favor of union, and some of the insuperable difficulties still powerful to prevent union. The committee, of which I have the honor to be a member, feeling the full force of these obstacles, regards union, at present, as impossible. Such is the honest conviction of every one of our committee present at the meeting in Philadelphia. We expect that our purposes and judgment will be admitted to be honest and fraternal.

In regard to the skeleton of a plan of union suggested by our brethren of the Reformed Church in the United States, it should be said that our committee sees nothing in it that could deserve the name of "*organic union.*" No such scheme would be enter-

tained for a moment in our Church, because there is no real union in it. If our committee seemed unable to see its advantages, the fact must be explained by the conviction that it has no advantages.

When the Dutch Church consults, in regard to union with a sister Church, she means something a thousand times closer and more affectionate than the plan blocked out by the esteemed writer of the article in the REVIEW. Unless we get much more than this, we would have less than nothing. (b)

Very pleasant and instructive were our conferences with the German Church. We have learned where our brethren stand. We do not feel that we are of one mind sufficiently to warrant any continued effort after organic union. This is only because we feel that union implies and requires more *unity* in creed and polity than the word suggests to some of our brethren of the other committee.

It is to be regretted that the historical article under consideration shows a disposition to question the good faith of the Reformed Church in America and of her Committee. But the official declaration of the Synods of the Reformed Church in the United States will be the proper sources of information upon these points. It has been my happy lot to enjoy large opportunities for conference with those Synods in an official capacity, and I cannot but believe that the friendly and affectionate interest of my own Church is reciprocated by those with whom I have been brought in contact. (c)

Whilst considering it due to truth to express this general demurrer to some declarations and insinuations in the paper alluded to, it is pleasant to express cordial appreciation of many declarations full of Christian confidence, sympathy and affection, uttered by the brethren of the Reformed Church in the United States. The unwelcome duty of correcting a wrong impression does not interfere with the enjoyment of pleasant recollections connected with all our intercourse with that Church and its representatives.

Yours very cordially,

PH. PELTZ.

New Paltz, N. Y., Sept. 17, 1875.

(a) The writer is correct here in one sense. What was adopted by the committees, and that only, can be regarded as the proceedings of the committees. But a history of the movement started by the Reformed Church in America, looking to a union with the Reformed Church in the United States, certainly includes more than the final paper adopted. The origin of the movement, and the action of the two General Synods, and the debates or speeches, these certainly form parts of the history of the movement. The writer in the REVIEW may not have succeeded in making it complete and entirely impartial; but as he prepared his article from

notes taken at the time, we may suppose it is correct. At any rate the writer of the above declaration and protest does not point out anything in the article that is not correct. We have only his assertion that it does injustice to the motives of the brethren from the Reformed (Dutch) Church. Where in the article, or how, we are not informed.

(b) We have nothing to say in regard to the merits of the skeleton of a plan of union, drawn up and presented by the writer of the article in the REVIEW. It may have been entirely inadequate for what was desired in the way of union. But when Dr. Peltz urges that it presented no plan for *organic union*, and that the Dutch Church wants something a thousand times closer and more affectionate than this plan proposed, he forgets, perhaps, that at that time his Church was negotiating with the Presbyterian Church South for a union which was *not* organic, and less close and affectionate than that contemplated in the plan offered at Philadelphia. Organic union is generally regarded as impossible at this time between the different denominations. Some think it undesirable. But if we cannot have that, may we not have something less, at least, to begin with?

(c) We acknowledge that the facts as brought out in the article in this Review, do not place the Reformed Dutch Church in the most pleasant attitude in reference to this union movement. She first proposed a union. The plan seemed to be at first to unite one of our Classes to their body. Then it extended so as to include one of our District Synods. It was said that all this grew out of a misunderstanding in regard to our government. When this mistake was corrected, the overture came to our General Synod, to which it ought to have been made at first. Now, when all things were ready to proceed, the committee from the Dutch Church suddenly came to a halt. *They had nothing to propose*—absolutely nothing. Our committee seemed to feel that after all that had gone before, some plan of union ought at least to be discussed, and accordingly they proposed one. It might be inadequate, but it would at least open the subject for discussion, and show that we were willing to respond to the cordial overture of the Dutch Church.

We do not remember that the author of the article reflected at all on the motives of the brethren from the Dutch Church. The facts may have seemed to produce the impression that they, after all, did not really desire a union with the German Church. We do not think that such was the case. We think the Dutch Reformed Church only made a mistake in initiating a movement for union before the time, and when they saw this they were ready to drop it. But the burden rests upon them. We did not interpose objections to union, but they did. It is best that it should be so. They

will feel all the more free to act hereafter, when the right time comes for a real and lasting union.

We cordially reciprocate the writer's kind regards for the German Church. We are sure that none but the kindest feelings are entertained by our Synods and people towards the Church which was sister to us in our early history in this country. If the article in the Review made any other impression, we regret it. [ED. REVIEW.]

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR EMBRACING THE DOCTRINES AND DISCLOSURES OF EMANUEL SWEDENBORG. By the Rev. George Bush, Late Professor of Hebrew in the New York University, with a Biographical Sketch of the Author. New York: Published by E. Hazzard Swinney, No. 20 Cooper Union, 1875.

A very interesting pamphlet of 120 pages. Prof. George Bush was well known as an eminent Biblical scholar, and his life is here sketched with vividness and skill by an admiring friend. It is the life of a conscientious man, an independent thinker and a laborious scholar. We admire his originality and independence. It is a misfortune certainly to be slavishly bound to theological ruts, as though theological science were inspired and we were bound to follow it as we follow the Bible itself. A certain independency belongs also to every man in regard to Church confessions and Church polity. But when we come to those things which belong to the creed and dogmas of the Church which have been believed and held through the ages, our fancied independence may become mere arbitrary opinion, and real bondage instead of freedom.

We are not told in this memoir what it was in the Presbyterian faith that Prof. Bush first rejected, whilst a Presbyterian minister, except his refusal to accept the Presbyterian polity as of divine appointment. Such a refusal certainly is no great offense. It seems, however, that he became dissatisfied with the whole Protestant conception of the Church, and especially with the idea of a ministry or priesthood. Then came his change of views on the subject of the resurrection, and the millennium, which, he believed, is passed, and the common view of the second coming of Christ and the end of the world. Before he had any acquaintance with Swedenborg's views, he had by independent investigation come to hold the same view of the resurrection, which, he held, takes place at death. When he discovered this coincidence he commenced the study of Swedenborg's revelations, and ended in becoming a convert to that system. In this pamphlet he gives his reasons for his conversion and endorsement of Swedenborgianism.

The pamphlet is worthy of high respect as emanating from a fine Biblical scholar, and as written with his acknowledged ability and

fairness. At the same time it presents in a brief compass the leading views of Swedenborg. Some of these views we propose briefly to notice.

Prof. Bush presents first his reasons for accepting Swedenborg's claim in regard to his knowledge of the spiritual world, which are based mainly on the fact that his disclosures commend themselves to our judgment and faith. They not only commend themselves as truthful, but are "of such a nature as to transcend the utmost grasp of the unassisted human faculties."

There is much in these disclosures that must commend them to every thinking person, but what we can accept is just what we believe, is held by such thinking persons in the Christian Church, apart from any supernatural revelation from Swedenborg. We think he misrepresents the common view of thoughtful Christians when he speaks of "the erroneous belief that man lives after death as a mere soul or mind, and that, not under the form of a man, but under the form of a breath or respiration, or a bubble of air, as arising from man's not knowing that the mind constitutes the interior form of the whole body." There is no doubt a wide-spread conception of the spiritual world as a mere abstraction; but those who obtain their views from the Word of God have no such thought. We believe that a man's *state* in the other world is what *he* is; that is, good or bad, according as he is such. We believe, moreover, that the other world has a sphere of existence,—that it is a world, but whether that sphere is in such correspondence to the natural world, that it has mountains and valleys, houses and animals just as here, except that they are spiritual, this we do not claim to know, because it has not been revealed. The whole argument, that the scenery of the spiritual world is a *projection* by spiritual beings, that our thoughts and fancies make realities, because whatever we think as spiritual beings are entities, reminds us of Fichte's theory of the natural world, that it is only a limitation of the *ego*, or of Kant's subjectivism. This, to our thinking, make that real world too much of an airy phantom, because it is purely subjective. As we believe in the objective entities of the natural world around us, even though they are in a sense merely phenomenal, so we like to think of realities in the order of the spiritual world as objective entities. In regard to this point, however, we allow freedom to every one to picture the other world according to his own best thoughts, in reference to all things not revealed in the Word of God.

But so far as Swedenborg's claim is concerned, that he was permitted to enter that world before death, and to make revelations concerning it beyond what is revealed through Christ, we must set it aside as conflicting with the one revelation made by Christ. His revelation is final and conclusive. He has told us all we ought to know of that world, and His teachings on this subject

are given in that book which is closed also, and to which no one may add anything. "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe through one arose from the dead." The rich man in Hades thought otherwise, but Abraham corrected him. We pretend not to be able to explain or account for Swedenborg's fancies on this point, but we must say of his claims here, that they fall under the condemnation of the Apostle: though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel (revelation), it must be rejected.

What Swedenborg says of angels, that they are human spirits, from our own or some other earth, may or may not be true. We do not think that it accords with what the Bible teaches on this subject; but as the subject is mysterious, and different views prevail among interpreters of the Bible, we do not see that it is of any great importance one way or the other. Some persons, we know, hold the view who have no sympathy with Swedenborg's revelations.

The reasons given by Prof. Bush for accepting Swedenborg's view of the atonement have force only as against a perverted representation of the theory of the Protestant Church. The doctrine of justification by faith, as Prof. Bush had been taught it, and of the atonement according to the juridical theory, would naturally give way before Swedenborg's doctrine. But let the atonement as held by the Protestant Church be properly represented, and we have all that is good in Swedenborgianism, without its fatal errors. Here, we believe, lies one of the greatest dangers in Swedenborg's system, and it is the more dangerous because it contains so much truth.

It denies the whole idea of making satisfaction for man's sin and guilt in *any sense*. Christ, in making atonement for our sins, acted only in the character of God, and not also of man. True, He was in the form of man, but He did not in any sense take the place of man in relation to God. He took this place only in relation to the hells, the infernal world. He made no satisfaction to the law which man had broken, and there is no such thing now as justification by faith.

And this brings us to another point closely connected with this, viz: Swedenborg's view of the Trinity and the Person of Christ. He denies a trinity of persons in the Godhead, and hence must deny also the true mediation of Christ. The error here consists not merely in rejecting the church's definition of three persons. The word person as used to set forth the *hypostases* in the Godhead, is objectionable, we know, to many who hold firmly to the doctrine of the Trinity, and Prof. Bush quotes some authorities to shew this. But Swedenborg sets aside the fact of the Trinity, as well as the doctrine and definition. He has a kind of trinity in the Godhead, that is a trinity in Christ, who is the only person in the

Godhead, but not in any sense in which the Christian Church of all ages, *ubique, semper, et ab omnibus*, has held it. This error, we believe, nullifies the real and true mediation of Christ, and overthrows the fact of the atonement. For, denying the Trinity, he must also deny the accepted faith of the Church in regard to the incarnation and the constitution of the person of Christ. Christ is not the God-man, that is true God and true man in one person. "For if He were a man precisely in the sense in which we are men—*having a human soul as well as a human body*—then there is no conceivable ground on which He could justly be denominated God, except by the *external adjunction* of the divine to the human nature. . . . In other words, must He not have had a divine spirit or soul enveloped in a human body? . . ." Swedenborg therefore speaks of the incarnation as that "by which Jehovah *sent Himself* into the world, and if the above view be correct, this is in fact implied in its being said that the Father *sent the Son* into the world."

We would say just the opposite. The idea of God joining Himself merely to a human *body* would be an external adjunction; it would not be an incarnation, for, in that case God would join Himself to only a portion of man, and that portion which is most external, that portion which is not the true essence of man. Here we reach the most fatal error of Swedenborg—the denial of the incarnation. What is a human body without a human soul? How can we separate between the two? We might perhaps think of a human soul without a human body, but a body without a soul is a corpse.

And this comes from Swedenborg's doctrine of *correspondences*, which is essentially dualistic. There is no organic union between soul and body, but only a union of correspondence. In the same way there is no organic union between the natural and the supernatural, any more than there is between substance and shadow, and so Christ does not really bind the whole creation, natural and supernatural in one—He is no true Mediator. And how, in this view, could He be a High Priest who could be touched with a feeling of our infirmities, if He did not suffer in a human soul as well as a human body? And how could He say "my *soul* is exceeding sorrowful!" (my divinity is exceeding sorrowful!) "even unto death." And how could He say: "Into Thy hands I commend my Spirit?" Was it His divinity which He commended to God in His dying hour?

In this connection we do not perhaps travel out of the record to notice Swedenborg's view of the Mahometan heaven. In treating of the subject of polygamy both among the Mahometans and Jews, he asserts that it is not sinful for them, because the true Church was not with them. Indeed his views on this whole subject are

very liberal, so much so as to allow a man, under certain circumstances, to keep a concubine in addition to a wife. He says: "The Mahometans also have their heaven; for all in the universe, who acknowledge a God, and from a religious notion shun evils as sins against Him, are saved." They have a superior and an inferior heaven. Those in the inferior heaven live with several wives and concubines as in the world; but those who renounce concubines and live with one wife, are elevated into the superior Mahometan heaven. Swedenborg saw the Mahometan heaven on one occasion, but what he says of it need not be repeated here, for it would not be to edification.

We refer to this point to show that he does not hold the Scriptural conception of the mediation of Christ. Salvation, complete salvation, with him consists in receiving love and truth from the Lord; but those who do not know Christ, or who will not accept Him, as the Mohametans, nevertheless have a heaven also prepared for them, and receive life from the Lord in a way different from that in which Christians receive it. And this because Christ is the absolute and only Lord, the only person in the Godhead, and therefore He gives life to men in all religions, where there is sincere obedience to the truth. What will become of the heathen and false religionists, those among them who try to live virtuous lives, we need not say; but our Scriptures teach us that there is no other name given under heaven among men whereby they can be saved but the name of Christ.

Swedenborg's doctrine of the resurrection, rather his denial of a general resurrection and judgment at the last day, contradicts, as we think, the teaching of the Bible also. The second coming of Christ, he says, has already taken place. It occurred in the eighteenth century, and he was commissioned to preach that the New Jerusalem has already descended out of heaven. Dark and dreary would this leave the future for the world. Christ came, and no one knew it but Swedenborg; whereas the Scripture declares that every eye shall see Him. There was no perceptible change in the world's history, no help for a suffering Church, no deliverance for waiting saints, no new heavens and new earth, no judgment in a separation of the good and the bad, and yet the glorious second coming has taken place. There is nothing further for the Church to hope and pray for. For all we know, history is to go on without a conclusion. This, we say, makes the future dark and dreary indeed.

But, no, it does not make it so; for Swedenborg made no new revelation. It was his notion, his belief; but his notion and belief do not make things to be as he conceived them to be, any more than the fancies of a dream are objective realities. But our space compels us to stop.

We have read this pamphlet with interest, as bringing into a small compass the system of Swedenborg by a Swedenborgian, and one who is confessed to have been one of its most able expounders and defenders. His representation of it is sent forth by the Swedenborgian Society as correct and able. What is good and true in it, and there is certainly much that is good and true there, we have in the old faith of the Church, without what we regard as its fatal errors.

TEXT-BOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY. By Dr. John Henry Kurtz, Professor of Theology in the University of Dorpat: Author of "A Manual of Sacred History," "The Bible and Astronomy," etc., etc. Two Volumes in One, Revised, with Corrections and Additions from the Seventh German Edition. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., No. 710 Arch Street. 1875.

This valuable text-book, published in this country in two volumes in English, in 1860, is now re-published in one volume. Of its merits it is hardly necessary to speak, for they have been acknowledged wherever it has been used. It has its defects; but as a help to the student of Church history, its merits far outweigh them. There is not much attention paid to epochs, but to some extent they are regarded. We have recommended it as one among other text-books to be placed in the hands of students, to be consulted in connection with lectures.

We see that the translator has corrected the barbarous mistake on page 261, 2d vol., where the word "shoulderminology" occurs. It is now printed "scholastic terminology." An Addenda is published at the close of the work which contains some valuable material, and brings the history, at certain points, down to the present time. We think it would have been well to have given a chapter here on American Church History, as the author gives very little space to this subject in the body of the work, besides making a number of mistakes. But we cannot do all things; and we take the work as it now appears, and commend it to the general reader, and especially to students of theology. Dr. Bomberger deserves the thanks of the theological public for the service he has rendered in correcting and improving the translation.

THE DIVINE-HUMAN ELEMENTS IN THE CHURCH AND MINISTRY.

A sermon; preached at the Trinity ordination, Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Conn., May 26, 1875. By the Rev. Samuel H. Giesy, D. D., Rector of Christ Church, Norwich, Conn.

We have read this sermon with pleasure. The theme which it treats is a familiar one in the theology of our Reformed Church.

It confines itself to the general theme without introducing special denominational views. With the exception of one sentence on page 21, "They held from Christ, and by His authority from them, deacons, priests, and Bishops, in the ascending order," it does not indicate that it was preached in an Episcopal Seminary. What it says on the subject of the Church and the Christian ministry, that it is divine-human, divine as to its origin, authority and powers,—human as to the subjects, which consist of fallible and imperfect men,—must be conceded by all who believe in the Holy Catholic Church according to the Apostles' Creed.

We think the author of the sermon fails at one point to bring out the character of the ministry as an organic function in the Church, as well as an organ of Christ. He says: "In its origin the Holy Ministry is Divine. This it is, not because it stands in the Church, which is itself Divine. It does, both in point of time and fact, take precedence. The Apostolic Commission went before the Pentecostal creation. The ministry was before, and in order to the Church in its aggressive mission. It was not the product of the Church in any sense."

There is here, as well as running through the whole sermon, a sundering of what the author calls the Church and the ministry, which we think involves an error, and is not warranted by the Scriptures. The ministry is a *part* of the Church, an organic function in and of the Church, while at the same time it receives its commission and authority from Christ and not from men. It is true the Apostolic Commission went before the Pentecostal creation. But so did also the call of disciples who were not among the twelve. The one hundred and twenty on the day of Pentecost were met together as one body, and they received the baptism of the Holy Ghost simultaneously; that is, the twelve and the rest were baptized together by Christ from above. In point of fact the Church was born on the day of Pentecost, as including ministry and laity. Neither went before the other. The twelve did not receive the Spirit first,* and then baptize the rest, but both were baptized together.

Now this does not show that the ministry is not ordained from Christ, and that in the logical order the powers are not from above downward, but it *does* show that the ministry stands in the Church, not over and above it, and that it is of and from the Church, as well as from Christ. Sunder the two, and you get at last a Romish priesthood, which is a sort of independent Church in itself. The relation between ministry and laity is living, organic. The ministry does not grow out of the universal priesthood of believers in the sense that the laity appoint them to represent and exercise for them the priestly function, but the universal priesthood is the condition for a special priesthood.

It is important that this close relation between the two should be apprehended. There is a median here between the one extreme of denying all special character and divine authority for the ministry, and the other extreme of sundering it from the body of which it is an organic part. Perhaps the author would not differ in his view on this point; but he uses the word Church as though it referred only to the laity, and the ministry something apart from it. Whenever the ministry forgets this and becomes separated from the people in its idea and life, it loses its vitality, and becomes a dead function. The author brings this out beautifully in another part of the sermon where he shows that the ministry must be *human* in order to be in warm living sympathy with those to whom they minister. But this is not enough. They must not only be human as standing above the Church, but also as standing in and of it. There is an important relationship between the general and special priesthood in the Christian Church.

While agreeing with the sermon in its main features, we, of course, do not allow any necessary connection between these and the peculiar theory of the Episcopal Church in regard to the three orders, *jure divino*, in the Christian ministry. We thank the author, an old and beloved friend and brother, for sending us the sermon, and wish him abundant success in his work in the holy ministry.

THE HOLY BIBLE, According to the Authorized Version (A. D. 1611), with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation by Bishops and Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M. A., Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. Vol. V. Isaiah—Jeremiah—Lamentations. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Company. 1875.

THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION, 1517 to 1648. By Ludwig Häusser. Edited by Wilhelm Oncken, Professor of History at the University of Giessen. Translated by Mrs. G. Sturge. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1874.

DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE ZEITALTER DER REFORMATION VON LEOPOLD VON RAUKE. 3 Vols. Leipzig, Verlag von Dunker und Humblot. 1873.

The first of the above-named works is a continuation of the Speaker's Commentary, by Bishops and other clergy of the Anglican Church. Four volumes have preceded it, namely: Vol. I., on the Pentateuch; Vols. II. and III., on the historical books

from Joshua to Esther; Vol. IV., on Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Solomon. The work thus far has met with a favorable reception. It presents the results of the latest and best Biblical study and criticism, without being encumbered by multitudinous notes. The Common Version is placed at the top of the page, and the numerous corrections of its renderings are scattered among the expository notes below. In this last volume, the first part, on Isaiah's prophecies, is by W. Kay, D. D., Rector of Great Leghs. The second part, on the prophecies of Jeremiah and Lamentations, is by R. Paine Smith, D. D., Dean of Canterbury.

The second work we have had for some time, but, so far as we can remember, no notice of it has appeared in this REVIEW. It contains a course of lectures, 49 in number, delivered by Häusser at Heidelberg, in 1859-60, which were taken down in short-hand by the editor, Wilhelm Oncken. The lectures preserve the animated and popular style in which they were delivered, and are valuable mainly for giving a full and graphic history of the secular side of the Reformation, the movements that took place in the political world during that period. In this respect it complements the history by Prof. Fisher, of Yale College, published several years ago. It brings the history of the Reformation down to the close of the Thirty Years' War, of which it presents a graphic outline. Like the work of Dr. Fisher, it omits any reference to the origin of the German Reformed Church in the Palatinate. This seems very strange, though it may be more accountable in Häusser, who is so largely concerned with political events, than in Fisher. Certainly the origin of the Reformed Church in the Palatinate, with the formation of the Heidelberg Catechism, is quite as important an event, ecclesiastically, as the Synod of Dort and the Articles there produced. Those who wish to extend their reading still further, especially on the political aspects of the Reformation, will find the material in the work of Rauke—in three vols.—each containing over seven hundred pages.

